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In recent years, there have been countless calls for reversing the
rise in irresponsibility in American society.' Calls for restoring per-
sonal responsibility in both private and political life sound from both
of the major political parties as well as from various cultural critics,
pundits, and academics.2 Proponents of a return to personal responsi-
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1. See e.g., MacNeil/Lehrer News Hour (PBS television broadcast, July 10, 1995)
(LEXIS, News library, Script file) (interviewing political analysts and public officials on the
question why "personal responsibility" has become such a "hot political theme"). Else-
where, I have offered a critical assessment of the role attributed to rights and "rights talk"
in the decline of personal responsibility. Linda C. McClain, Rights and Irresponsibility, 43
DuKE LJ. 989 (1994).
2. From the Democratic side, see, e.g., MacNeil/Lehrer News Hour, supra note 1
(broadcasting segment of a speech by President Clinton concerning personal responsibil-
ity); David E. Anderson, Political World "Too Secular," President Says, WASH. PoST, Sept.
4, 1993, at D6 (quoting President Clinton's call for a "new ethic of personal and family and
community responsibility"); Excerpts from the Platform: A "New Covenant" With Ameri-
cans, N.Y. TIMES, July 15, 1992, at A10 (charging the Republican Party with a twelve-year
"nightmare" of "irresponsibility and neglect"). From the Republican side, see, e.g., Ging-
rich Says English Must Be the "Common Language," N.Y. TIMES, June 8, 1995, at A22
(reporting that Speaker of the House Newt Gingrich stated that the United States had
indulged in "a couple of decades of irresponsibility" and called for a new "age of responsi-
bility"). The "Responsive Communitarian" movement associated with Amitai Etzioni,
Mary Ann Glendon, and former Clinton advisor William Galston has adherents among
academic, political, and other public figures across the political spectrum (including David
Blankenhorn and Barbara Dafoe Whitehead, discussed infra Part I.A). The movement
proclaims a need to correct an imbalance between rights and responsibilities. The Respon-
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bility wage their battle on numerous fronts, advocating a cultural
revolution, a moral revival, and a recovery of "virtue" to bring about a
reformation of attitudes and behaviors regarded as troublesome.
3
Many voices now urge that law and public policy should encourage, or
require, personal responsibility and should no longer tolerate, much
less reward, irresponsibility.
A prime target in the campaign for personal responsibility is pro-
creative irresponsibility, or "irresponsible" reproduction. In the rhet-
oric of irresponsibility, reproductive behaviors and choices which are
deemed irresponsible serve as an indicator of moral decline, social
breakdown, and pathology.4 The cluster of behaviors and choices that
have been labelled "irresponsible" includes, but is not limited to, "ille-
gitimacy," single-parent families, divorce, abortion, and adolescent
sexual activity. The frequent and often impassioned invocation of "il-
legitimacy" as a crisis, an epidemic, and the most urgent social prob-
lem of the day suggests that families begun and continued outside of
marriage-overwhelmingly families consisting of a woman and her
children-are the primary problem.5 However, some voices express a
broader concern about all children growing up in single-parent fami-
sive Communitarian Platform: Rights and Responsibilities, RESPONSrVE COMMUNITY, Win-
ter 1991/92, at 4 [hereinafter Platform]. See McClain, supra note 1, at 990-91 (discussing
prominent figures associated with the Responsive Communitarian movement and its basic
tenets); see also Suzanna Sherry, Responsible Republicanism: Educating for Citizenship,
62 U. CHI. L. REV. 131, 132 (1995) (stating that reconciliation of rights and republicanism
requires attention to individual responsibilities).
3. The Responsive Communitarian movement appeals to "values" that we all share
and calls for a "moral revival." See generally AMITAI ETzIONI, THE SPIRIT OF COMMU-
NITY: RIGHTS, RESPONSIBILITIES, AND THE COMMUNITARIAN AGENDA (1993) (holding soci-
ety can attain a recommitment to moral values and responsibility without puritanical
excesses). For proposals to restore virtue, see GERTRUDE HIMMELFARB, THE DE-MORALI-
ZATION OF SOcIETY: FROM VICTORIAN VIRTUES TO MODERN VALUES (1994); THE BOOK
OF VIRTUES (William J. Bennett ed., 1993). Himmelfarb contrasts "virtues," which were
"fixed and certain" for the Victorians, with "values," which today connote moral relativ-
ism. HIMMELFARB, supra, at 12-18. Cf WILLIAM A. GALSTON, LIBERAL PURPOSES (1991)
(theorizing that the modem liberal state is energized by public purposes which require the
practice of liberal virtues). For favorable invocation of Himmelfarb by political leaders
advocating the use of shame and stigma to reduce out-of-wedlock births, see Katharine Q.
Seelye, Gingrich Looks to Victorian Age to Cure Today's Social Failings, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
14, 1995, at A19.
4. See HIMMELFARB, supra note 3, at 222-24,237-40 (associating an increase in "ille-
gitimacy" and teenage sexual activity with the decline of society's "moral condition"); WIL-
LIAM J. BENNETT, THE INDEX OF LEADING CULTURAL INDICATORS 72-77 (1994)
(including statistics on, inter alia, teen-age pregnancies, out-of-wedlock births, and abortion
as cultural indicators of social pathologies and national decline).
5. See, e.g., Charles Murray, The Coming White Underclass, WALL ST. J., Oct. 29,
1993, at A14 (arguing that "white illegitimacy" is the new trend threatening the United
States).
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lies, including not only children whose parents were never married but
also those whose parents are separated or divorced.6 Although the
debate frequently focuses upon women's behaviors and choices, some
who sound the alarm about single-parent families perceive the crisis in
terms of "fatherless America" and of men's abandonment of the role
and responsibilities of fatherhood.7
This public alarm and indignation about "irresponsible" repro-
duction reaches a fevered pitch when such reproduction implicates the
public fisc through welfare programs. In the recent debates over wel-
fare reform, lawmakers and others made repeated appeals for legisla-
tive change that would end "illegitimacy," restore personal
responsibility, and get people (women and adolescent females) to stop
having children that they cannot afford to support without public
assistance. These debates led to Congress' passage of the Personal Re-
sponsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1995,8 major legislation that
would dramatically alter the social welfare state in the United States.
Although President Clinton vetoed that legislation, it is likely that
6. See SARA McLANAHAN & GARY SANDEFTUR, GROWING Up WrrH A SINGLE PAR-
ENT. WHAT HURTS, WHAT HELPs (1994) (discussing disadvantages to all children who
grow up in households with only one biological parent); William A. Galston, Needed- A
Not-So-Fast Divorce Law, N.Y. TIMEs, Dec. 27, 1995, at All (arguing that society pays
inadequate attention to divorce as a "disruptive force" that "harms children").
7. See, eg., DAVID BLANKENHoRN, FATHERLESS AMERICA 1 (1995) (arguing that
"[flatherlessness is the most harmful demographic trend of this generation," the "leading
cause of declining well being," and "the engine driving our most urgent social problems").
8. H.R. 4, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). On March 24, 1995, the House of Repre-
sentatives passed the Personal Responsibility Act. On September 19, 1995, the Senate
passed an amended version, the Work Opportunity Act of 1995. The House of Represent-
atives rejected the Senate's amended version and a conference committee approved a com-
promise version of the two bills, the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of
1995. H.R. 4, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (1995). The House and Senate, voting largely on
partisan lines, with Republicans supporting and Democrats rejecting the compromise bill,
approved the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1995. See Robert
Pear, House Sends Senate an Overhaul of the Welfare System, N.Y. TMs, Dec. 22, 1995, at
A37; Robert Pear, Welfare Bill Cleared by Congress and Now Awaits Clinton's Veto, N.Y.
TimEs, Dec. 23, 1995, at 1. On January 9, 1996, President Clinton vetoed the Act, saying
that it did "'too little to move people from welfare to work' and made excessive cuts in
welfare spending." Robert Pear, G.O.P.'s Plan for Welfare Draws a Veto, N.Y. TmsES, Jan.
10, 1996, at C19. The Personal Responsibility Act originated in the House Republicans'
Contract With America, as legislation to implement the Contract's approach to welfare
reform. CoI'mAcr Wrrui AMERICA: THm BoLD PLAN BY REP. NEWT GINGRICH, REP.
DICK ARMnY AND T=E HousE REPUBLICANS TO CHANGE T=E NATION 65-90 (Ed Gilles-
pie & Bob Schellhas eds., 1994) (describing the Personal Responsibility Act).
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whatever legislation emerges will embody similar concerns about per-
sonal responsibility and "illegitimacy." 9
In this Article, I will critically evaluate the rhetoric of irresponsi-
ble reproduction, elaborating on the cluster of reproductive choices
and behaviors that is deemed "irresponsible" and analyzing why these
particular reproductive choices and behaviors are deemed irresponsi-
ble. I argue that the current rhetoric of irresponsible reproduction
cannot serve as an adequate basis for serious public debate about re-
production and responsibility or for changing law and public policy.
Its models are flawed, reflect a problematic gender ideology and
troublesome stereotypes about people in poverty, and rely upon re-
ductive accounts of human motivation in the area of reproductive be-
havior. Even on its own terms, the rhetoric contains significant
internal tensions which complicate its translation into law and public
policy.10 Moreover, the focus upon personal responsibility in the diag-
nosis of social ills ignores issues of collective responsibility. In my cri-
tique of this rhetoric, I focus especially on its gender assumptions. I
argue that feminist analyses of how issues of responsibility and irre-
sponsibility feature in women's reproductive and mothering exper-
iences offer a valuable corrective to the current rhetoric and should
inform serious public conversation about reproduction and
responsibility.
In Part I, I explicate the problem of "irresponsible" reproduction,
examining how proponents of personal responsibility distinguish be-
tween responsible and irresponsible reproduction. Although repro-
duction within marriage serves as the best proxy for responsible
reproduction in this discourse, and nonmarital reproduction for irre-
sponsible reproduction, such models prove to be both over- and un-
derinclusive. The rhetoric reveals three paradigmatic models of
irresponsibility-the single mother, the welfare mother, and the teen
mother-and three corresponding aspects of irresponsibility-immo-
rality, unaccountability, and incapacity." However, there is slippage
9. As this article goes to press, Congress has just held hearings on a welfare proposal
endorsed by the National Governors' Association. See Robert Pear, House Democrats
Assail Welfare Plan Backed by Governors, N.Y. TImES, Feb. 21, 1996, at A16.
10. This aspect of the rhetoric of reproductive irresponsibility is well illustrated by the
intersection of the campaign against "illegitimacy" and the abortion issue. See infra Part
II.B for further discussion.
11. Elsewhere, I have argued that, in assessing the irresponsibility critique of rights, it
is useful to focus upon two distinct senses of responsibility: responsibility as autonomy
(self-governance, or entrusting the right-holder to exercise moral responsibility in making
decisions guided by conscience) and responsibility as accountability (being answerable to
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among these categories and I attempt to untangle exactly what marks
certain reproduction as irresponsible (e.g., the absence of marriage,
the absence of financial resources, or the imposition of various social
costs). I also discuss the charge that the moral deregulation of law
and public policy has fostered procreative irresponsibility.
In Part H, I offer a critical assessment of the rhetoric of irrespon-
sible reproduction. Using the recent legislative debates over welfare
reform as an example, I argue that the procreation stories told in pub-
lic policy discourse are simplistic, reductive, and inadequate.
Although reductive accounts of how governmental assistance provides
incentives to personal irresponsibility may seem to offer a simple and
satisfying justification for adopting the means to end that irresponsi-
bility, it is irresponsible to premise policies upon them. I raise criti-
cisms of the gender ideology that undergirds prominent conservative
critiques of welfare as well as the emerging "responsible fatherhood"
movement. The range of assumptions about female and male natures
and motivations embedded in this rhetoric has serious implications for
family forms and public policy, and is a ripe topic for feminist
analysis.' 2
Examination of the rhetoric of irresponsible reproduction also
reveals that agreement upon the appropriate social, political, and legal
response to the problem of "irresponsible" reproduction may prove
elusive. In Part II, I illustrate this point with a conflict played out
during the recent debates over welfare reform. A central charge in
these debates is that welfare law and policy have fostered irresponsi-
bility and unfairness: that welfare recipients procreate at the expense
of taxpayers who, in contrast, have children only if they can afford
them. Thus, recent attempts to combat the rates of "illegitimate"
births and welfare dependency-"irresponsible" behaviors induced by
welfare-advocate doing so by altering the incentives and excluding
certain categories of mothers and their children from public assist-
ance. However, these proposals elicited strong opposition, even from
many who shared concern over "illegitimacy." The proposals were
objected to on the ground that such "irresponsible" policies lacked an
empirical foundation and would have the inevitable and immoral con-
others for the manner and consequences of the exercise of one's rights). McClain, supra
note 1, at 994.
12. Indeed, some feminist legal scholars have argued that single mothers are labelled
"deviant" and viewed as threatening precisely because their singleness challenges patriar-
chal ideology about the family. See MARTHA ALBERTSON FiNEMAN, THE NEUTERED




sequences of increasing the incentives for poor women to have abor-
tions and/or hurting children that such women would, in any event,
bear. This tension between the public policy goals of reducing "illegit-
imacy" and favoring childbirth over abortion offers a window into the
conflicting legislative measures and public policy messages concerning
what responsible and irresponsible reproduction is. This tension
reveals the double binds faced by women making reproductive
choices.
I conclude Part II by contending that in order adequately to an-
swer questions about responsible and irresponsible reproduction we
must also address underlying questions about the respective roles of
personal and collective responsibility for the existence of poverty and
for the care and support of children. In the abstract, the notion that
people have a responsibility to provide for their children seems an
unobjectionable ideal or principle. However, the further claim that
"responsible" families procreate without any expectation of govern-
mental assistance and are unfairly forced to subsidize "irresponsible"
welfare-dependent families contains a number of problematic assump-
tions. This emphasis upon personal responsibility too easily obscures
issues of collective responsibility and social justice.
As the foregoing discussion illustrates, a serious public conversa-
tion about reproduction and responsibility, and especially how law
and public policy should foster responsibility, must include important
dimensions which are now missing. In Part III, I argue that feminist
analysis of the concepts of responsibility and irresponsibility would
enrich such a conversation by focusing on such topics as the impact of
gender inequality, male irresponsibility, and violence against women
upon women's family choices and the extent to which single mother-
hood should be viewed as a deliberate choice.13 I also address ten-
sions within feminist work about how to offer adequate accounts of
women's choices and behaviors in the areas of sex, reproduction, and
motherhood. I argue that a continuum model of agency and responsi-
bility offers a useful framework for thinking about such issues and de-
veloping alternative models of responsible reproduction. Feminist
discourse about mothering and abortion contributes to such models. I
conclude by examining the role of critical evaluation and judgment in
such a project.
13. Martha Fineman has urged that feminists view single motherhood as a "deliberate
choice." FINEMAN, supra note 12, at 125. See infra text accompanying notes 382-89 for
discussion.
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I. Identifying the Problem of "Irresponsible" Reproduction
A. The Rhetoric of "Irresponsible" Reproduction
In assessing the rhetoric of "irresponsible" reproduction, a
threshold question is: What activities constitute procreative irrespon-
sibility and why? In answering this question, it is helpful to begin with
a working model of what, as gleaned from the rhetoric, constitutes
responsible reproduction. "Responsible" reproduction, first and fore-
most, takes place within marriage, the traditional, "legitimate" family
form. Such reproduction occurs where parents are self-sufficient and
can meet their "private" responsibility for material support of their
family without public assistance. They are adults who possess the ma-
turity or mental and moral capacity to make responsible decisions
about reproduction. In contrast, "irresponsible" reproduction takes
place outside of marriage. It occurs where parents are not self-suffi-
cient but instead, encouraged by the incentive of welfare benefits,
shift the financial costs of parenting to others (e.g., the taxpayer-sup-
ported welfare state), or it is undertaken by teens, persons who do not
possess the maturity or capacity to make morally responsible repro-
ductive decisions, let alone serve as responsible parents. I will demon-
strate that these contrasting models of responsible and irresponsible
reproduction are both over- and underinclusive.
The rhetoric of procreative irresponsibility suggests three primary
targets of the charge: "single mothers," "welfare mothers," and "teen
mothers." My initial formulation, which focuses upon women and ig-
nores men, echoes the discourse. However, each of these three para-
digms could be reformulated in terms of male irresponsibility. For
example, one could target as irresponsible "single fathers" who do not
marry or remain part of the familial households of the women they
impregnate, "deadbeat dads" who fail to-meet their financial as well
as other responsibilities to their children, and "promiscuous" or
"predatory" males who prematurely engage in reproductive sex with
teen females or who sexually exploit or abuse them.14 In fact, men are
not wholly absent as targets of the rhetoric of procreative irresponsi-
bility, as the increasing condemnation of the "deadbeat dad" suggests,
and there is a growing call for "responsible fatherhood."' 5 Yet, there
14. See Jennifer Steinhauer, Study Cites Adult Males for Most Teen-Age Births, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 2, 1995, at A10 (reporting that at least half the babies born to teenage girls are
being fathered by adults); U.S. Finds Heavy Toll of Rapes on Young, N.Y. TiMEs, June 23,
1994, at A12 (reporting that girls under eighteen are victims of more than half the rapes
reported to police). Such adult men also violate statutory rape laws.
15. See infra Part II.A.3 for discussion.
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are significant differences in why mothers and fathers are deemed to
be irresponsible and in the social opprobrium attached to each.
The single mother, the welfare mother, and the teen mother may
coincide in particular women, and the rhetoric of irresponsible repro-
duction often erroneously conflates all single mothers into one undif-
ferentiated stereotype. However, I will separate them analytically to
illustrate how they exemplify three aspects or types of irresponsibility:
immorality, unaccountability, and incapacity. The single mother de-
fies ideas of traditional sexual morality and of morally responsible
choice because she is a mother outside of marriage (this is especially
true if her motherhood originated in out-of-wedlock childbearing).
The welfare mother's irresponsibility lies in her unaccountability. She
fails to take responsibility for the consequences of her actions because
she reproduces and then shifts the financial costs of rearing her chil-
dren to the public. The teen mother signifies irresponsibility through
incapacity or immaturity. As the phrases "children having children"
and "babies having babies" suggest,16 she procreates and becomes a
parent without having attained a threshold level of maturity and
moral responsibility. But there is considerable crossover among these
aspects of irresponsibility, particularly in the association of poverty
not only with sexual immorality, but also with the violation of moral
principles of self-sufficiency. At its broadest, the rhetoric often criti-
cizes all single-family households for imposing costs upon society and
questions the capacity of all single mothers to be effective parents
without a man in the household.
17
At the outset, it may be useful to frame these three aspects of
perceived "irresponsibility" in terms of alleged violation of duties.
The term "irresponsibility" may connote a shirking, or heedless dis-
missal, of duties. Within this framework, the single mother is irre-
sponsible because she shirks her duty of bringing a child into a stable,
two-parent, marital family or avoiding conception and childbirth (if
not sexual activity itself). The welfare mother is irresponsible because
16. See Special Report: The Baby Trap, PEOPLE, Oct. 24, 1994, at 38 (featuring cover
story title, "Babies Having Babies"); Diana M. Pearce, "Children Having Children": Teen-
age Pregnancy and Public Policy From the Woman's Perspective, in THE POLrrIcs OF PREG-
NANCY 46 (Annette Lawson & Deborah L. Rhode eds., 1993).
17. In a recent article, Nancy Dowd critically assesses the justifications for stigma-
tizing female-headed, single-parent families. These justifications consist of arguments that
such families are poor, "psychologically unhealthy," and immoral. Nancy E. Dowd, Stig-
matizing Single Parents, 18 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 19, 26 (1995). Dowd further argues that
the myths and stereotypes on which these justifications rest hide "implicit stories of race
and gender that reek of oppression." Id. at 45.
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she breaches her duty of securing a tenable, non-publicly financed sit-
uation for her child or avoiding conception and childbirth in the first
place. The teen mother is irresponsible because she disregards the
duty of ensuring that she is old and mature enough to provide proper
parenting to the child she causes to come into the world (including
financial provision). In my critical assessment of the rhetoric, I will
return to these notions of duty.
(1) The Single Mother
The rhetoric of procreative irresponsibility is replete with refer-
ences to crises concerning the rise in "illegitimacy" or "out-of-wed-
lock" births; the increase in "single-parent," "broken," or "nonintact"
families; and the problem of "the failure of families to form."'18 In an
often-quoted essay, Senator Daniel P. Moynihan argues that America
is "defining deviancy down" by redefining as normal certain behaviors
that were previously regarded as deviant.19 He suggests that the fail-
ure to regard the rising rate of births to unmarried mothers in single-
parent households as a social crisis is a prime example of this phenom-
enon and maintains that such households in turn create other vexing
social problems.20 In another popular article, Charles Murray con-
tends that "illegitimacy is the single most important social problem of
our time-more important than crime, drugs, poverty, illiteracy, wel-
fare or homelessness because it drives everything else."'21 Similarly,
William Bennett claims that "illegitimacy" is "the single most destruc-
tive social pathology in modern American society"2 and that America
is "headed for ruin if these numbers on illegitimacy continue."2 3 For
those who sound this alarm, part of the crisis is that the demographic
trends cut across racial, ethnic, and class lines and that rates of
18. Terminology such as "nonintact" or "broken" families assumes that any family
deviating from the model of a marital, two biological parent family is incomplete or lack-
ing, regardless of a family's means of formation or its own self-definition (for example, an
unmarried woman's deliberate decision to raise a child on her own or a gay or lesbian
couple's decision to raise a child).
19. Daniel Patrick Moynihan, Defining Deviancy Down, 62 AM. SCHOLAR 17, 19
(1993).
20. ld. at 21-26.
21. Murray, supra note 5, at A14; see also Mickey Kaus, Bastards, NEw REPuBmc,
Feb. 21, 1994, at 16 (reporting emerging conservative consensus around Murray's claim).
22. Illegitimacy and Welfare: Hearings on H.R. 4 Before the Subcomm. on Human
Resources, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. 1 (Jan. 20, 1995) (written welfare testimony of William J.
Bennett) [hereinafter Testimony of Bennett].
23. Cheryl Wetzstein, Abortion Tops 'Family Cap' Debate; Policy Feared as Coercion
to End Pregnancy, WASH. TiMEs, May 1, 1995, at A6 (quoting Bennett's April testimony
before Congress).
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nonmarital procreation among white Americans are now approaching
those of African Americans of thirty years ago (when Moynihan ini-
tially sounded the alarm).24 Along these lines, the proposed Personal
Responsibility Act identified "the reduction of out-of-wedlock births"
as an important governmental interest to be advanced by welfare re-
form. The Act contained numerous assertions about the importance
of marriage and the negative consequences of "illegitimacy"-some
differentiated according to race-as contributing to "the crisis in our
Nation. '25 Thus, the discourse overtly uses racial terms to warn of
dangerous crossovers.26 Such warnings also contain the offensive
premise that social problems are tolerable so long as they affect only
minorities, but warrant society's serious attention when they spill over
to mainstream (white) society.
27
What is irresponsible about reproduction by single mothers? Is it
simply the fact that it takes place outside of marriage or is it some-
thing more? In the first instance, such behavior is condemned as im-
moral. As former Education Secretary William Bennett recently
testified before Congress, it violates "an important moral principle"
that "having children out-of-wedlock is wrong," independent of any
economic arguments against it.28 It is the deviation from traditional
24. Murray, supra note 5, at A14; Testimony of Bennett, supra note 22, at 1-2. Murray
and Bennett use as a benchmark Moynihan's earlier report which cautioned that the preva-
lence of female-headed households within the African-American community set that com-
munity apart from white America and linked that "unstable" family structure to a number
of problems faced by African Americans. See OFFICE OF POLICY PLANNING AND RE-
SEARCH, U.S. DEPT. OF LABOR, THE NEGRO FAMILY: THE CASE FOR NATIONAL ACTION
9 (1965).
25. H.R. 4, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 100 (1995) ("Sense of the Congress"). Interest-
ingly, although the Senate's proposed amendment to the Personal Responsibility Act, the
Work and Opportunity Act of 1995, and the compromise bill approved by Congress (the
Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1995) contain findings about the
value of marriage and the negative consequences of single-parent families, they do not
differentiate based upon, or mention, race. See Work Opportunity Act of 1995, H.R. 4,
104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 101 (proposed § 406, Promoting Responsible Parenting); Personal
Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1995, H.R. 4, § 101 ("Findings").
26. See Murray, supra note 5, at A14. But the theme of racial cross-over works the
other way in arguments that moral rebellion by the "cultural elite" or "haves" (whites) has
devastated the poor and "have nots" (inner-city blacks). See infra note 37 and accompany-
ing text.
27. See Murray, supra note 5, at A14.
28. Testimony of Bennett, supra note 22, at 3. See also MacNeil/Lehrer News Hour
(PBS television broadcast, Aug. 8, 1995) (LEXIS, News library, Script file) (remarks of
Senator John Ashcroft that "illegitimacy is a moral wrong" and that it is "morally wrong
and morally indefensible" that children do not have or know their fathers); Dowd, supra
note 17, at 42-45 (critically discussing history of "morality justification" for stigmatizing
single parents).
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sexual morality and a two-parent family structure, along with the ab-
sence of an appropriate paternal role, that renders this behavior im-
moral, irresponsible, and dangerous. Feminist legal theorist Martha
Fineman ably illustrates that the single mother features as "deviant"
in such public policy discourse precisely because of her "singleness"
and the absence of a man in her family.29
Furthermore, the increasing societal acceptance of such "deviant"
families is seen as part of the crisis. As political philosopher and for-
mer Clinton advisor William Galston cautions, there has been a grow-
ing "relaxation of social, cultural and moral stigma against out-of-
wedlock births," so that many Americans no longer believe that peo-
ple who procreate outside of marriage should be "subject to moral
reproach." 30 Because of these changes in mores, or perhaps because
of many Americans' lack of a clear set of moral values and norms,
some critics of "irresponsible" reproduction urge that the battle or
cultural war must be waged at the level of moral suasion and social
sanction and that we must overcome our reluctance to make moral
judgments critical of such behavior.31 Some even suggest that such a
battle may be more important and efficacious than any new law or
policy.32
Former Vice President Dan Quayle's "Murphy Brown" speech
was an instructive sally in this cultural war. Quayle publicly con-
demned the popular television series "Murphy Brown" for glorifying
single motherhood and "mocking the importance of fathers" by al-
lowing Murphy to have a child as a single mother and "calling [this
conduct] just another 'lifestyle' choice. '33 Quayle proclaimed:
29. FnqEMAN, supra note 12, at 101-25.
30. William Raspberry, Decline of the Family, ATLANTA CONST., Mar. 2, 1994, at A10
(quoting from Galston speech). See also HIMmELFARB, supra note 3, at 236. For one re-
cent example, the decline of stigma concerning living together without being married, see
Jennifer Steinhauer, No Marriage, No Apologies, N.Y. TIMras, July 6, 1995, at Cl.
31. See IhMMELFARB, supra note 3, at 239-42; see also Seelye, supra note 3, at A19
(reporting that Gingrich, citing Himmelfarb's work, argued that using moral leadership to
shame-people could reduce out-of-wedlock births and other social problems).
32. See Seelye, supra note 3, at A19 (reporting Gingrich's observations, in the context
of attacking out-of-wedlock births, that using "moral force" against child abusers and other
"scourges of society" matters "at least as much as the law does" and that "I didn't say at all
you had to translate moral force into running around and using the law to brand people");
Jonathan Alter & Pat Wingert, The Return of Shame, NEWSWEEK, Feb. 6, 1995, at 21, 25
(quoting David Blankenhorn's claim that "[a] stronger sense of shame about illegitimacy
and divorce would do more than any tax cut, or any new government program, to improve
the life circumstances of children").
33. Andrew Rosenthal, Quayle Says Riots Sprang From Lack of Family Values, N.Y.
TimEs, May 20, 1992, at Al, A20. Blankenhorn expresses concern about female-headed
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Ultimately, marriage is a moral issue that requires cultural consen-
sus and the use of social sanctions. Bearing babies irresponsibly is,
simply, wrong. Failing to support children one has fathered is
wrong. We must be unequivocal about this.
34
As Gertrude Himmelfarb writes in Quayle's defense, "precisely be-
cause she was so successful, beautiful, and affluent, [Murphy Brown]
made illegitimacy respectable and even glamorous. '35
One of the feared consequences of the decline in stigma attached
to out-of-wedlock births is that when adult women, especially promi-
nent women, have children outside of marriage without any sign of
shame or remorse, they serve as poor role models for adolescent fe-
males who are said to engage in imitative behavior.36 But unlike their
wealthier adult counterparts, it is argued, these young mothers are
likely to be or become poor, to rely upon the welfare system to sup-
port their children one generation after another, and to suffer numer-
ous other social consequences. This idea of dangerous imitation
extends to the broader, even more implausible, claim that the legacy
of the rejection of traditional moral restraints in the 1960s led by the
families fitting the so-called "Murphy Brown" pattern, exemplified by the organization
Single Mothers By Choice, because they render the father unnecessary. BLANKENHORN,
supra note 7, at 175-77.
34. Rosenthal, supra note 33, at A20.
35. HIMMELFARB, supra note 3, at 246.
36. The "uproar of protest" when Ingrid Bergman, who became pregnant by her pro-
ducer, went on the Ed Sullivan Show in the 1950s is offered as a contrasting example. See
A Firing Line Debate, Resolved&" Welfare Has Done More Harm Than Good (PBS televi-
sion broadcast, Mar. 15, 1994) (transcript at 32, on file with author) (remarks of William F.
Buckley) [hereinafter Firing Line Debate]; see also Barbara Dafoe Whitehead, Dan Quayle
Was Right, THm ATLNrrlc, Apr. 1993, at 47, 52 (describing "unwed parenthood" as 'very
much in fashion" in Hollywood).
The lament over the decline in stigma and the concern over role models and their
assumed impact upon young women cross race, sex, and party lines. See Regina Austin,
Sapphire Bound!, 1989 Wis. L. REv. 539, 564-65 (1989) (describing criticism of Liz Walker,
an unmarried black news anchorwoman who became pregnant, for the kind of role model
that she set for black teenagers); id. at 549-64 (critiquing Chambers v. Omaha Girls Club,
629 F. Supp. 925 (D. Neb. 1986), which upheld the dismissal by Girls Club (predominantly
staffed by African-American women) of an unmarried, pregnant African-American wo-
man from employment because of the role model requirements of the Club); Alter &
Wingert, supra note 32, at 25 (reporting Stanley Crouch's view that eliminating welfare will
reduce out-of-wedlock pregnancies of black teens and, as the number recedes, "it will be
easier for the beleaguered black church to fill the void and begin the long task of re-
establishing the stigma."). But see Barbara Omolade, The Unbroken Circle: A Historical
Study of Black Single Mothers and Their Families, in AT THE BOUNDARIES OF LAW 171,
181 (Martha Albertson Fineman & Nancy Sweet Thomadsen eds., 1991) (arguing that
although the black community did not historically condone nonmarital birth, it did not
ostracize unmarried mothers and their children). For criticisms of this role-model argu-
ment, see Austin, supra, at 552-58; Firing Line Debate, supra, at 32-33 (remarks of Rep.
Charles Rangel).
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middle class, or the "haves," in combination with the social welfare
programs of the Great Society, has been devastating for the poor, or
the "have nots," miring the latter in behavioral, as well as material,
poverty.37 Indeed, Quayle's speech linked "intergenerational pov-
erty" to a "poverty of values" and criticized reliance by young single
mothers on the state, instead of a husband, as a provider.
38
Some voices within the discourse suggest that the problem is not
so much a "poverty" as a "plethora" of values,39 but articles like Dan
Quayle Was Right argue that we should not be equivocal about, or
equally tolerant of, diverse family forms.40 Such diversity, the argu-
ment goes, harms children and undermines society. Notwithstanding
Quayle's focus on the nonmarital family, such articles emphasize that,
the critique of the single-parent family targets all families in which a
child will live with only one biological parent, whether created by the
absence of marriage, by divorce, or by step-parent families (adoption,
touted by some proponents of reproductive responsibility as an "es-
sential and compassionate part of welfare reform," seems to be the
exception 41). This broad critique focuses on several phenomena: the
extent to which women appear to be choosing to be single parents,
37. See Rosenthal, supra note 33, at A20 (reporting Quayle's comments that having
families helped many aging, middle-class baby boomers "recover traditional values," and
that the majority survived the "turbulent" and "unfortunate legacy of the 'boomer' genera-
tion['s]" war "against traditional values" in the 1960s, "[b]ut many of the poor, with less to
fall back on, did not"); MYRON MAGNET, THE DREAM AND THE NIGHTMARE: THE Six-
TIEs' LEGACY TO THE UNDERCLASS 16-17, 95 (1993) (arguing that the combination of the
cultural revolution launched by the "haves" against moral restraints and the social revolu-
tion brought about by the welfare programs of the Great Society had the unintended effect
of worsening the condition of the poor); HIMMELFARB, supra note 3, at 244 (invoking Mag-
net's argument). Critics of the cultural revolution of the 1960s, and particularly the sexual
revolution, point to the following contemporary consequences: promiscuity, AIDS, abor-
tion, single-parent families, "illegitimacy," and welfare dependency. See, e.g., MAGNET,
supra.
38. Excerpts From Vice President's Speech on Cities and Poverty, N.Y. TIMES, May 20,
1992, at A20. In his speech, Quayle claimed that a "poverty of values" in the inner cities
caused the Los Angeles riots following the acquittal in the Rodney King police brutality
trial. Rosenthal, supra note 33, at Al, A20.
39. MacNeil/Lehrer News Hour (PBS television broadcast, Sept. 8, 1994) (LEXIS,
News library, Script file) (remarks by William A. Galston).
40. See, eg., Whitehead, supra note 36, at 47. President Clinton himself has given
what has been interpreted as a "Dan Quayle was right" speech. See Paul Bedard, President
Sees Value in Pro-Family Strategy: Clinton, Quayle Sound Similar Themes, WASH. TIMES,
Sept. 9, 1994, at Al.
41. Testimony of Bennett, supra.note 22, at 3 (advocating making adoption easier and
describing adoption as "the best alternative we have to protect a child's interest in a
postwelfare world"); see also Murray, supra note 5, at A14 (advocating making adoption
easier as solution for nonmarital childbirth). Presumably, because the child will be raised
in a two-parent home, the absence of both biological parents is not considered harmful.
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whether from the outset or through divorce; the unprecedented de-
gree to which men appear to be abandoning the father/husband role;
and the extent to which neither women nor men hold the same atti-
tudes as in the past about the importance of family and sacrifice for
children.42 Thus, there is tension in the discourse about whether the
crisis results only from mother-headed homes caused by "illegiti-
macy," 43 or all "fatherless" households, including those created by di-
vorce or otherwise.44 While the concern about deviation from
traditional mores and the absence of shame seems most publicly visi-
ble surrounding "illegitimacy," some voices also urge a return to the
use of shame and even some legal restrictions to combat the increas-
ing social acceptance of divorce.45
(2) The Welfare Mother
A second aspect or type of irresponsibility found in the rhetoric
of irresponsible reproduction is unaccountability, vividly illustrated by
the welfare mother. In this sense, to be responsible is to be accounta-
ble or answerable for one's actions.46 In contrast with the "welfare
mother," responsible reproducers have children only if they can sup-
port them and do not expect the welfare state to assume the costs of
their reproductive decisions. In this view, it is irresponsible to bring
42. See BLANKENHORN, supra note 7; Whitehead, supra note 36.
43. In "Part 2" of his "Murphy Brown" speech, Quayle claimed that his focus then,
and now, is on "the problem of fatherless homes," but he distinguished households lacking
a father due to divorce or death from households where children "don't even know who
their father is." See Remarks of Former Vice President Dan Quayle to the Commonwealth
Club of California, Fed. News Serv., Sept. 8, 1994 (LEXIS, Nexis Library, Curnws File)
[hereinafter Remarks of Quayle].
44. See BLANKENHORN, supra note 7, at 2-3, 66-83; Whitehead, supra note 36, at 57-
60.
45. See Alter & Wingert, supra note 32, at 25 (quoting Blankenhorn urging "stronger
sense of shame" regarding illegitimacy and divorce); Whitehead, supra note 36, at 52 (con-
tending that American popular culture celebrates divorce and unwed motherhood); Gal-
ston, supra note 6, at All (advocating a two-tier system of divorce law, under which
couples with dependent children are subject to an updated fault-based system, with an
alternative of a five-year waiting period).
46. See THE BOOK OF ViRruEs, supra note 3, at 185-86 ("To 'respond' is to 'answer.'
Correspondingly, to be 'responsible' is to be 'answerable,' to be accountable .... Respon-
sible persons are mature people who have taken charge of themselves and their conduct,
who own their actions and own up to them-who answer for them.") (emphasis in origi-
nal). This conception of responsibility, as well as the conception of irresponsible conduct
as conduct that imposes costs upon others, is prominent in the "responsive communitar-
ian" critique of rights. See McClain, supra note 1, at 1008-21. In discussing the meaning of
personal responsibility, Eloise Anderson, Chair of California's Department of Social Serv-
ices, stated that "American," and not just middle class, values include the idea that you
take responsibility for and pay for your actions. MacNeil/Lehrer News Hour, supra note 1.
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children into the world if one cannot or does not provide care for, and
financially support, them.47 Indeed, John Robertson observes that,
because the United States does not face severe overpopulation, "the
main grounds for claiming that reproduction is irresponsible is where
the person(s) reproducing lack the financial means to raise offspring
or will otherwise harm their children.
'48
There is both a personal and an institutional dimension to this
notion of irresponsibility as unaccountability. The personal irrespon-
sibility manifested by the welfare mother might be described as the
state of being financially over-dependent on government. There is
also an accompanying problematic mental state of unaccountability:
the supposed attitude that it is acceptable to incur such dependency
and not to absorb the costs of one's procreative behavior. The institu-
tional claim is that welfare's benefit structure has encouraged this
unaccountability by allowing people to procreate without personally
feeling all the consequences of their actions.49 Thus, there are two
related but distinct problems: people are acting irresponsibly in
procreating without resources and not fully absorbing the conse-
quences of their behavior, and society has erred in permitting them to
act irresponsibly and failing to hold them accountable.
The attempt to address the problem of irresponsibility in both its
personal and institutional senses is dramatically illustrated by recent
legislative efforts to steer the procreative behavior of welfare recipi-
ents. Proponents of New Jersey's new welfare law, the Family Devel-
opment Program, explicitly linked a "family cap" provision to the goal
of encouraging responsible and rational reproductive decisionmak-
47. See Murray, supra note 5, at A14 ("From society's perspective, to have a baby that
you cannot care for yourself is profoundly irresponsible .... "); Work and Responsibility
Act of 1994, Detailed Summary, at 31 (Clinton Welfare Plan) (on file with author) ("The
ethic of parental responsibility is fundamental. No one should bring a child into the world
until both parents are prepared to support and nurture that child."); see also MacNeill
Lehrer News Hour, supra note 1 (broadcasting remarks by Rep. Eleanor Holmes Norton
contending.that there was consensus on welfare around the basic proposition that if you
bring a child into the world, you ought to work, but that consensus broke down in deciding
how to implement it).
48. JOHN A. ROBERTSON, CHILDREN OF CHoIcE: FREEDOM AND THE NEw REPRO-
DuCrIVE TECHNOLOGIES 31 (1994). Robertson concludes that "both grounds are seriously
inadequate as justifications for interfering with procreative choice."- ld
49. On this notion of irresponsibility, Jeffrey Lehman offers this helpful definition of
"socially irresponsible" behavior: "[b]ehavior that differs from what individuals would do if
they were forced to feel personally all of the consequences of their actions." Jeffrey S.
Lehman, To Conceptualize, To Criticize, To Defend, To Improve: Understanding America's
Welfare State, 101 YALE L.L 685, 700 (1991) (review of THEODORE R. MARMOR, ET AL.,
AMERICA'S MISUNDERSTOOD WELFARE STATE (1990)).
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ing.50 The Program renders a family ineligible for any additional
AFDC benefits for children born to a woman already on public assist-
ance. Proponents of reform argue that the old system rewarded irre-
sponsibility by paying welfare benefits regardless of family size,
encouraging people to reproduce and shift costs of childrearing to the
public. Instead, it is only fair that poor people should play by the
same rules and adhere to the same value system as working-class and
middle-class families who have to ask whether they can afford to have
a child or will need to earn additional income, and do not get an auto-
matic wage increase every time they have a child.5 1 This rationale for
capping benefits (which has survived an initial legal challenge52) fea-
tured prominently in subsequent national welfare reform efforts as a
justification for family caps and other benefit exclusions.
53
In the rhetoric about the welfare mother, marriage again serves
as a proxy for responsible reproduction. As Quayle put it: "A welfare
check is not a husband. The state is not a father. '54 Murray maintains
that until the welfare state tampered with "natural forces" by making
single-mother families economically viable, a combination of stigma,
social sanction, and legal rules about marriage kept such units, which
are "a net drain on the community's resources," to a manageable
number.55 As Fineman observes, the assumption is that the only way
a mother can avoid poverty for herself and her children is by being
linked to a father's financial resources.5 6 This assumption is evident in
such prescriptions as "the best anti-poverty program for children is a
stable intact family" or "marriage is the best anti-poverty program.
57
The other acceptable solution is to move mothers "from dependence
50. See Changes in State Welfare Reform Programs: Hearings Before the Subcomm.
on Social Security and Family Policy and Comm. on Finance, 102d Cong., 2d Sess. at 3-16
(Feb. 3, 1992) (statements of Gov. James Florio and Assemblyman Wayne Bryant) [herein-
after Testimony of Bryant].
51. Id.
52. See C.K. v. Shalala, 883 F. Supp. 991 (D.N.J. 1995), appeal docketed, No. 95-5454
(3d Cir. July 11, 1995). See infra text accompanying notes 262-65 for discussion.
53. See John H. Cushman, Jr., Rivals Criticize Bill on Welfare Offered By Dole, N.Y.
TIMES, Aug. 7, 1995, at Al, B6. See discussion of the Personal Responsibility Act and
subsequent legislation infra Parts II.A-B.
54. See Excerpts From Vice President's Speech on Cities and Poverty, supra note 38, at
A20.
55. Murray, supra note 5, at A14.
56. FINEMAN, supra note 12, at 106.
57. See GALSTON, supra note 3, at 284 (referring to "stable intact family"); David
Broder, A Meeting of the Minds on the State of the American Family, Crii. TRIB., Mar. 25,
1993, at 29 (quoting William Bennett, David Gergen, William Galston, and Barbara Dafoe
Whitehead in stressing the "alarming" condition of the American family).
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to independence, from welfare to work," thus bringing them back in
touch with and holding them accountable to American values of work
and responsibility.5 8 Of course, there is considerable tension between
proposals to encourage "responsibility" by requiring welfare mothers'
full-time participation in the paid labor force and proposals for na-
tional family policy and corporate restructuring premised on the im-
portance of children receiving care from their parents, particularly in
early childhood.59
If economic viability is the test for responsible reproduction and a
"legitimate" family, as Murray suggests, then many families headed by
mothers indeed fail the test. Families consisting of a mother and her
children have a higher rate of poverty than do two-parent families,
and a substantial number of those families in poverty receive welfare
in the form of AFDC.60 But the focus on "illegitimacy" as a cause of
welfare dependency proves underinclusive: Although a significant
number of families originating in nonmarital births receive AFDC
benefits, divorce or marital separation is the most common precipitat-
58. The President's Address: "We Heard America Shouting," N.Y. T MES, Jan. 25,
1995, at A17, A18; MacNeil/Lehrer News Hour, supra note 1 (broadcasting remarks of
Eloise Anderson concerning American values). See also Wetzstein, supra note 23, at A6
(quoting remarks of Robert Rector of the Heritage Foundation, that welfare reform "must
strongly discourage dependency and irresponsible behavior and encourage people to get
married and find work"). Some statistics suggest that marriage is the most common event
associated with women leaving AFDC (35% due to marriage, contrasted with earnings
increase (21%), and children leaving home (11%)). HousE COMM. ON WAYS AND MEANS,
103D CONG., 2D S.SS., OVERVIEW OF ENTITLEMENT PROGRAMS, 1994 GREEN BOOK:
BACKGROUND MATERIAL AND DATA ON PROGRAMS WITHIN THE JURISDICIION OF THE
COMMrITEE ON WAYS AND MEANS 451 (1994) [hereinafter 1994 GREEN BOOK]. However,
other more recent studies suggest that a greater proportion of exits from AFDC are be-
cause of work (46%) than marriage, but that two-thirds of those women who leave because
of work return to AFDC within five years. Id. at 450.
59. Compare Work and Responsibility Act of 1994, Detailed Summary, supra note 47,
at 7 (describing as a positive impact of proposed welfare reform that "thousands more
children will watch their parents go off every day to the responsibility and dignity of a real
job") and H.R: 4, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 202 (1995) (proposing mandatory 35-hour per
week work requirements by 2002 with no exceptions for mothers of young children) with
Jean Beth Elshtain, et al., Communitarian Position Paper on the Family 4-7 (undated) (on
file with author) (encouraging paid leave, flex-time, and home-work arrangements) and
Robert Pear, Governors' Draft Plan Rejects Parts of House Welfare Bill, N.Y. TIMES, Apr.
28, 1995, at A22 (describing National Governors' Association proposal objecting to House
welfare bill's 35-hour work requirement because "in our society mothers with young chil-
dren typically work only part-time").
60. See Single Women and Poverty Strongly Linked, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 1994, at 35
(citing a study's finding that "single mothers" and "displaced homemakers" are four times
as likely to live in poverty as the population as a whole); Dowd, supra note 17, at 23-24
(giving statistics that 53% of female-headed families are poor).
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ing factor which leads women to seek such benefits.61 Conversely,
equating "illegitimacy" with the lack of economic viability is also over-
inclusive, because many nonmarital families are not in poverty, raising
the question whether society has any justification for treating such
families (a category that Murray downplays) as "illegitimate" and
irresponsible.6
2
Marriage proves overinclusive as a proxy for responsible repro-
duction because it does not guarantee self-sufficiency or the absence
of poverty. First, high divorce rates and low rates of child support
payment by noncustodial fathers substantially contribute to mothers'
poverty and reliance on welfare.63 The rhetoric condemning the
"deadbeat dad" and calling for tougher child support laws acknowl-
edges that men who start out as "responsible" reproducers within
marriage may become "irresponsible" or unaccountable. 64 Second,
marriage proves a very ineffective anti-poverty program for stay-at-
home mothers who, after divorce, become "displaced homemakers"
whose under-investment in their own human capital disadvantages
them in the market. 65 Third, in many instances, even if women in pov-
erty married the fathers of their children, they would still be in pov-
erty and in need of public assistance. 66 Fourth, a growing population
among the poor consists of married couples with children, families in
61. Divorce or marital separation accounts for 45% of the beginnings of AFDC
"spells," the birth or acquiring of a child by unmarried women for 30%, and a loss of or
decrease in earnings of a female head of household for 12%. 1994 GREEN BOOK, supra
note 58, at 451.
62. Murray, supra note 5, at A14 (claiming that single mothers with less than a high
school education are more likely to produce "the emergence of a white underclass," as
opposed to "Murphy Brown" families). For statistics regarding the increase of nonmarital
births across income groups, see FERTILITY OF AMERICAN WOMEN (Census Bureau Re-
port, June 1994).
63. McLANAHAN & SANDEFUR, supra note 6, at 24-26 (identifying nonpayment of
child support as a major reason for family poverty following divorce); see also Cheryl Wetz-
stein, 'Deadbeat' Dads Fight Finance-Only Fatherhood: More Pay if Given Right to Play,
WASH. TI cs, May 13, 1994, at A8 ("billions of dollars in unpaid child support ... keeps
millions of women and children in near-poverty or on welfare").
64. Fineman observes that marriage separates the "responsible" from the "irresponsi-
ble" male reproducer in public policy rhetoric. FINEMAN, supra note 12, at 209-11.
65. See Single Women and Poverty Strongly Linked, supra note 60, at 35 (citing part of
the reason as single mothers' and displaced homemakers' over-representation in service
jobs); see also CAROL ROSE, Women and Property: Gaining and Losing Ground, in PROP-
ERTY AND PERSUASION 233 (1994) (linking women's poverty to their cooperating and "dis-
investing" within marriage).
66. See Christopher Jencks & Kathryn Edin, Do Poor Women Have A Right to Bear
Children?, AM. PROSPEct, Winter 1995, at 43, 44; see discussion of the relationship be-
tween male unemployment and female-headed households infra text accompanying notes
225-27.
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which one or both parents participate in the paid labor market.67
Would two-parent families below a certain income level be judged to
be irresponsible reproducers?6 Finally, as I will argue below, if the
test for responsible reproduction is reproducing without expecting to
shift the costs of support to others, few families would pass the test
when one considers the many subsidies, tax benefits, and credits upon
which American families depend.6
9
(3) The Teen Mother
The teen mother, the third target of the irresponsibility critique,
illustrates the association of irresponsibility with immaturity or inca-
pacity.70 The cry of "children having children" or "babies having ba-
bies" captures this aspect of irresponsibility while also warning of
cultural breakdown and moral crisis.71 The fear expressed by critics of
irresponsible reproduction, that nonmarital teen mothers follow the
example of prominent adult women, suggests the susceptibility of such
teen mothers to outside influences.72 Similarly, proponents of the
Personal Responsibility Act invoked the dependent welfare teen as a
symbol of the cruelty of the current system, which is said to induce
children to have children by holding out the prospects of an apartment
and benefits.73 According to proponents of the Act, reproduction by
such teen mothers is a form of "reckless irresponsibility" 74 that is ex-
tremely costly to society because of their reliance upon public assist-
ance and their incapacity to rear responsible future citizens.75 The
67. Jason DeParle, Sharp Increase Along the Borders of Poverty, N.Y. TimEs, Mar. 31,
1994, at A18.
68. Such public assistance programs as the Earned Income Tax Credit would suggest
that the answer to this question is no, although that program is currently under attack in
Republican budget proposals. See Todd S. Purdum, Clinton Defends Income Tax Credit
Against G.O.P. Cut, N.Y. TimEs, Sept. 19, 1995, at Al. Cf. JoHN STUART MILL, ON LIB-
ERTY 100 (David Spitz ed., 1975) (characterizing undertaking the "responsibility" of bring-
ing a child into the world, where the child will not "have at least the ordinary chances of a
desirable existence," as "a crime against that being").
69. See Michael Wines, Taxpayers Are Angry. They're Expensive, Too, N.Y. TIMES,
Nov. 20, 1994, § 4, at 5 (outlining figures for some federal spending programs in fiscal 1993
and tax breaks for individuals in 1993).
70. Cf. THi BooK oF VIRTUEs, supra note 3, at 185-86 (associating responsibility with
chronological and emotional maturity and ability to be accountable for one's actions, and
irresponsibility with lack of these qualities).
71. See, e.g., Special ReporL The Baby Trap, supra note 16, at 38.
72. See supra note 36 and accompanying text.
73. See infra Part II.A.
74. 141 CONG. Rtc. S11783 (daily ed. Aug. 7, 1995) (statement of Sen. Faircloth).
75. H.R. 4, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 101(8)(G) (1995) ("Between 1985 and 1990, the
public cost of births to teenage mothers under the [AFDC] program, the food stamp pro-
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teen welfare mother is thus deemed triply irresponsible: she manifests
incapacity, immorality, and unaccountability.
As with the categories of single mother and welfare mother, the
use of proxies in the rhetoric surrounding the teen mother leads to
over- and underinclusiveness. Teen mothers induced to procreate by
welfare benefits often serve as a proxy for both the single mother and,
especially, the welfare mother. This proxy system yields a distorted
picture: although many single women receiving AFDC became
mothers during their teens, teen mothers comprise a very small per-
centage of mothers on AFDC, and young teens, an even smaller per-
centage. 76 Further, although teen mothers tend to be poorer, stay on
welfare rolls somewhat longer, and may face more problems than
adult women in leaving the rolls,77 teen mothers "do not inevitably
end up as long-term welfare recipients. '78
The popular coinage "children having children" is particularly
problematic. First, the majority of births to adolescent mothers are to
females aged 18 or 19, generally not considered to be children.79 Simi-
larly, the rhetoric does not address married teen mothers who are pre-
sumably deemed capable of making responsible decisions. Indeed, an
historical perspective suggests that "out-of-wedlock" teenage preg-
nancy has been prevalent throughout American history and that what
constitutes today's "crisis" is that pregnant teens no longer resolve the
"problem" by marriage or adoption.80
Second, the notion of "children having children" suggests a gen-
eral moral incapacity, immaturity, and lack of moral agency among all
gram, and the [M]edicaid program has been estimated at $120,000,000,000."). See also
Work and Responsibility Act of 1994, Detailed Summary, supra note 47, at 30 (reporting
an annual cost to taxpayers of $34 billion to assist families begun by teenagers). This doubt
of maternal capacity is often cast more generally upon adult single mothers, especially
those receiving welfare.
76. 1994 GREEN BOOK, supra note 58, at 401 (reporting that 7.6% of mothers on
AFDC were under 20 in 1992); id. at 411 (reporting that 3.8% of "adult" AFDC recipients
were between 11-18 years old in 1992); GAO REPORT, FAMILIES ON WELFARE: TEENAGE
MOTHERS LEAST LIKELY TO BECOME SELF-SuFFICIENT 3 (1994) [hereinafter FAMILIES ON
WELFARE I] (reporting that from 1976 to 1992, "almost half of all single women receiving
AFDC-about 42 percent-were or had been teenage mothers," but "current teenage
mothers" were 13%).
77. See FAMILIES ON WELFARE I, supra note 76, at 2.
78. Lucy Williams, Race, Rat Bites, and Unfit Mothers: How Media Discourse Informs
Welfare Legislation Debate, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1159, 1190 (1995).
79. See Deborah L. Rhode & Annette Lawson, Introduction, in THE POLITCS OF
PREGNANCY, supra note 16, at 1, 3.
80. See Susan E. Harari & Mars A. Vinovskis, Adolescent Sexuality, Pregnancy, and
Childbearing in the Past, in THE POLITICS OF PREGNANCY, supra note 16, at 23-45.
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teenage females and lends itself to reductive accounts of why such
females become pregnant. Such accounts discourage careful analysis
of the complex set of reasons for adolescent pregnancy, including sex-
ual exploitation and victimization, insufficient motivation to avoid
pregnancy, unrealistic judgments about the consequences of their ac-
tions, and deliberate and (from such young women's perspectives) ra-
tional choices about motherhood.81
Third, the specter of "children having children" may mask divi-
sions of opinion about precisely what the problem of teen reproduc-
tive irresponsibility is. The term suggests that the problem is
"irresponsible" sex in the sense that children should not be having sex
at all, let alone be parents. Yet one might also view the problem as
one of "irresponsible" sex in the sense that teens should be exercising
responsibility if they are sexually active by avoiding unwanted or un-
wise consequences such as pregnancy, parenthood, and diseases.82
There are related divisions over the content of "responsible" sex edu-
cation policy.83
Finally, this assumption of incapacity also includes a blanket as-
sumption that all teen mothers are incompetent parents and hinders
serious discussion of why teen parenting is problematic and how, if
prevention of early parenting fails, society should help teen parents be
responsible. Admittedly, studies detail the many disadvantages of ad-
olescent parenting to adolescent parents and their children, but some
scholars argue that the most serious of these disadvantages are eco-
nomic and that, with social support, "the consequences of parenting at
a young age need not be disastrous or permanent for teenagers or for
their children."' 4 Further, although it is undeniable that some teens
prove to be immature and irresponsible parents, it is often observed
that teenage females accept the responsibilities of motherhood as a
maturing and transformative experience.85
81. I discuss these and other factors infra Part Ill.C2.
82. See Pearce, supra note 16, at 47.
83. Is the responsible policy an abstinence-only curriculum, on the rationale that
teens can and should defer sexual activity and that abstinence is the best way to avoid
pregnancy, disease, and emotional complications? Or is a responsible curriculum one en-
couraging abstinence, but sending a message that teens who do become sexually active
should do so "responsibly," that is, knowing the possible emotional consequences, protect-
ing themselves against disease, and deferring parenthood until they are emotionally and
financially prepared? For an analysis of this debate, critical of the latter approach, see
Barbara Dafoe Whitehead, The Failure of Sex Education, THE ATLAit-c, Oct. 1994, at 55.
84. Dowd, supra note 17, at 44-45.
85. On the emotional immaturity of teen mothers, see ELuA- ANDERsoN, SREET-
WISE: RAcE, CLASS, AND CHANGE IN AN URBAN CoMMUNrrY 123-28 (1990). On early
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(4) Further Costs of Irresponsible Reproduction
In the rhetoric of irresponsible reproduction, one charge common
to all three targets described above-single mothers, welfare mothers,
and teen mothers-is that such family forms are costly for children,
for society, and for men's roles as fathers. In contrast to an ideal,
intact marital family, which serves as a proxy for the responsible, suc-
cessful family form, the single-parent family and other "nonintact"
families are said to do worse, if not fail, at the tasks of providing for
and properly socializing children and therefore impose costs upon so-
ciety. Father absence serves as a proxy for and cause of such failure.
Although the broadest formulation of these claims implicates all sin-
gle-parent families, often the corrective agenda targets the narrower
category of "illegitimacy."
One common claim is that there is substantial evidence that chil-
dren in families with only one biological parent due to nonmarital
birth or divorce ("nonintact" or "disrupted" families) are at a disad-
vantage compared with children in two-parent ("intact") families.
86
The most obvious source of disadvantage is the poverty of many such
families (which is also a disadvantage for the mothers). Sara McLana-
han and Gary Sandefur maintain that "growing up with only one bio-
logical parent frequently deprives children of important economic,
parental, and community resources, and that these deprivations ulti-
mately undermine their chances of future success."'87 As much as half
of the disadvantage that such children suffer-a deprivation that the
authors call "father absence"-is due to loss of economic resources or
parenthood as transformative and maturing for teenaged females, see JILL DUERR BER-
RICK, FACES OF POVERTY: PORTRAITS OF WOMEN AND CHILDREN ON WELFARE 65-86
(1995) (profiling a successful teenage mother on AFDC); SHARON THOMPSON, GOING ALL
THE WAY: TEENAGE GIRLS' TALES OF SEX, ROMANCE, AND PREGNANCY 136-42 (1995)
(describing stories of "quiet independent responsibility" among teenage mothers); Special
Report: The Baby Trap, supra note 16, at 38 ("Ironically, in fact, having a baby has given
many of these young women a new and much-needed focus in life.").
86. See MCLANAHAN & SANDEFUR, supra note 6, at 1 (claiming that children who
grow up in a household with only one biological parent "are worse off" than those who
grow up in a household with two biological parents); Karl Zinsmeister, Parental Responsi-
bility and the Future of the American Family, 77 CORNELL L. REV. 1005 (1992) (suggesting
that rise in single-parent households is "unambiguous social decay"); Whitehead, supra
note 36 (citing social-scientific evidence showing children in disrupted families do worse
than children in intact families).
87. MCLANAHAN & SANDEFUR, supra note 6, at 3. To measure future adult success,
defined in economic terms, the authors look at three indicators: educational attainment,
labor force attachment, and early family formation. Id at 19-22. They find that children
from single-parent families have higher rates of school dropout, teen pregnancy and
parenting, and disengagement from the labor market. Id. at 32-40.
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lower income. The rest of the differential is attributed to lower paren-
tal involvement and supervision and to greater residential mobility.88
But McLanahan and Sandefur stress that they are not arguing that
"father absence" or "family disruption" is the only, or even primary,
cause of problems such as dropping out of high school and early
childbearing and parenting, or that most children in single-parent fam-
ilies will have such problems (indeed, the substantial majority will
not).89 Moreover, the two-parent family form is no guarantee of pro-
tection against economic and other forms of disadvantage: black chil-
dren in two-parent families have "much higher poverty rates than
white children in single-parent families." 90 Rather, their claim is sim-
ply that these problems occur at a higher rate in children from single-
parent families.91 An additional area of disadvantage noted by others
is the increased risk to children, especially daughters, of sexual abuse
and violence, particularly in households with a step-father or
nonmarital partner.92
Voices that decry the rise in single-parent families warn that costs
for these children result in costs to society at large. Beyond the fiscal
cost of supporting such children through public assistance when
households lack sufficient economic resources, the argument goes,
such children are more likely eventually to engage in self-destructive
and costly behaviors (e.g., juvenile crime, drugs, nonmarital preg-
nancy, and the like). There are staggering lists of social problems or
pathologies traced back to the root cause of "broken families" and
"the breakdown of intact traditional families. ' 93 As discussed in Part
II, such accounts reflect a problematic gender ideology and assign wel-
fare a central role in contributing to "fatherless" families. 94 More-
88. Id. at 134. The authors distinguish families consisting of one biological parent and
one step-parent, for whom income is not equally influential as a source of disadvantage.
Idk
89. Id. at 134.
90. Id. at 85.
91. Id. at 2, 39-63. See also Whitehead, supra note 36, at 66-67 (arguing that family
disruption detrimentally affects mother-child relationships, school achievement, and the
children's overall emotional well-being).
92. See BLANKENHoRN, supra note 7, at 39-42; Whitehead, supra note 36, at 72.
93. See Zinsmeister, supra note 86, at 1007 (arguing that "many of the social problems
that plague us most darkly today-drugs, educational droop, street violence, and so
forth-are... shoots off a single root, namely the breakdown of intact traditional fami-
lies"); Moynihan, supra note 19, at 24 (citing Zinsmeister's argument that "the drug crisis,
the education crisis, and the problems of teen preguancy and juvenile crime ... trace back
predominantly to one source: broken families"); Murray, supra note 5, at A14 (arguing
that illegitimacy drives all other social problems).
94. See infra Part II.A.3.
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over, claims about the costs of single-parent families have triggered
responses pointing out harms to women and children within two-par-
ent families and exploring the strengths of single-parent families and
how they can produce healthy children.
95
Although some, like Murray, trace such problems directly to
nonmarital families, terminology such as the "intact" family (two mar-
ried, biological parents) versus the "nonintact," "broken," or "dis-
rupted" family clearly sweeps more broadly to implicate many family
forms. 96 Indeed, scholars who study single-parent families find that
families originating in nonmarital births and in divorce have many
similarities, including their supposed consequences for children.97 In
fact, some proponents of personal responsibility advocate that govern-
ment should be urged to do something not only about nonmarital
births but also about divorce.98 More typically however, a more inclu-
sive diagnosis of the supposed costs of all single-parent families gives
way to a diagnosis of "illegitimacy" as the root problem requiring a
solution. For example, the Personal Responsibility and Work Oppor-
tunity Act includes "findings" concerning the "negative consequences
of raising children in single-parent homes" in order to demonstrate a
"crisis in our Nation."99 Yet, in proposing solutions to this "crisis,"
the role of divorce and marital disruption in creating welfare depen-
dency and single-parent families drops from view and Congress de-
clares that preventing out-of-wedlock pregnancy and reducing out-of-
wedlock births are "very important government interests" to be fur-
thered by the legislation. 100 One might credibly argue that "illegiti-
macy" is an easier target than divorce because the former is viewed as
behavior more typical of "others" (namely, poor people and people of
color), while the latter implicates many middle-class and upper-class
American lives (including those of prominent proponents of the at-
95. See STEPHANIE CooNTz, THE WAY WE NEVER WERE: AMERICAN FAMILIES AND
THE NOSTALGIA TRAP (1992); Susan B. Apel, Communitarianism and Feminism" The Case
Against the Preference for the Two-Parent Family, 10 WIs. WOMEN'S L.J. 1 (1995); Jane
Mattes, Many Single Moms Make Doubly Good Parents, DAILY NEWS, Sept. 23, 1994, at
29. See also Whitehead, supra note 36, at 55,58 (noting increasing depictions of two-parent
family as "source of pathology").
96. McLanahan and Sandefur use the label "disrupted family" regardless of whether
children were born outside of marriage or within marriage because, "from the child's point
of view," the family is disrupted if their biological parents live apart, including with a step-
parent. MCLANAHAN & SANDEFUR, supra note 6, at 6.
97. Id. at 97-98.
98. See, e.g., Galston, supra note 6, at All.
99. H.R. 4, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 101 (1995).
100. Id.
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tack on "illegitimacy" and welfare dependency). 1°1 If divorce, as
some critics argue, raises a moral question of whether a net gain for
adult individual autonomy should prevail at the expense of children's
well-being, it is not clear how many adults are ready to sacrifice such
freedom.'0 2
Furthermore, focusing on costs to society causes the parameters
of irresponsible reproduction to expand, including categories of re-
sponsible and irresponsible parenting. How broad are these catego-
ries? The charge of unaccountability uses possession of financial
resources as a sign of responsibility, employing a two-parent family
with financial resources as the model against which other families are
judged. However, financial resources are a necessary but not suffi-
cient condition for children's well-being and a broader model of re-
sponsible parenting could render even these "model" families
inadequate. For example, such a paradigm would dictate that people
should not become parents unless they are prepared and willing to
accept moral responsibility to provide not only for a child's material
needs, but also for a child's physical, emotional, moral, and spiritual
needs. 0 3 Is it irresponsible for both parents in a two-parent family,
above a certain income level, to participate full-time in the paid labor
market and delegate childcare responsibilities to others instead of at-
tending to their children themselves?' °4 In fact, some communitarian
101. For example, Newt Gingrich, Charles Murray, Phil Gramm, Pete Wilson, and Bob
Dole all decry "illegitimacy" and welfare dependency and promote personal responsibility.
All have been divorced and all but one have remarried, behavior that might well have
disqualified them from public life in an earlier era. See Elizabeth Kolbert, Whose Family
Values Are They, Anyway?, N.Y. TiMEs, Aug. 6, 1995, § 4, at 1. To be sure, some propo-
nents of reproductive responsibility do call for consistency and warn against the hypocrisy
of celebrating among the "rich and famous" the "irresponsible behavior we deplore among
the underclass" (eg., nonmarital family forms). Remarks of Quayle, supra note 43.
102. See Galston, supra note 6, at All (suggesting that toughening divorce law raises
"moral questions" such as whether our society is "willing to put the well-being of children
first, even when it may conflict with adult desires and restrain our passion for autonomy").
See also MARY ANN GLENDON, RIGrHTs TALK 127-28 (1991) (noting reticence of parents to
discuss economic or emotional effect of personal parental freedom on children); White-
head, supra note 36, at 48, 52 (describing cultural shift to acceptance of new family
structures).
103. See Work and Responsibility Act of 1994, Detailed Summary, supra note 47, at 30
("Both parents bear responsibility for providing emotional and moral guidance, as well as
economic support, to their children. Teenagers who bring children into the world are not
yet equipped to discharge this fundamental obligation."); Platform, supra note 2, at 7 ("We
must insist once again that bringing children into the world entails a moral responsibility to
provide, not only material necessities, but also moral education and character formation.").
104. The example of parents whose careers leave them little time for their children is
one that a professional acquaintance offered me when I asked him what he included in the
category of irresponsible reproduction. Along these lines, the strong emotional attach-
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proponents of personal responsibility express such criticisms of con-
temporary parenting and emphasize costs that society incurs when
families fail in their vital role as inculcators of moral values and per-
sonal responsibility in children.10 5
B. Procreative Rights, Welfare Entitlements, and Incentives to
"Irresponsibility"
One component of the charge of "irresponsible" reproduction is
that rights and entitlements have encouraged or licensed irresponsibil-
ity. This charge typically focuses upon the supposed "moral deregula-
tion" of constitutional law and welfare law and policy beginning in the
1960s. Galston argues that constitutional precedents recognizing a
right to abortion helped to spur the "assault on traditional morality"
and forms of authority as well as the call for "neutrality in areas previ-
ously seen as the legitimate arena for collective moral judgment."'
0 6
Himmelfarb similarly argues that the problematic "de-moralizing" of
social policy, that is, "divorcing it from any moral criteria, require-
ments, even expectations," has extended to the de-moralizing of soci-
ety. Himmelfarb offers welfare policy as a prime example.10 7
From the perspective of those who believe that rights license irre-
sponsibility, constitutional precedents such as Eisenstadt v. Baird,0 8
ment that grown children feel for their former nannies, and their apparent "buried anger"
and resentment at their mothers for delegating childcare responsibilities, were featured as
themes of a recent documentary. See Janet Maslin, When One is Reared by a Nanny, Not a
Mom, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 3, 1995, at C8 (reviewing the documentary Martha and Ethel).
Similarly, the 1950s and early 1960s ideal of the hard-working father, whose earnings pro-
vided his wife and children with a high standard of living and great material comforts and
advantages, has come under criticism by a subsequent generation for the emotional and
physical distance of such fathers and their lack of involvement with their children. See
ROBERT L. GRISWOLD, FATHERHOOD IN AMERICA: A HISTORY 185-210, 252-54 (1993).
105. ETZIONI, supra note 3, at 63-68 (criticizing deficits in parenting and urging a "shift
from consumerism and careerism to an emphasis on children"); Platform, supra note 2, at
7-8 (stating that "[f]athers and mothers, consumed by 'making it' and consumerism, or
preoccupied with personal advancement, who come home too late and too tired to attend
to the needs of their children, cannot discharge their most elementary duty to their chil-
dren and their fellow citizens"). Cf. Joan Williams, Gender Wars: Selfless Women in the
Republic of Choice, 66 N.Y.U. L. REv. 1559, 1624-27 (1991) (citing Newsweek article ob-
serving that "at-home mothers often think of career-and-family mothers as selfish yuppies
who never believe they have enough money" and that conservative ideology of "at-home
mothering" stresses that "'traditional' families sacrifice income to ensure their children a
parents' care").
106. GALSTON, supra note 3, at 269. He also identifies the civil rights movement in a
general sense as a cause for this assault on traditional mores and authority. Id. at 268-70.
107. HIMMELFARB, supra note 3, at 243.
108. 405 U.S. 438 (1972).
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Roe v. Wade,10 9 and Carey v. Population Services International"°
might be said to amount to moral deregulation. In these cases, the
Supreme Court recognized an individual's right to decide, free from
unwarranted governmental interference, whether to bear or beget a
child and to continue or terminate a pregnancy. Thus, these decisions
amount to moral deregulation in the following sense: whether or not
these decisions recognize a right to engage in nonmarital sexual activ-
ity,"' they afford protection to reproductive liberty outside the mari-
tal family, recognizing fundamental rights of unmarried individuals to
decide whether or not to procreate. 1 2 They also make it legally per-
missible to separate heterosexual activity (within or without marriage)
from reproductive consequences (i.e., pregnancy), and even to sever
any inevitable link between pregnancy, childbirth, and the responsibil-
ities of parenting. They place limits upon the means that states may
use to advance their interests in regulating sexual morality (e.g., dis-
couraging nonmarital and extramarital relationships and teen sexual
109. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
110. 431 U.S. 678 (1977).
111. These cases protect the right of an individual to use, or not use, contraception,
and to bear or beget children, without explicitly recognizing any right to engage in the
underlying sexual activity (although it would seem logical that the former must include the
latter). Some commentators argue that these cases imply a right to engage in heterosexual
intercourse and, more broadly, in intimate association including gay and lesbian sex. See
LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERiCAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 15-21 (2d ed. 1988); Kenneth L.
Karst, The Freedom of Intimate Association, 89 YALE L.J. 624 (1980). Others argue that
these cases are about protecting reproductive decisions and family planning, not sex. See
Thomas C. Grey, Eros, Civilization, and the Burger Court, 43 LAW & CoNTEMP. PROBS.,
Summer 1980, at 83. Teens are in an even more precarious state with respect to legal
regulation of sexuality. In many states criminal laws prohibit others from engaging in sex-
ual activity with teens (in some states, such laws only apply to teen-aged females), yet teens
do have certain constitutional rights concerning contraception and abortion. See, e.g., CAL.
PENAL CODE § 261.5 (West 1988 & Supp. 1993); N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 130.25, 130.30, 130.35
(McKinney 1987 & Supp. 1996); WAsH. REv. CODE §§ 9A.44.073, 9A.44.076, 9A.44.079
(West 1988 & Supp. 1996) (statutes prohibiting intercourse with a minor). See also Michael
M. v. Superior Court, 450 U.S. 464 (1981) (upholding California's statutory rape law apply-
ing only to females); Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2832 (1992) (upholding
parental consent provision with judicial bypass procedure in Pennsylvania's abortion
statute).'
112. For elaborations on the fundamental constitutional right to procreative liberty, or
a right to procreative autonomy, see TRIBE, supra note 111, §§ 15-10,15-20 to -21; RONALD
DwORKiN, LwE's DOMINION 102-117,148-72 (1993). John Robertson argues that, although
the Court has recognized a right of unmarried persons to avoid pregnancy and reproduc-
tion, "it does not necessarily imply a right to engage in coitus in order to get pregnant,"
raising the question of whether unmarried persons have a constitutionally recognized right
to procreate. ROBERTSON, supra note 48, at 38. Because I am writing about reproduction,
I am using the formulation of procreative autonomy, although there is a defensible broader
reading of privacy to include intimate association. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186,
199 (1986) (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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activity).1 3 The irresponsibility critique could claim that, in these
cases, the Court sent a message about the moral permissibility of con-
stitutionally protected choices and behavior. As Justice Scalia puts it,
"[i]f the Constitution guarantees abortion, how can it be bad?" 114
Similarly, to the extent responsibility proponents target rising divorce
rates, they could point to the "no fault" divorce revolution as a moral
deregulation of family law, which arguably sent a message that divorce
was morally acceptable and should be a matter of individual moral
choice rather than social censure." 5
Although my aim here is not to refute the moral deregulation
charge, I would counter that constitutional rights to procreative au-
tonomy, far from obscuring the issue of responsibility, call for the ex-
ercise of moral responsibility precisely because they protect and
afford a realm of choice. 116 The justification for protecting that realm
concerns the significance of such decisions for personhood, autonomy,
and bodily integrity. Because of the impossibility of exercising such
moral responsibility in the face of state compulsion concerning ques-
tions of the mysteries of one's existence and the meaning of reproduc-
tion in one's life, reserving a realm of choice is appropriate." 7 By
113. See, e.g., Carey, 431 U.S. at 694-95 (invalidating a contraception statute aimed at
deterring, inter alia, teenage sexual activity, because it would be "plainly unreasonable" to
assume that the state selected such consequences of uncontracepted sexual intercourse as
pregnancy, childbirth, and abortion as suitable punishments for fornication to promote the
public policy against sexual intercourse among the young) (quoting Eisenstadt v. Baird,
405 U.S. 438, 488 (1972)). However, then-Justice Rehnquist indicated deference to state
police power to enact such regulations. Carey, 431 U.S. at 717-19 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
114. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2882 (1992) (Scalia, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part). Scalia describes this popular conclusion as a "natural,"
although not "accurate line of thought." Id.
115. See Carl E. Schneider, Moral Discourse and the Transformation of American Fam-
ily Law, 83 MiCH. L. Rnv. 1803 (1985); Jana B. Singer, The Privatization of Family Law,
1992 Wis. L. REv. 1443.
116. See McClain, supra note 1, at 1069-73; Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2806-08 (O'Connor,
Kennedy, and Souter, JJ., joint opinion, Blackmun and Stevens, JJ., joining) (noting con-
siderable conscientious disagreement among reasonable people about the meaning of pro-
creation and of human responsibility and respect for it, as well as about the morality of
decisions to continue or terminate a pregnancy).
117. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2807 (O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, JJ., joint opinion,
Blackmun and Stevens, JJ., joining); see also Carey, 431 U.S. at 685 (characterizing a deci-
sion "whether or not to beget or bear a child" as "at the very heart of [the] cluster of
constitutionally protected choices" because, "in a field that by definition concerns the most
intimate of human activities and relationships, decisions whether to accomplish or to pre-
vent conception are among the most private and sensitive"). On the role of "significance"
in justifying constitutional rights of deliberative autonomy, see James E. Fleming, Securing
Deliberative Autonomy, 48 STAN. L. REv. 1, 40-43 (1995).
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recognizing the right to choose, the state allows individuals to act per-
sonally responsible.
Nevertheless, complicated questions arise concerning what con-
stitutes coercion or compulsion and what government may do, short of
outright coercion or compulsion, to encourage responsibility. 118
Planned Parenthood v. Casey appeared to join issues of reproductive
rights and responsibilities, offering perhaps the most elaborate justifi-
cation to date for a protected realm of personal decisionmaking pre-
mised on the requirements of personhood and moral responsibility,
while upholding state measures designed to steer such decisionmaking
against abortion in the name of encouraging "wise" (or responsible)
exercise of reproductive liberty.119 But the type of responsibility en-
couraged was less responsibility as autonomy, in the sense of responsi-
ble and reflective self-government, than responsibility as
accountability, that is, deciding in accord with the states' preference
for childbirth. The joint opinion drew on a long, and often criticized,
line of decisions affirming that, in the interest of protecting potential
life, states may enact measures limiting the funding, facilities, and
medical personnel available to assist a woman in implementing an
abortion decision in order to reflect a value judgment in favor of
childbirth, activity deemed in the public interest.120 To what extent
Moreover, the justification presented in the text presents at least two lines of response
to charges of irresponsibility. One is that in a morally pluralistic society, there may be
more than one right or responsible choice and we must afford protection to human diver-
sity. A second is that, even if others are correct in concluding that an individual is making
an unwise, irresponsible, or wrong choice, it violates respect for human dignity, moral ca-
pacity, and personhood (as well as bodily integrity) for government to coerce or compel
such decisionmaking. See McClain, supra note 1, at 1067-77.
118. I plan to address these questions elsewhere, focusing on the issue of encouraging
reproductive responsibility. See Linda C. McClain, What Lies Beyond "Empty" Tolera-
tion? (Dec. 4, 1995) (unpublished manuscript on file with author).
119. 112 S. Ct. at 2791, 2826 (O'Connor, Kennedy, and Souter, Ji., joint opinion). In
justifying the informed consent scheme, the opinion stated: "What is at stake is the wo-
man's right to make the ultimate decision, not a right to be insulated from all others in
doing so." Id. at 2821. Ronald Dworkin argues that Casey correctly recognizes a state's
constitutionally permissible role in encouraging responsibility in reproductive decision
making (decisions implicating the "sanctity" of life) rather than impermissibly insisting
upon conformity. DwoiicNm, supra note 112, at 152-54. Other commentators also interpret
Casey as upholding a state's efforts to encourage a woman to make a responsible decision
and to reflect on her responsibilities as well as rights. See, e.g., Robin L. West, The Nature
of the Right to an Abortion: A Commentary on Professor Brownstein's Analysis of Casey,
45 HAsrrNGs LJ. 961,966-67 (1994); Linda C. McClain, The Poverty of Privacy?, 3 COLUM.
J. GENDER & L. 119, 139-40 (1992).
120. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2818-19 (citations omitted).
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proponents of reproductive responsibility can deploy this line of pre-
cedent to support measures discouraging childbirth is a crucial issue.
The charge of moral deregulation raises the practical question of
how successful a return to stigma or shame can be if current law pro-
tects the very conduct subject to these proposed social sanctions (e.g.,
nonmarital procreation). At present, most critics of reproductive irre-
sponsibility do not seem to repudiate outright the idea of constitu-
tional protection for a right to procreate, although some reject the
constitutional right to abortion. 121 The message seems to be that,
whether or not women have a legal right to, as Quayle put it, "bear
babies irresponsibly," it is morally wrong for them to do so. More-
over, in contrast to current welfare policy, which gives them an entitle-
ment to public assistance for their children, they should have no right,
moral, statutory, or otherwise, to such assistance. As one Republican
Senator put it: "I do not know of anyone who wants to infringe on a
woman's reproductive rights to have as many children as she pleases,
but.., the working taxpayers of this country should not have to pay
for them."'122 Nonetheless, current welfare rhetoric may harbor eu-
genic themes and may have as its underlying message that poor wo-
men (among whom women of color are disproportionately
represented) should not and do not deserve to procreate. 123
121. For example, Dan Quayle. See discussion infra Part II.B. Some take the view that
the issue should be resolved by the states.
122. 141 CONG. REC. S11783 (daily ed. Aug. 7, 1995) (statement of Sen. Faircloth).
123. For an analysis along these lines, see Dorothy Roberts, The Only Good Poor Wo-
man: Unconstitutional Conditions and Welfare, 72 DENV. U. L. REV. 931 (1995); Andrew
Hacker, The Crackdown on African-Americans, THE NATION, July 10, 1995, at 45-46.
America has its history of eugenic experiments, sterilizations, and other attempts to control
the reproduction of such groups as the poor, minorities, and the "feeble-minded." See
ROBERTSON, supra note 48, at 31 (suggesting that past experience with forced sterilization
and the focus upon the "poor and minorities as targets of coercive policies" make stringent
or coercive measures affecting reproduction "highly unappealing"); Charlotte Rutherford,
Reproductive Freedoms and African American Women, 4 YALE J.L. & FEMINIsM 255, 273-
75 (1992) (discussing sterilization and its disproportionate effect on lower-income African-
American women). See also Buck v. Bell, 274 U.S. 200 (1927) (upholding Virginia statute
providing for sterilization of institutionalized persons with hereditary mental defects);
Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U.S. 535 (1942) (holding that Oklahoma statute which provided
for sterilization of "habitual" criminals and which excepted certain offenses violated Equal
Protection Clause of Fourteenth Amendment). Cf. Arlene M. Kline, Letter to the Editor,
CHI. TRIB., Apr. 12, 1993, at 2 (expressing the view that if women on public assistance
choose not to use birth control, they "should be put out of the baby-making business per-
manently"). Some see a disturbing return to eugenic thinking in Murray's new book exam-
ining the relationships among race, class, genes, and intelligence. See Charles Lane, The
Tainted Sources of "The Bell Curve", N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Dec. 1, 1994, at 14 (discussing the
sources relied upon in RICHARD J. HERRNSTEIN & CHARLES MURRAY, THE BEL. CURVE
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The full scope of the corrective agenda of proponents of repro-
ductive responsibility is not yet known. Important questions involve
precisely where proponents would draw the line between community
and political sanction, or nonlegal and legal measures, and when the
community should enlist the law and political institutions to send the
proper moral message. 124 If it is imposition of costs upon society that
makes reproduction irresponsible, we need to pay close attention to
what proponents of responsibility count as a cost, what those costs
actually are, and whether they should be dispositive.125 For example,
to reinforce the central, normative status of marriage and the two-
parent family, some voices urge a range of moral and social measures
not triggering the coercive power of government, including moral
leadership by political leaders using the bully pulpit to decry out-of-
wedlock births (and perhaps divorce). 26 At the same time, Galston
argues that if two-parent families do significantly better than single-
parent families in raising children who become functional, responsible
citizens and impose fewer costs upon society than single-parent fami-
lies do, it is legitimate for government to prefer two-parent families
and to take legal measures to bolster their survival by making divorce
more difficult to obtain. 27 In addition to advocating a return to a
(1994)); Jason DeParle, Daring Research or 'Social Science Pornography'?, N.Y. TIMES,
Oct. 9, 1994, § 6, at 48, 50 (discussing reactions to -IERRNSTEIN & MURRAY, supra).
124. See McClain, supra note 1, at 1031-33, 1050-54 (discussing ambiguities in "respon-
sive communitarian" agenda).
125. For example, John Robertson observes that "[r]eproduction is often said to be
irresponsible because of the costs imposed on others," yet he argues that "[i]mplicit in such
a judgment is the assumption that the person reproducing has little or no reproductive
interest to justify those costs." ROBERTSON, supra note 48, at 73. Thus, person's reproduc-
tive interests, particularly if they will also rear their offspring, may be substantial. Whether
their reproduction is "irresponsible," because it imposes costs upon the public treasury,
Robertson suggests, depends upon such questions as what their reproductive alternatives
are and whether those public costs significantly exceed the costs that any birth imposes on
society so that a charge of irresponsibility may be warranted. 1d. at 73, 76-77. But even if a
case of excessive cost were established, Robertson concludes that, although persuasive
measures may-be justified, coercive and mandatory measures, such as involuntary contra-
ception, cannot be justified given constitutional principles of procreative liberty and the
individual interest at stake. Id. at 78-80.
126. See supra note 32 (reporting views of Blankenhorn and Gingrich).
127. GALSTON, supra note 3, at 286-87 (supporting "braking mechanisms" on divorce
when there are minor children and a "children first" policy); Galston, supra note 6, at All
(advocating a return to fault-based system or five-year waiting period for couples with
children); see also EZIONI, supra note 3, at 79 (advocating use of "precommitment" mar-
riage vows that would delay and increase cost of divorce) (citing Elizabeth S. Scott, Ra-
tional Decisionmaking About Marriage and Divorce, 76 VA. L. RFv. 9 (1994)). Galston
describes his approach as a "functional," rather than an intrinsic, traditionalism, one that
can embrace traditional values, such as the primacy of the marital family,'not for Biblical
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"marriage culture," Blankenhorn supports such legal measures as
prohibiting sperm banks from providing sperm to unmarried women
and recommends that all public policymakers be directed to evaluate
proposed legislation for its impact upon the institution of marriage.128
Another example clearly invoking the mechanism of the state to
fortify social sanctions is Murray's provocative proposal to make mar-
riage the sole source of parental rights and responsibilities, which he
grants would leave mothers of nonmarital children with no legal re-
course against the fathers of such children for financial or other sup-
port. 129 His proposal would run afoul of the line of cases holding that
states, in an effort to deter "irresponsible liaisons beyond the bonds of
marriage," may not punish children, who are not responsible for the
circumstances of their birth, by barring them from parental financial
support, inheritance benefits, and other opportunities available to
marital children. 130
The current efforts to restore "personal responsibility" to welfare
policy provide perhaps the clearest example of recourse to political
tools to combat irresponsible reproduction. In understanding the
charge of moral deregulation of welfare policy, it is useful to bear in
mind that, from the outset, there have been "strings" attached to the
statutory entitlement to AFDC benefits in the form of various eligibil-
ity and compliance rules. 13' Some of those rules, for example, the
reasons but for pragmatic ones, i.e., preventing cultural and political breakdown. GAL-
STON, supra note 3, at 287-88.
128. BLANKENHORN, supra note 7, at 231-33.
129. Murray, supra note 5, at A14; Firing Line Debate, supra note 36, at 36-37 (remarks
of Murray). One might ask whether Murray also means that unmarried mothers would
have no obligation to raise and provide for their children.
130. See, e.g., Weber v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 406 U.S. 164, 175 (1972) (invali-
dating scheme excluding "illegitimate" children from beneficiaries of worker's compensa-
tion scheme and noting that visiting society's condemnation of "irresponsible liaisons
beyond the bonds of marriage" on "the head of an infant is illogical and unjust" and "con-
trary to the basic concept of our system that legal burdens should bear some relationship to
individual responsibility or wrongdoing"); Glona v. American Guarantee & Liab. Ins. Co.,
391 U.S. 73 (1968) (invalidating Louisiana wrongful death statute barring recovery for ille-
gitimate children while allowing recovery for legitimate children and noting that there is no
rational basis for the distinction); Levy v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 68 (1968) (invalidating provi-
sions of Louisiana wrongful death statute excluding illegitimates from class of children
entitled to recover for a parent's death). For a discussion of the differing standards of
review the Court has applied in evaluating statutes which discriminate against illegitimate
children, see TRmE, supra note 111, § 16-24, at 1553-58. Rehnquist would have upheld the
classification struck down in Weber as a rational statutory scheme "designed to encourage
legally recognized and responsible family relationships." 406 U.S. at 184 (Rehnquist, J.,
dissenting).
131. The current Social Security Act imposes an obligation on states who participate in
the AFDC program to provide aid to "all eligible individuals." 42 U.S.C. § 602 (10)(A)
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"suitable home" and "man in the house" rules, sanctioned scrutiny of
women's sexual and reproductive lives and their homes and disqualifi-
cation of such women and their children for the mother's alleged im-
morality.132 Beginning in the 1960s, a combination of successful legal
challenges by welfare rights organizations and changes in administra-
tion policies restricted states' abilities to exclude many women (espe-
cially unmarried women and women of color) through broad
application of such rules.133 One principle that the Court used in
striking down such restrictions, akin to that in the Court's so-called
"illegitimacy" cases, was that a state's interest in discouraging immo-
rality and "illegitimacy" did not justify punishing children by exclud-
ing them from needed benefits when the state could further such
interests by other, less harmful, means. 34
Discontent with the placement of such limits on states' abilities to
discourage "immorality" may be at the core of contemporary calls for
reforming the incentive structure of welfare. Current rhetoric charg-
ing that welfare encourages "illegitimacy" appears to signal an eager-
ness to return to moral supervision or regulation by deterring
"illegitimacy" through child exclusions and family caps. The argu-
ment is that, however laudable the original purpose of AFDC, the
program evolved to include a population made up not of "worthy wid-
ows" who once had a breadwinner, but of divorced women and never-
(1988 & Supp. 1994). Although Goldberg v. Kelly, 397 U.S. 254 (1970), established that
certain Due Process rights attend the termination of welfare benefits, the Court has not
recognized a constitutional right to welfare.
132. For a history of this provision, see King v. Smith, 392 U.S. 309, 321-27 (1968).
Perhaps the rationale for such moral supervision may be found in the original social con-
tract underlying ADC (now AFDC), that the state would provide financial support to
mothers deprived of a male breadwinner (the paradigmatic case was the worthy widow) so
that they could raise their children to be productive citizens and could stay out of the wage
labor market. Perhaps, as many welfare scholars argue, the changing demographics of the
AFDC population to include more unmarried women and women of color underlies the
adoption of regulatory measures that could help states police and restrict their case loads.
See Mmsi ABRAMOWrrz, REGULATrNo THE LivEs OF WOMEN: SOCIAL WELFARE POLICY
FROM COLONIAL TIMEs TO THE PREsErN 318-26 (1988); Williams, supra note 78, at 1174-
85.
133. See King, 390 U.S. at 321-27 (invalidating Alabama statute which denied AFDC
aid to children of mother who cohabits with "substitute father" who owes no state-imposed
duty to provide support). For an account of this history, see ABRAMowrrz, supra note 132,
at 318-37.
134. King, 392 U.S. at 320-27. In his concurrence, Justice Douglas invoked "illegiti-
macy" precedents to argue for invalidating the statute on Equal Protection grounds. Id. at
334-36 (Douglas, J., concurring). The Court expressly relied upon the "illegitimacy" cases
in the subsequent case of New Jersey Welfare Rights Organization v. Cahill, 411 U.S. 619,
620-21 (1973).
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married women who never had a breadwinner. 135 Its effects have
been to subsidize non-marital childbirth and thus encourage "bad be-
havior:" irresponsibility in the form of immorality and
unaccountability. 136
The "solution" is to conceive of welfare programs as having peda-
gogical purposes and as sending moral messages. In contrast to a ben-
efit schedule tailored to children's needs, family caps and child
exclusion provisions send a "moral message" about responsible pro-
creation and parenting, procreation within marriage and with financial
resources, and the limits of governmental responsibility for such pro-
creation, thus ensuring fairness to taxpaying, working families. As I
shall argue in Part II, this argument about incentive effects lacks a
strong empirical foundation. Further, the intersection of constitu-
tional precedents permitting a state to encourage childbirth over abor-
tion with welfare schemes designed to deter childbirth by poor and
unmarried women highlights the conflicting messages within the dis-
course of irresponsible reproduction.137
II. Assessing the Rhetoric of "Irresponsible" Reproduction
In this Part, I offer a critical analysis of the charges of "irresponsi-
ble" reproduction in contemporary discourse about single mother-
hood and welfare reform. The recent Congressional debates over
welfare reform feature as a key source in this discussion. I examine
assumptions about the relationship between the incentive effects of
governmental programs and human motivation, agency, and victimiza-
tion, contending that reductive models of choice and causation lead to
135. See CONTRACr WIr AMERICA, supra note 8, at 67-68.
136. See MacNeil/Lehrer News Hour (PBS television broadcast, Sept. 13, 1995)
(LEXIS, News file, Script library) (broadcasting views of Kristi Hamrick of the Family
Research Council that welfare rewards "bad behavior.., that is a decision to have children
out of wedlock and to add to that problem by having more children").
137. Although the declining fertility rate of married women is a primary reason that
the percentage of births to single women is increasing, exhortations to married women to
have more children have not been sounded. See Illegitimacy and Welfare: Hearings on
H.R. 4 Before the Subcomm. on Human Resources, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. (Jan. 20, 1995)
(written Welfare Testimony of Rebecca M. Blank) [hereinafter Testimony of Blank]. Not
yet (or openly), at any rate. Cf. Reva Siegel, Reasoning From the Body: A Historical
Perspective on Abortion Regulation and Questions of Equal Protection, 44 STAN. L. REv.
261, 297-318 (1992) (describing themes of married women's maternal obligations in nine-
teenth century physicians' campaigns against abortion); Gwendolyn Mink, The Lady and
the Tramp: Gender, Race, and the Origins of the American Welfare State, in WOMEN, TIE
STATE, AND WELFARE 92 (Linda Gordon ed., 1990) (analyzing conception of women's
citizenship tied to (white, nonimmigrant) married women's obligation to reproduce the
race).
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flawed public policy proposals. I evaluate the gender ideology under-
lying conservative critiques of single-mother, or "fatherless," families
and of welfare, which is echoed in the emerging "responsible father-
hood" movement.
The intersection of the rhetoric about "irresponsible" procreation
with rhetoric about the "irresponsibility" of abortion will serve to il-
lustrate how the abortion issue complicates the task of assigning irre-
sponsibility. I further show that, even when there seems to be
agreement as to the content of irresponsible reproduction, there may
be strong disagreement about appropriate public policy goals and the
proper and effective means to pursue them. These conflicts are most
evident in attempts to reconcile public policy objectives that deter
nonmarital childbirth on the one hand, and deter abortion on the
other, a conflict vividly present in recent welfare reform debates. But
they also surface in attempts to advance a principle of parental re-
sponsibility without abandoning society's responsibility for protecting
children.
Finally, I argue that an assessment of the rhetoric of reproductive
irresponsibility and appropriate policies to address it requires an in-
quiry into background assumptions about personal and collective re-
sponsibility for poverty and economic inequality, and for meeting the
needs of society's dependents, including children. Attention to issues
of collective responsibility calls into question some key assumptions in
the rhetoric of personal responsibility. I will illustrate this point by
revisiting the contrasting models of responsible and irresponsible re-
production underlying the "fairness" justification for capping welfare
benefits and contend that raising issues of collective responsibility
reveals the flaws of this justification.
A. Procreation Stories Told in Welfare Discourse
In the discourse about irresponsible procreation, there are a
number of assumptions about agency and responsibility. In conserva-
tive rhetoric, for example, one finds the following, at times overlap-
ping and conflicting, models of welfare recipients: the rational actor
responding to incentives; the victim of a perverse governmental sys-
tem; the culpable exploiter of that system; and the deviator from natu-
ral gender roles. The first three models were prominent in recent
legislative efforts surrounding the Personal Responsibility Act. The
fourth is a key part of some prominent conservative analyses of wel-
fare. All of these models derive from a model of responsible repro-
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duction: that undertaken in marriage by self-sufficient adults who
provide for their own children without governmental assistance.
(1) Welfare Recipients as Rational Actors, Victims, and Exploiters
I begin with the rational actor model because a pervasive theme
in contemporary welfare reform discourse is that of the need to
change perverse incentives supposedly created by welfare programs.
In Losing Ground, Charles Murray argued, quite influentially, that it
was not necessary to look to such explanations as the "Zeitgeist of the
1960s," macroeconomic conditions, cultural pathologies, or racial dif-
ferences to account for increased rates of "illegitimacy," welfare de-
pendency, and unemployment of the young. 138 Rather, the poor and
the "not-poor" alike make "rational" decisions to maximize their ad-
vantage; however, what is "rational" at the economic level of the poor
may appear irrational from the perspective of the middle-class. 139
Thus, the poor person as rational actor responded predictably to
changes in the "rules of the game of surviving and getting ahead," as
well as to changes in the incentive structure created by social policies
of the 1960s.140 After the AFDC program eliminated the "man in the
house" rule, as well as others, the rational choice for a pregnant wo-
man became to continue a pregnancy and to eschew marriage in favor
of receiving a package of governmental benefits. For the man, an un-
pleasant, minimum-wage job and marriage were no longer the rational
choice, since he could live with (and off of) the woman, without a job
and without marriage. According to Murray's account, "there is no
shiftless irresponsibility," only rational choices among alternatives.
14'
Thus, to recognize that people behave rationally in response to incen-
tive structures is not to blame or condemn them, even though their
choices may be socially irresponsible. Rather, for Murray and propo-
nents of the Personal Responsibility Act, the solution is to change the
incentive structure (or the "rules") of the system producing the unde-
sirable behavior.
138. CHARLES MURRAY, LOSING GROUND 154 (1984).
139. Id. at 155.
140. Id. at 154-55, 162.
141. Id. at 157-62 (using the hypothetical young couple, Harold and Phyllis). Indeed,
some stress the shrewdness of people who are poor and homeless and their rational calcu-
lations of advantage. See, e.g., Brandt J. Goldstein, Panhandlers at Yale: A Case Study in
the Limits of Law, 27 IND. L. REv. 295 (1993) (examining the strategic planning element of
panhandling).
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At times, current political rhetoric echoes Murray's claim that
poor people act and respond rationally to incentives. 142 When gov-
ernment subsidizes such behavior as "illegitimacy" and procreation by
people who cannot afford to support their children, it is no surprise
that "you get more of what you pay for."'1 43 But the rhetoric more
often sounds themes of a lack of responsible self-direction and of se-
duction and entrapment by a perverse incentive structure. Poor peo-
ple are cast less as agents than as victims. For example, the House
Republicans' Contract With America assumes that incentives in the
welfare system lead people into a dependency trap: "The Great Soci-
ety has had the unintended consequence of snaring millions of Ameri-
cans into the welfare trap."'144 This "welfare trap" appears to
undermine people's moral capacity and produce both an economic de-
pendency and a destructive psychological state of dependency.
145 It
enmeshes welfare recipients in an incentive structure at odds with, as
President Clinton has put it, "core values American's share: work,
family, opportunity, [and] responsibility."1"6 People on welfare are
victims of a cruel system, caught-to use imagery from the floor de-
bate over the Personal Responsibility Act-in a "trap of dependency
142. See e.g., Eloise Anderson, A Senate Retreat on Welfare, N.Y. TiMmS, Sept. 16,
1995, at 19 (stating that "[welfare] recipients are not stupid" and, if given the right incen-
tives, will behave in ways common to "those of us not living on public dependency").
143. 141 CONG. REc. S11783 (daily ed. Aug. 7, 1995) (statement of Sen. Faircloth); see
Testimony of Bennett, supra note 22, at 3 ("[W]hat you subsidize you get more of. Welfare
is illegitimacy's economic life-support system.").
144. CornrAcr WrrH AMEmCA, supra note 8, at 65. Throughout the debate over the
Personal Responsibility Act, Republican legislators tellingly traced the welfare state to
President Johnson's Great Society programs of the 1960s and the supposed failures of lib-
eralism rather than to the Social Security Act of 1935. Id. at 66-68.
145. For a helpful analysis of these different meanings of dependency, see Nancy Fraser
& Linda Gordon, A Genealogy of Dependency: Tracing a Keyword of the U.S. Welfare
State, 19 SIGNs 309 (1994).
146. Work and Responsibility Act of 1994, Detailed Summary, supra note 47, at 1.
Such themes are prominent in the rhetoric of the Clinton Administration, representing a
"new" or centrist Democratic approach to welfare:
The current welfare system is at odds with the core values Americans share:
work, family, opportunity, [and] responsibility. Instead of rewarding and encour-
aging work, it does little to help people find work, and punishes those who go to
work. Instead of strengthening families and instilling personal responsibility, the
system penalizes two-parent families, and lets too many absent parents who owe
child support off the hook. Instead of promoting self-sufficiency, the culture of
welfare offices seems to create an expectation of dependence rather than inde-
pendence. And the ones who hate the welfare system the most are the people
who are trapped by it.
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and irresponsibility" rather than buoyed up by a "social safety net."'
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The imagery of enslavement also featured in the debate, echoing the
dramatic characterization by the sponsor of New Jersey's welfare re-
form legislation, Representative Bryant, of the existing welfare system
as a "modern form of slavery," breeding both irresponsibility and
criminal behavior.14
8
The imagery of welfare recipients as victims of misguided govern-
mental policies might suggest that they should be excused from blame
because of irresponsibility in the sense of incapacity. Yet these victims
are found doubly irresponsible because they engage in behavior that is
also irresponsible in the sense of being reckless, self-destructive, and
costly for society (such as "illegitimacy," family breakdown, crime,
and increasing poverty itself). 149 Society is another victim of the wel-
fare state. Welfare recipients' supposed irresponsibility is evidenced
by their unaccountability, that is, by subsidizing their procreation,
AFDC permits them to shift the costs of supporting their children to
the government and to hard-working taxpayers. 150 This unac-
countability engenders charges of unfairness and taxpayers' resent-
ment of welfare recipients as people who are not required to play by
the rules.151 Thus, the welfare recipient as victim gives way to the
147. See 141 CONG. REC. H3352-53 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1995) (statement of Rep.
Archer); id. at H3356-57 (statement of Rep. Camp); id. at H3360 (statement of Rep. John-
son); 141 CONG. REC. H3764 (daily ed. Mar. 24, 1995) (statement of Rep. Greenwood).
148. See, e.g., Wayne King, Trenton Panel Supports Plan for Welfare, N.Y. TIMES, Dec.
6, 1991, at B1, B6 (reporting statements of Rep. Bryant); 141 CONG. REc. H3384-85 (daily
ed. Mar. 21, 1995) (statements of Rep. Gooding); 141 CONG. REC. H3770 (daily ed. Mar.
24, 1995) (statements of Rep. Gooding); 141 CONG. REC. H3793 (daily ed. Mar. 24, 1995)
(statement of Rep. Funderburk).
149. See CONTRACT Wrm AMERICA, supra note 8, at 65 (including "illegitimacy,
crime, illiteracy, and more poverty" as "destructive social behavior"); 141 CONG. REC.
S11783 (daily ed. Aug. 7, 1995) (statement of Sen. Faircloth) (referring to "irresponsible
behavior of welfare recipients having children out of wedlock"). It may be helpful to com-
pare "irresponsibility" with culpability in criminal law. For example, one may be so "irre-
sponsible," in the sense of lacking capacity, that one should be excused for conduct. Or
one's conduct may be so "irresponsible," in the sense of recklessness, that one should be
held accountable.
150. See, e.g., 141 CONG. REC. S11783 (daily ed. Aug. 7, 1995) (statement of Sen. Fair-
cloth) (welfare recipients who have children "do not take responsibility because they do
not have to"); Anderson, supra note 142, at 19 (charging that current welfare system treats
women as victims by failing to hold them accountable to the rules "those of us not living on
public dependency" follow).
151. Consider Senator Gramm's charge: "What a great paradox it is that while families
across America are pulling the wagon, both husband and wife working every day to save
enough money to have a baby, they are paying taxes to support programs like [AFDC]
which is subsidizing people to have babies they cannot support." 141 CONG. REC. S13488
(daily ed. Sept. 13, 1995) (statement of Sen. Gramm).
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welfare recipient as culpable exploiter of the system: the images of
the able-bodied idler, the welfare queen, the deadbeat dad, or the
food stamp cheater all suggest evasion of responsibility by imposing
costs upon, or shifting them to, others.' 52 Although governmental
programs that were designed "to give a helping hand to the neediest"
have "bred" such problems, it is persons who engage in such activity
that must be held accountable by the government's "requiring" them
"to take personal responsibility for the decisions they make.' 53
The Contract With America sounds a prominent conservative
theme in contemporary politics: when (liberal) government attempts
to do good by assuming collective responsibility for solving problems,
it actually makes matters worse and produces such "unintended con-
sequences" as vitiating personal responsibility. 54 Yet, in the cam-
paign to inculcate personal responsibility, there is a curious tension
over the proper role of government. On the one hand, there appears
to be a fundamental repudiation of the safety net and the welfare
state, a repudiation manifest in diagnoses of the problem as govern-
ment going astray by assuming responsibility. On the other hand, pro-
ponents of personal responsibility seek to use government as a moral
tutor and agent of character transformation: the problem is not that
government has acted on behalf of the poor, but how it has done so.' 55
Government should show true compassion not by subsidizing irre-
152. For some examples from the recent debates over the Personal Responsibility Act,
see 141 CONG. REc. H3362-63 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1995) (statement of Rep. Ensign) (re-
porting resentment of working mother with a disability that her tax dollars go to someone
on welfare); id. at H3367 (statement of Rep. Holden) (defending punitive measures for
"deadbeat parents" because "[w]e owe it to our children to have the financial support of
both parents and to the taxpayers who fund the irresponsible behavior of deadbeat par-
ents"); 141 CONG. REc. H3506 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 1995) (statement of Rep. Hutchinson)
(noting resentment by the working poor of able-bodied welfare recipients); 141 CONG.
REc. H3793 (daily ed. Mar. 24, 1995) (statement of Rep. Funderburk) (referring to "three
generations of Americans who do nothing but sit at home waiting for the next government
check to arrive"); 141 CONG. REc. H-3394-95 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1995) (statement of Rep.
Foley) (describing food stamp fraud and use of food stamps to buy junk food).
153. CONTRAcr WrrH AmEmcA, supra note 8, at 65.
154. "Unintended consequences" evokes Murray's claims concerning the "unintended
outcomes" of the policies of the Great Society, as well as his "law of unintended rewards:"
that social programs increase the net value of being in the condition that they seek to
change or make more tolerable. See MURRAY, supra note 138, at 179, 212-16.
155. Although I cannot pursue it here, there is a similar ambivalence about federalism:
advocates of the block grant approach to welfare promote it as returning power to the
states, yet the federal government maintains a tutorial role by restricting how states may
use federal funds (e.g., family caps). Compare CONtRAcr Wri AMERICA, supra note 8, at
66 (describing "main thrust" of Personal Responsibility Act as "to give states greater con-
trol" over welfare benefit programs) with id (detailing what states "must" do under Act).
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sponsibility, but by tutoring the poor in personal responsibility. As
the Contract With America's reference to requiring personal responsi-
bility suggests, welfare recipients, with compromised moral capacities,
must be led firmly down the path toward responsible self-government.
To accomplish responsible self-government is to be held accountable
to a specified set of norms about responsible conduct.
The phrase "tough love" is used in welfare reform discourse to
describe the principle of personal responsibility that government
should promote in welfare programs. In this rhetoric, analogies to the
parent-child relationship characterize the relationship between the
government/taxpayers and welfare recipients.156 For example, the
parent must teach children right and wrong, but when children fail to
live up to expectations, they have to know that the parent will hold
them accountable and discipline, not reward, them. Similarly, welfare
recipients should be made aware that they will be "held accountable
for their actions and disciplined when necessary.' 15 7 One Congress-
person employed this analogy to support the elimination of cash bene-
fits for certain procreative behavior: a responsible parent would not
reward an irresponsible child with cash payments for an apartment,
and a responsible employer would not give workers a raise simply be-
cause they had additional children. 158
In such analogies there are two relevant loci of responsibility: the
responsibility of those at the top of the hierarchical relationship (par-
ent, employer, government) and the responsibility or irresponsibility
of those at the bottom (child, employee, welfare recipient). Some in-
vocations of these paternalistic analogies clearly targeted adolescent
females who are believed to be bearing children in order to receive
AFDC and get their own apartments. While Democrats charged that
the Personal Responsibility Act was a "cruel" and "mean-spirited" bill
that was "tough on children,"'159 Republicans responded by contend-
ing that the real cruelty existed in a welfare system that traps people
in dependency and encourages "children having children.' 60 These
156. See 141 CONG. REC. H3359 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1995) (statement of Rep. Clement)
(referring to "tough love" and parent-child analogy); id. at H3362 (statement of Rep. Eng-
lish) (referring to "tough love" approach).
157. 141 CONG. REc. H3359 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1995) (statement of Rep. Clement).
158. 141 CONG. REc. H3383 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1995) (statement of Rep. Riggs).
159. See, e.g., 141 CONG. REc. H3355 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1995) (statement of Rep.
Ford); id. at H3358 (statement of Rep. Lewis); id. at H3360-61 (statement of Rep. Coyne);
id. at H3397 (statement of Rep. Tucker).
160. See, e.g., 141 CONG. REc. H3356-57 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1995) (statement of Rep.
Camp) (describing how welfare system has "literally trapped" Americans in "cycle of de-
pendency"); id. at H3361 (statement of Rep. Dunn); id. at H3382 (statement of Rep. Cun-
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adolescent females are deemed irresponsible not only because they
lack the capacity for responsible moral choice-succumbing to the in-
centives of an "irresponsible" public policy-but also because they
lack the capacity to be good mothers. Memorably, Representative
Shaw claimed that the federal government has set up "children" in
housekeeping, with whom his Democratic opponent "would not leave
his cat... over the weekend.' 61 Yet charges of such unaccountability
and incapacity also target adult welfare recipients. 162 Perhaps the
most dramatic imagery of compromised capacity exists in the animal
analogies used by some Republican legislators to explain the dangers
of tampering with the natural order and undermining self-suffi-
ciency.163 These legislators compared providing welfare to feeding
and caring for alligators and wolves, thus fostering dependency. How-
ever striking, these themes of the moral incapacity of the poor and the
diagnosis of their need for regulation have a long history. 64
Attention to the racial dimension of these images of irresponsibil-
ity is critical. Even when the rhetoric does not overtly use racial
terms, it may aim particularly at the "dependency and irresponsible
reproduction" of people of color, especially African Americans. 165
For example, many critics of welfare rhetoric observe that the stereo-
typical image of the welfare recipient is a black, unmarried woman.
Although white women in fact constitute a slightly greater percentage
of all AFDC recipients, "no one has a clear image of who or where
these [white] recipients are."'1 66 The fact that a higher percentage of
ningham); 141 CONG. REC. H3764 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 1995) (statement of Rep.
Greenwood).
161. 141 CONG. REC. H3516 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 1995) (statement of Rep. Shaw).
162. Several legislators illustrated the failures of the current welfare system with
highly-publicized newspaper stories of bad parenting by particular welfare recipients, for
example, letting children go hungry and live in squalor while spending benefit money on
drugs. See 141 CONG. R C. H3382 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1995) (statement of Rep. Cunning-
ham); 141 CONG. REC. H3504 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 1995) (statement of Rep. Roth); a at
H3506 (statement of Rep. Hayworth). For a feminist analysis of the way in which such
anecdotes of "bad mothers" feature in welfare reform rhetoric, see Williams, supra note 78.
163. 141 CONG. REc. H3766 (daily ed. Mar. 24, 1995) (statement of Rep. Mica) (alliga-
tors); id. at H3772 (statement of Rep. Cubin) (wolves). Here, the social Darwinism im-
plicit in much conservative welfare reform rhetoric explicitly reared its head.
164. See JOEL F. HIIANDLER & YEHESKEL HASENFELD, THE MORAL CONSTRUCTION OF
POVERTY (1991); MICHA L B. KATz, THE UNDESERVING POOR: FROM THE WAR ON POV-
ERTY TO THE WAR ON WELFARE (1989).
165. See Hacker, supra note 123, at 45; see also Williams, supra note 78, at 1168 (argu-
ing that media representation of poverty and the poor, even without mentioning welfare,
"plays directly to white, middle-class fears of the African-American underclass").
166. Hacker, supra note 123, at 45. See also FiNEMAN, supra note 12, at 107-08 (dis-
cussing how stereotype of African-American single mothers results in their classification as
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African-American women are single parents because of nonmarital
births than because of divorce, and that a higher percentage of white
women become single parents by divorce or separation than by
nonmarital births, may also contribute to why "illegitimacy" is more
readily associated with welfare dependency, pathology, and social cri-
sis than is divorce.167 Further, even claims of a common crisis may
mask harsher and more punitive attitudes concerning the reproductive
and mothering behavior of women of color.168 Indeed, Lucy Williams
argues that public perceptions of the poor as "other," i.e., African
Americans who have "warped values," undergird such behavior modi-
fication measures as family caps.169
It appears that the restoration of personal responsibility requires
stern measures. Presumably, bad habits like welfare dependency are
hard to break, especially if they erode the capacity for responsible
self-government. Alternatively, on a rational actor model, if people
are not sufficiently deterred by disincentives, they may continue be-
havior that was rational under the old system. In The Coming White
Underclass, Murray argued that societies have always relied more on
sticks than carrots to deter "illegitimacy" and made a proposal, at one
time thought to be radical, to eliminate all public assistance to unmar-
ried mothers.170 The Personal Responsibility Act, as passed by the
House, utilized such a method of outright denial of assistance. The
Act prohibited states from giving cash assistance to, among other
groups, children born "out-of-wedlock" to teen mothers, to teen
mothers until they reach eighteen, and to additional children born to
"underclass"); Dorothy E. Roberts, Racism and Patriarchy in the Meaning of Motherhood,
1 AM. U. J. GENDER & L. 1, 25 (1993) (explaining how condemnation of unwed mothers is
rooted in images of the Black matriarch). Statistics concerning the racial breakdown of the
1992 population of parents receiving AFDC are: white, 38.9%; black, 37.2%; Hispanic
(who can be of any race), 17.8%; Native American, 1.4%; and Asian, 2.8%. 1994 GREEN
BOOK, supra note 58, at 402.
167. See Dowd, supra note 17, at 45-46 (observing that the "most stigmatized single-
parent families, never-married parents, are more common among African-Americans,
while divorced single-parent families are more common among whites").
168. For discussion of such attitudes and differential treatment, see Roberts, supra note
166, at 7-15 (arguing that racism and patriarchy have shaped Black women's and white
women's reproductive and mothering experiences from slavery to the present). For an
illuminating historical study of the differential societal interpretation of single black and
white women's pregnancies, indicating that black women who became pregnant were
viewed as more culpable and deserving of punishment, see RICKiE SOLINGER, WAKE UP
LITTLE SUSIE: SINGLE PREGNANCY AND RACE BEFORE ROE V. WADE (1992).
169. Lucy A. Williams, The Ideology of Division: Behavior Modification Welfare Re-
form Proposals, 102 YALE L.J. 719, 740-41 (1992).
170. Murray, supra note 5, at A14.
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families already receiving benefits.171 Although the Senate's version
of the Personal Responsibility Act would have allowed states the op-
tion of denying assistance to such adult and teen mothers and their
children, the "compromise" legislation passed by Congress requires a
family cap for families already receiving assistance, unless a state ex-
pressly adopts legislation to exempt itself from such a prohibition and
permits aid to teen mothers only when certain educational and resi-
dential requirements are met.172 In short, welfare reform must secure
responsibility and accountability by using sanctions to signal precisely
what is meant by "responsible" and "irresponsible" conduct.
(2) "Illegitimacy," Dependency, and Women's Agency
The Contract With America, the Personal Responsibility Act, and
the floor debates over the Act manifest the view that welfare itself has
been the most potent cause of "illegitimacy" and all that it signifies-
paternal abdication of responsibility, "fatherlessness," the destruction
of the family, adolescent pregnancy, crime, and the like.173 In turn,
out-of-wedlock births lead to intergenerational welfare dependency
and other social ills.' 74 Promoting marriage and reducing "illegiti-
macy" are among the primary purposes of the Personal Responsibility
Act, and the Contract With America indicts the current welfare system
171. H.R. 4, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 101 (proposed § 405) (1995). The Act would also
deny benefits to families who do not cooperate in paternity proceedings; to families of an
individual who, after attaining age 18, has received benefits for five years; and to lawful
immigrants and undocumented aliens. H.R. 4, §§ 101 (proposed § 405), 401 ("Ineligibility
of Aliens for Public Welfare Assistance"). The Clinton plan would allow states the optioii
of limiting benefit increases "when additional children are conceived by parents already on
AFDC," so long as states allow families to "earn back" the lost benefit amount through
disregarded income from earnings or child support and ensure that parents have access to
family planning services. Work and Responsibility Act of 1994, Detailed Summary, supra
note 47, at 35.
172. See Work and Opportunity Act of 1995, H.R. 4, § 101 (proposed § 406 (B) and
(C)); Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act of 1995, H.R. 4, § 103 (proposed
§ 408, Prohibitions; Requirements). With respect to teens, the Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportunity, Act does not bar aid to teen mothers outright, but prohibits states from
assisting teen parents who do not attend high school or a training program and who do not
live in adult-supervised settings. ld. (proposed § 408 (5) and (6)).
173. See CoNTRAcr Wrri AMERICA, supra note 8, at 65; H.R. 4, 104th Cong., 1st Sess.
§ 100 (1995) (citing negative economic and social consequences associated with single-par-
ent families); 141 CONG. REc. H-3365 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1995) (statement of Rep. Martini)
(charging that welfare has "subsidized the rise of the single-parent family"); id& at H3396
(statement of Rep. Smith) (linking welfare payments to the "resulting explosion in illegiti-
macy and the breakdown of the family"); 141 CONG. REc. H3503-04 (daily ed. Mar. 22,
1995) (statement of Rep. Talent) (arguing that out-of-wedlock births lead to "an awful lot
of terrible social pathologies").
174. H.R. 4, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 100 (1995).
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because its "massive welfare spending" fails to "reduce illegiti-
macy."'175 The welfare debate mirrors the over- and underinclusive-
ness of the broader rhetoric of reproductive irresponsibility by using
"illegitimacy" to signify single mothers and welfare mothers, and mar-
riage to signal responsible reproduction.176 With the problem of pov-
erty and its solution defined in terms of reducing "illegitimacy," it is
not surprising that Congress' "findings" accompanying major welfare
reform legislation focus on reproductive behavior and family forms,
rather than factors such as macroeconomic contributors to unemploy-
ment and underemployment, the difficulty parents face finding ade-
quate and affordable child care and medical benefits, and the causes
of the disproportionate poverty of mothers (especially women of
color).
177
It is certainly reasonable to question the possible incentive effects
and social consequences of governmental programs and to determine
whether they are at odds with the purposes underlying such programs.
However, what is striking is the lack of complexity and empirical
foundation in the proposed behavioral models of how welfare ac-
counts for women's (and men's) reproductive choices and behaviors.
One reductive assumption in such models is that the availability of
welfare benefits, which are below the poverty level in every state (and
have declined in real value over the last two decades), provides incen-
tives for women to procreate outside of marriage. 78 This reductive
portrait of women and the causal effects of welfare on their motiva-
175. See id. at §§ 100, 101 (stating government's interest in ending dependency by pro-
moting work and marriage and discouraging out-of-wedlock births); CorrrAcr WrriH
AMERICA, supra note 8, at 65 ("Our Contract will achieve what some thirty years of mas-
sive welfare spending has not been able to accomplish: reduce illegitimacy, require work,
and save taxpayers money.").
176. See supra Part I.A.2. One striking example occurred when Representative Smith
read from a magazine article about fatherlessness to illustrate his claims about "illegiti-
macy" and welfare dependency, despite the fact that the article focused almost entirely on
"fatherlessness" created by divorce. See 141 CONG. REC. H3396 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1995)
(statement of Rep. Smith) (discussing Joseph P. Shapiro et al., Honor Thy Children, U.S.
NEWS & WORLD REP., Feb. 27, 1995, at 38).
177. See Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Act, H.R. 4, § 101.
178. Charles Murray's book, Losing Ground, is well known for advancing this view.
See MURRAY, supra note 138, at 154-66. For another example, see Robert Rector, Memo
to: President-Elect Clinton, 12 HERrrAGE FOUND. REPs. 1 (Jan. 18, 1993) (maintaining that
welfare creates economic disincentives). The argument in text is similar to David Duke's
discredited argument in his Louisiana gubernatorial campaign. See Robert Sutro, Duke
Campaigns on Distorted Facts Despite Rebuttals and Clarifications, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 12,
1991, at A18. For AFDC benefit levels, see Living at the Bottom: An Analysis of 1994
AFDC Benefit Levels (Center on Social Welfare Policy and Law, Publication No. 210-2,
June 1994).
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tions has played a central role in recent welfare reform efforts, despite
the substantial body of scholarship refuting the charge that the availa-
bility of welfare benefits induces nonmarital births, and despite testi-
mony before Congress that there is no solid evidence for concluding
that eliminating benefits will significantly reduce nonmarital births.179
Nor has evidence of actual demographic patterns-that is, that the
families of women on AFDC are no bigger than those of the rest of
the population and, indeed, tend to be smaller-exerted any counter-
vailing effect on the imagery of the welfare recipient/rational actor
procreating in response to incentives. 180
Moreover, the initial evaluation of New Jersey's family cap mea-
sure reveals no statistically significant difference between birth rates
of women subject to the cap and those who are not.' 8' Therefore, one
might persuasively argue (as some members of Congress did in oppo-
sition to family caps) that responsible political officials should not sup-
port a measure that may simply reduce the income of poor families
with young children.1m2 But for some, the absence of empirical sup-
179. William Julius Wilson offered empirical refutation of Murray's claims concerning
the incentive effects of welfare upon nonmarital births, particularly within the black com-
munity, and argued instead for the causal significance of male joblessness. See WILLIAM
JULIUs WILSON, THE TRULY DISADVANTAGED 90-92, 95-100 (1987); see also Welfare and
Out-of-Wedlock Births: A Research Summary (statement of 87 social scientists) (on file
with author); Barbara Vobeja, Gauging Welfare's Role in Motherhood. Sociologists Ques-
tion Whether 'Family Caps' Are a Legitimate Solution, WASH. POST, June 2, 1994, at Al,
A12 (reporting that acceptance by politicians of causal link between welfare benefits and
birth rates contradicts work of social scientists). For empirical refutations offered in testi-
mony given to the House Ways and Means Committee, see Testimony of Blank, supra note
137, at 2, 4-5 (summarizing the research evidence and concluding that "AFDC payments
are not related to women's fertility or the effect is very small;" predicting that changes in
governmental programs will not significantly reduce such births); 141 CONG. REc. H3517
(daily ed. Mar. 22, 1995) (statement of Rep. Ford) (stating that expert testimony presented
to Congress suggested very strongly that there is no evidence that teen mothers have ba-
bies for the purpose of collecting welfare benefits).
180. See MARK R. RANK, LIVNG ON THE EDGE: THE REALITES OF WELFARE IN
AMERICA 72-73 (1994); 1994 GREEN BOOK, supra note 58, at 401 (average AFDC family
size in 1992 was 1.9 children).
181. See Michael C. Laracy, "If It Seems Too Good to Be True, It Probably Is." Obser-
vations on Rutgers University's Initial Evaluation Findings that New Jersey's Child Exclu-
sion Law Has Not Reduced AFDC Birth Rates... Contrary to Previous Claims by Its
Supporters 10 (Annie E. Casey Found., June 21, 1995); see also Melinda Henneberger, State
Aid Is Cappe4 But to What Effect?, N.Y. TrmEs, Apr. 11, 1995, at Al.
182. The reference to "responsible" in text draws on Laracy, supra note 181. In the
Senate, Senator Paul Wellstone raised the issue of the lack of empirical support for the
claim that benefits induce births and referred to the Rutgers study (cited supra note 181).
See 141 CONG. REc. S11744, 11750 (daily ed. Aug. 7, 1995) (statement of Sen. Wellstone).
Senator Moynihan also referred to the Rutgers study during the Senate debate and has
repeatedly expressed skepticism about such causal claims. See 141 CONG. Rtc. S11750
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port for such arguments may be beside the point, for even if one
grants that welfare does not "cause" illegitimacy, it should no longer
"subsidize" it.183
This reductive model of incentives assumes that, just as welfare
causes "illegitimacy," so reforming welfare is an effective solution to
the problem. It ignores the fact that the rise in nonmarital births is
not limited to women who rely, or will likely rely, on AFDC for sup-
port, but is spread throughout the income distribution.184 In fact,
since 1982, the most dramatic growth in single motherhood is among
educated, wealthier, and professional women (some have coined this
the "Murphy Brown" phenomenon). 8 5 As many scholars have ob-
served, this increase in single-parent families is primarily attributable
not to welfare, but to broader cultural trends concerning divorce, pre-
marital sexuality, nonmarital pregnancy and parenting (including, to
the dismay of some, the decline of stigma), decreases in married wo-
men's fertility rates, increases in women's work force participation, as
well as to certain macroeconomic trends. 186
Another assumption inherent in these models is that women and
adolescent females exercise a high degree of agency in their reproduc-
tive lives. Thus, like rational actors, they can and will respond to in-
centives and disincentives, that is, to carrots and sticks, as well as
control their male sexual partners. For example, Gary Bauer, head of
the Family Research Council, stated that he supported the benefit ex-
clusions in the Personal Responsibility Act, notwithstanding his or-
ganization's opposition to legal abortion, because he hoped they
would re-create "that culture where women tell men to get lost."'1 87
Similarly, a central justification for the New Jersey family cap legisla-
tion was to encourage rational and responsible decisionmaking by
(daily ed. Aug. 7, 1995) (statement of Sen. Moynihan); Daniel P. Moynihan, Congress
Builds A Coffin, N.Y. REv. BooKs, Jan. 11, 1996, at 33, 34-35 (reprinting part of the Con-
gressional Record of December 12, 1995).
183. Testimony of Bennett, supra note 22, at 3 ("Welfare may not cause illegitimacy, but
it does make it economically viable .... And what you subsidize you get more of .... ).
184. See GAO REPORT, FAMILIES ON WELFARE-SHARP RISE IN NEVER-MARRIED
WOMEN REFLECTS SOCIETAL TREND May 31, 1994 [hereinafter FAMILIES ON WELFARE
II]; Testimony of Blank, supra note 137, at 3; Sam Fulwood, Out-of-Wedlock Births Rise
Sharply Among Most Groups, L.A. TIMES, July 14, 1993, at Al (discussing FERTILITY OF
AMERICAN WOMEN (Census Bureau Report, June 1992)).
185. See Jason DeParle, Big Rise in Births Outside Wedlock, N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 1993,
at Al; Roni Rabin, When Baby Makes Two, NEWSDAY, July 29, 1993, at 64.
186. See FAMILIES ON WELFARE II, supra note 184; Testimony of Blank, supra note
137, at 2-4; Lynn Smith, Mothers Go It Alone, L.A. TIMES, July 22, 1993, at El.




AFDC recipients about economic costs of procreation.188 In legal
challenges to this scheme, litigants questioned this assumption of
agency and argued not only that women did not make reproductive
decisions based on the availability of more benefits, but also that
many pregnancies of women on public assistance, like those of many
women not on public assistance, are unintended. 8 9 Moreover, restric-
tive laws governing access to abortion (laws restricting funding and
counseling, as well as informed consent requirements) and limited ac-
cess to family planning and contraceptive services introduce further
constraints on poor women's supposed "rational" decisionmaking
about reproduction. 90 As I elaborate in Part III, this assumption of
rational calculation and control is often problematic for women in
general and particularly so with respect to adolescent females, who
experience high rates of rape and sexual abuse.' 9'
(3) Welfare, Gender Ideology, and "Responsible Fatherhood"
The fourth model of welfare recipients, the deviator from natural
gender roles, features in the dramatic (and problematic) gender ideol-
ogy present in some conservative analyses of welfare. This gender
ideology warrants examination because some of its proponents are
among the most prominent voices in the welfare debate. Moreover,
traces of it are found across the broader spectrum of voices associated
with the emerging "responsible fatherhood" movement, which shares
an uneasiness about women forming families without men and is often
critical of the existing welfare system for its supposed messages about
and impact upon fathers.
In this gender ideology, the rise in welfare rates and in single-
parent families traces to the pernicious effects of the government's
tampering with proper gender roles. By facilitating women's ability to
maintain a family independent of men's financial support, welfare is
harmful because it renders men unnecessary, depriving them of their
cultural role of provider and leading them to seek satisfaction in pred-
atory, promiscuous, and irresponsible sex-including "irresponsible
188. See supra text accompanying notes 50-51.
189. See Complaint, C.K. v. Shalala, 883 F. Supp. 991 (D.N.J. 1995); see also Dorothy
Roberts, Exploding the Myths Behind New Jersey Welfare Reforn, N.J.L.J., Jan. 25,1993, at
21 (arguing that New Jersey's welfare reform measures were based on erroneous assump-
tions about women on welfare).
190. See Rutherford, supra note 123, at 258-67.
191. See sources cited supra note 14 and see infra Part III.B.2.
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fathering of random progeny," children they will not support. 192 This
argument harbors a view about undomesticated masculinity drawn
from "nature" and from sociobiological notions of a natural male irre-
sponsibility or sexual imperative to spread seed widely and engage
promiscuously in short-term sexual encounters. 193 Motherhood,
George Gilder argues, is largely shaped by biology or nature, but fa-
therhood must be defined by culture. Like Gilder, Blankenhorn ar-
gues that, in contrast to motherhood, fatherhood is a cultural
construct, a role necessary to domesticate a masculinity that otherwise
inclines in the direction of violence, sexual aggression, and promiscu-
ity.194 Murray argues that "the constants are that boys like to sleep
with girls and that girls think babies are endearing."'195 Further, he
identifies himself as a "disciple" of Gilder with respect to the idea that
men "are socialized to a very large degree by women's expectations of
them.'1 9
6
Gilder argues that it is women's wombs (with their promise of the
future) and the lure of monogamous sex in a patriarchal household
that brings young men into marriage and out of an irresponsible sexu-
ality. Offering a strange new twist on the theme of men's fear of cuck-
oldry, a prominent one in sociobiological discourse,197 Gilder argues
that the welfare state has "cuckolded" men by robbing them of their
role as husband and provider by inducing women with children to de-
192. Irving Kristol, Life Without Father, WALL ST. J., Nov. 3, 1994, at A18. See
GEORGE GILDER, WEALTH AND POVERTY 115, 114-23 (1981).
193. See GILDER, supra note 192, at 171; JAMES Q. WILSON, THE MORAL SENSE 165-90
(1993) (suggesting that males are more difficult to socialize for roles in family life). For an
elaboration of the differences in male and female reproductive imperatives or "sexual
strategies," see DAVID M. Buss, THE EVOLUTION OF DESIRE: STRATEGIES OF HUMAN
MATING 19-72 (1994); ROBERT WRIGHT, THE MORAL ANIMAL 33-92 (1994). Cf. FAYE
GINSBURG, CONTESTED LIVES 9 (1989) (observing that a prevalent assumption in the anti-
abortion movement is that sexual irresponsibility is natural to men, but unnatural to
women).
194. BLANKENHORN, supra note 7, at 3,4, 25, 66; GILDER, supra note 192, at 122, 136.
The context of Blankenhorn's assertion is not welfare but the general problem of men's
abandonment of paternal responsibility.
195. Murray, supra note 5, at A14.
196. Firing Line Debate, supra note 36, at 37 (remarks of Murray).
197. See WRIGHT, supra note 193, at 66-72; Buss, supra note 193, at 125-31. Buss main-
tains that male sexual jealousy is an adaptive mechanism responding to male fear of cuck-
oldry, a jealousy at the root of male efforts to control women's reproductive lives and much
male violence against women. Buss, supra note 193, at 125-31. See also RICHARD A. Pos-
NER, SEX AND REASON 95-98, 112, 214 (1992) (explaining male sexual jealousy and a vari-
ety of customs and practices designed to secure paternity by policing and controlling
women as adaptive or rational).
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pend instead upon government (which may be a better provider). 98
It is instructive to recall former Vice President Quayle's objection to
this substitution: "A welfare check is not a father, the state is not a
husband." 99 Indeed, being a provider, some conservative commenta-
tors argue, is at the core of manhood.200
Such accounts assume that women, in their role as gatekeepers,
can and should exercise their agency by "just saying no" to sex and
pregnancy outside of marriage. The "failure of families to form" re-
flects women's failure to engage successfully in their proper cultural
task of domesticating or "taming" men into marriage, monogamous
commitment, and paternal support of children.20 ' With the rise of sex-
ual "permissiveness" associated with the 1960s, women supposedly be-
gan to tolerate male deviance from this standard, so that men are not
yoked into domesticity in exchange for women's sexual favors but are
able to get sex without commitment. 2 2 But part of the social crisis,
according to these accounts, may be that it is no longer possible for
women to domesticate men because boys' lack of prior socialization
by fathers has unleashed some sort of dangerous masculinity of which
women and girls are victims. Women feature here both as agents who
should "tame" men and as victims of natural male irresponsibility.
This tale of thwarted masculinity presents baffling questions
about the nature of masculinity and the role of men as fathers. It is
instructive to consider this theme in the context of arguments about
the pathology and social disorder attributed to "fatherless" families.
As an initial matter, father absence serves as a cause of a family's
198. GILDER, supra note 192, at 71-72, 115. This is a particularly strange twist because
here the government supports the child, while the biological father does not; in contrast,
the cuckold unwittingly supports a child he supposes to be his own, but who is actually the
child of another man.
199. See supra text accompanying note 54. Compare the famous statement by National
Welfare Rights Organization founder Johnnie Tillmon: "AFDC is like a supersexist mar-
riage. You trade in a man for the man." Johnnie Tillmon, Welfare, Ms., July/Aug. 1995, at
50 (reprinting essay from 1972 issue of Ms.).
200. GILDER, supra note 192, at 136; Kristol, supra note 192. See also BLANKENH RN,
supra note 7, at 212-13 (reporting that, in his interviews with fathers about their most im-
portant contributions to family, "provider" was almost always the first word spoken).
201. See William Raspberry, Women Taming Men, WASH. POSr, Nov. 24, 1993, at A17
(discussing ideas of A.L.T. Allen). See also David W. Murray, Countdown For the Family,
SACRAMENTO BEE, May 1, 1994, at FI (stating that, across cultures, the fact that "women
domesticate men who marry them has been widely noted").
202. Both William Buckley and Charles Murray stressed sexual permissiveness and
changes in sexual mores in their remarks made in support of the proposition that "Welfare
Has Done More Harm Than Good." Firing Line Debate, supra note 36, at 28-29, 31-32.
See also Raspberry, supra note 201, at A17.
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poverty and lack of material resources, which has consequences for
children's and mothers' well being. But, there appears to be some-
thing about female-headed households and/or the absence of fathers
that spawns pathological behaviors. Consider the following passage
from Moynihan:
From the wild Irish slums of the 19th century Eastern seaboard to
the riot-torn suburbs of Los Angeles, there is one unmistakable les-
son in American history: a community that allows a large number
of young men to grow up in broken families, dominated by women,
never acquiring any stable relationship to male authority, never ac-
quiring any set of rational expectations about the future-that com-
munity asks for and gets chaos. Crime, violence, unrest,
unrestrained lashing out at the whole social structure-that is not
only to be expected; it is very near to inevitable.203
Moynihan's portrait of this dangerous family form appears to lo-
cate the problem both in female domination of the family and in the
absence of male authority, contending that a mother cannot afford her
children a stable relationship to authority or rational expectations
about the future. Male children thus grow up to be unsocialized and
dangerous men. Similarly, Murray warns that when the number of
boys without fathers in a community reaches a critical mass, as in "the
black inner city," "the values of unsocialized male adolescents [are]
made norms-physical violence, immediate gratification, and preda-
tory sex.' '2°4 Women are thus doubly unable to control males, either
as sons or as sexual partners.
Less dramatically, David Blankenhorn, in his recent book Father-
less America, maintains that fathers play a special role not only in pro-
viding for and protecting children, but also in "paternal cultural
transmission: a father's distinctive capacity to contribute to the iden-
tity, character, and competence of his children. °20 5 Fatherlessness, he
argues, also has serious costs for the men who do not assume the re-
sponsibilities of the roles of father and husband. Men who become
unanchored from these socially productive roles become generally un-
anchored in their lives, which is costly for women and society because
such men are more likely than married men to engage in self-destruc-
tive and violent behavior, including casual sex, nonmarital childbear-
ing, and violence against women.
20 6
203. Moynihan, supra note 19, at 26.
204. Murray, supra note 5, at A14. See also Lee Smith, The New Wave of Illegitimacy,
FORTUNE, Apr. 18, 1994, at 81, 82 (quoting Murray). Others warn that testosterone is "the
most dangerous chemical known." Id. (reporting views of unidentified source).
205. BLANKENHORN, supra note 7, at 25.
206. Id. at 36-39.
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On the one hand, men outside the fatherhood role are irresponsi-
ble, antisocial, sexually predatory, and violent. On the other hand, a
woman parenting without a father's presence produces a dangerous
family form, particularly dangerous for boys, who turn out to be
young males who manifest the same dangerous behaviors as undomes-
ticated men. Although this analysis supposes that men are both the
problem and the solution, one might also conclude that the evidence
drawn from nature warrants endorsement of the model of the single
(female) parent family. That is, males are simply too unreliable and
irresponsible as providers and childrearers (not to mention violent) to
risk bringing them into the household.207 In any event, given the unat-
tractive portrait of men and marriage found in this gender ideology,
one can hardly blame women if they exercise available options to
avoid both. 208
This tale of the breakdown of proper gender roles offers a com-
plete universe of causal explanations for reproductive behavior, with
little relation to or regard for such factors as rates of male unemploy-
ment, bad marriages, women's desire for independence, and the like.
It is no doubt more riveting than a searching examination of reasons
why rates of nonmarital pregnancy and households are increasing and
rates of marriage decreasing. Although it is easy enough to dismiss
this tale, it may warrant more serious examination. At its core are
issues of considerable relevance to a discussion of reproduction and
responsibility-the meaning of, and the relationship between, man-
hood and fatherhood, men's responsibilities concerning families, and
the configuration of families.
In recent years, a new "social movement" has emerged, calling
for "responsible fatherhood" and diagnosing "fatherlessness" as a
central, if not the "most urgent," social problem driving an array of
other social ills.209 The voices in this movement cross racial and class
207. See Mary Anne Case, Of Richard Epstein and Other Radical Feminists, 18 HARV.
J.L. & PuB. PoL'Y 369,390-96 (1995) (suggesting that an optimistic reading of sociobiologi-
cal evidence would lend support to making the mother-child unit the basic family model as
proposed by FINEMAN, supra note 12, at 230-33); Alan Ryan, Only Connect, NEw REPUB-
LIC, Oct. 4, 1994, at 33, 36-37 (reviewing WLsoN, supra note 193) (suggesting that "if men
are by nature irresponsible and women are by nature caring, then surely one-parent fami-
lies ought to be preferred over traditional ones").
208. Why must marriage be the only way to "tame" men and secure responsible behav-
ior? Fineman argues that the legal system should premise fathers' rights on actual caretak-
ing of children or on contracts with mothers who act as caretakers. See FImMAN, supra
note 12, at 229, 234-35.
209. BLAN EINoN, supra note 7, at 1. Some of the organizations associated with this
movement are: The National Fatherhood Initiative, founded by Dan Eberly, of which
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lines, sounding common themes about the importance of fathers and
the dire consequences for women, children, society, and indeed men
when men flee paternal responsibility and fatherhood is no longer at
the core of cultural definitions of manhood. These consequences in-
clude not only family poverty and juvenile delinquency, but also in-
creased criminal activity and violence against women committed by
men unanchored by a family unit.210 In the words of Charles Ballard,
the leader of the Institute for Responsible Fatherhood and Family Re-
vitalization: "[T]o me, the father isn't the problem. He's the
solution."
211
Why are fathers important? As Murray and Gilder suggest, the
male role as provider is at the core of some visions of fatherhood, as is
the male role as patriarchal authority figure and head of household.
212
Martha Fineman concludes that the rhetoric of father's rights and re-
sponsibilities seldom goes beyond these notions.213 Voices in the "re-
sponsible fatherhood" movement do insist that fathers should be
providers and honor their financial obligations, but they resist, if not
resent, the reduction of the father to merely a financial resource.
21 4
They state that caretaking and nurturing are important tasks, not only
David Blankenhorn is Chairman; The National Institute for Responsible Fatherhood and
Family Revitalization, founded by Charles Ballard; National Center for Fathering, founded
by Ken Canfield; and Promise Keepers, founded by Bill McCartney. See Susan Chira, War
Over Role of American Fathers, N.Y. TiMEs, June 14, 1994, at A22; Voices in the Father-
hood Debate, L.A. TIMEs, Mar. 1, 1995, at E4; Gustav Niebuhr, Men Crowd Stadiums to
Fulfill their Souls, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 6, 1995, at 1. For media coverage of the fatherhood
movement, see, e.g., Chira, supra; Clint O'Connor, Symposium Assesses State of Father-
hood, CLEV. PLAIN DEALER, June 16, 1995, at 14A; Tamar Lewin, Creating Fathers Out of
Men With Children, N.Y. TIMES, June 18, 1995, at 1. For references to a new "social move-
ment," see, e.g., O'Connor, supra, at 14A; ABC World News Tonight: American Agenda-
Importance of Fathers (ABC television broadcast, Dec. 14, 1994) (LEXIS, News library,
Script file) (highlighting groups advocating paternal responsibility).
210. See sources cited supra note 209 (discussing these themes). Vice President Gore
recently convened a panel at the White House to examine the "devastating" effect of dis-
appearing fathers on children and society. O'Connor, supra note 209, at 14A. The Million
Man March, organized by Nation of Islam leader, Louis Farrakhan, called for African-
American men to "atone" for their behavior toward women and children and to pledge
never to engage in violence toward their families. See William Douglas & Monte R.
Young, Meeting for Revival, NEWSDAY, Oct. 17, 1995, at A5.
211. Charles Augustus Ballard, Prodigal Dad: How We Bring Fathers Home to Their
Children, 71 HERITAGE FouND. POL. REv., Winter 1995, at 66.
212. See William Safire, What Fathers Want, N.Y. TIMES, June 16, 1994, at A27 (identi-
fying "intrinsic authority" as the "essential prerogative of fatherhood"); Kristol, supra note
192, at A18 (stating that fatherhood consists of two characteristics: "First, he is there, a
loyal member of the household. Second, he works to help support his family.").
213. FINEMAN, supra note 12, at 201-04 (discussing, inter alia, Safire, supra note 212).
Fineman does not specifically address the "responsible fatherhood" movement.
214. See BLANKENHORN, supra note 7, at 97, 117, 124-47; Ballard, supra note 211, at 66.
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for mothers, but for fathers as well.215 Some openly seek to restore
male leadership and authority in the home, albeit exercised in a non-
abusive manner (a "kindler, gentler patriarchy"). 216 But even those
who espouse a model of shared parental authority within the family
reject "androgynous" and egalitarian notions that fathers and mothers
do the same thing, and associate fathers with special roles (for exam-
ple, transmission of cultural values, a sense of right and wrong,
etc.)_2
1 7
The tensions between women's interests and the "responsible fa-
therhood" movement are similar to those raised by the problematic
gender ideology of conservative analyses of welfare. These tensions
are relevant to the discourse of irresponsible reproduction and welfare
reform. First, voices in this movement claim that welfare is not a solu-
tion to poverty because it focuses on women, subsidizes fatherless
families, and fails to recognize the important role of men in the fam-
ily.218 This may imply that women and their children should forfeit
the social safety net that welfare provides, however inadequately, in
order to provide incentives for male responsibility. However, this
claim suffers from the same sort of causal reversal found in Murray
and Gilder's stories, which presume that there is a crop of men ready,
willing, and able to support women (albeit at a fairly low income
level), but that they are undermined by welfare. In charging that gov-
ernmental programs intended to solve problems of poverty are really
215. See e.g., BLANKENHORN, supra note 7, at 212-21 (reporting that fathers see them-
selves as providers, protectors, nurturers, and sponsors); Fathers Balancing Roles of Pro-
vider and Nurturer (CNN television broadcast, Nov. 12, 1994) (LEXIS, News library, CNN
file) (reporting modem expectation that fathers be nurturers as well as providers); cf
FINEMAN, supra note 12, at 204-05 (raising possibility of discourse focused on nurturing
that would include fathers).
216. See Ellen Goodman, Female Submissiveness a Subtext to 'New' Men's Movement,
LMERAL OPIMON WEEK, Oct. 30, 1995, at 1 (dubbing husband and father envisioned by
Promise Keepers and Nation of Islam as a "kindler, gentler patriarch"); Donna Minkowitz,
In the Name of the Father, Ms., NovJDec. 1995, at 64, 69 (reporting on Promise Keepers'
view of male leadership in family).
217. See BLANKENHORN, supra note 7, at 117-23 (suggesting that models of gender role
convergence undermine the distinctive nature of father's role); id. at 201-22 (discussing
special roles of father which extend beyond that of breadwinner); Chira, supra note 209, at
A22 (describing the national debate over the nature of fatherhood). Some African-Ameri-
can women objected to the Million Man March because of the male-dominated approach
of the Nation of Islam to rebuilding the family. See Michel Marriott, Black Women are
Split Over All-Male March on Washington, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 14, 1995, at 8.
218. See BLANKENHORN, supra note 7, at 231; Welfare Reform Proposals, Including
H.R. 4605, The Work and Responsibility Act of 1994: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on
Human Resources of the House Ways and Means Comm., 103d Cong., 2d Sess. 649 (1995)
(testimony of Charles Ballard) [hereinafter Testimony of Ballard].
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the source of the problem, Murray, Gilder, and the proponents of "re-
sponsible fatherhood" ignore the fact that AFDC and its precursors
came into being precisely because women and children lacked a
breadwinner.21 9 The government assumed the breadwinner role in ex-
change for women providing valuable mothering services.220 More-
over, this model suggests that public policy should address family
poverty primarily by encouraging or requiring fathers' personal re-
sponsibility, with no guarantee that reliance on it will be adequate,
and no recognition of collective responsibility for the well being of
children.
Second, encouraging responsible fatherhood as the solution to
the phenomenon of single-parent families inevitably conflicts with
some women's abilities to define their own family forms. Male irre-
sponsibility does count as a significant factor in the creation of many
single-parent families and their poverty, and many mothers would
welcome fathers assuming more responsibility for their children's nur-
ture and support.22' However, women's own agency and desire for
independence are also significant factors leading to current family
forms.22 2 Women who do not want a man to be part of their house-
hold clash with notions that every child deserves a father, or "a father
for every child. ' 223 Welfare also serves an important (even "subver-
sive") role in facilitating female independence from men and marriage
by providing women with the economic resources (albeit inadequate)
to leave an abusive, violent, or unsatisfactory relationship with a
man.
224
219. See generally ABRAMOVrrz, supra note 132, at 315-18.
220. Id.; LINDA GORDON, PITIED BUT NOT ENTITLED 37-39 (1994).
221. See infra Part III.B. For example, in a recent Frontline documentary on "The
Vanishing Father," the primary focus was on men who were failing to provide child sup-
port. Frontline: "The Vanishing Father" (PBS television broadcast, May 16, 1995) (1995
WL 2875694). Mothers expressed strong interest in men meeting their financial obliga-
tions as well as, in some instances, participating in the lives of their children. Id. Such
participation might or might not include a marital or other bond between mother and fa-
ther. One of the interesting findings about Ballard's work is that although a significant
percentage of the men who complete the Institute's program provide financial support for
and engage in nurturing of their children, very few marry the mothers. Richard Whitmire,
Successful Fatherhood Program to Spread to Five Other Cities (Gannett News Service, June
14, 1995) (LEXIS, News library, Curnws file).
222. See Donna Franklin, Black Herstory, N.Y. TIMEs, Oct. 18, 1995, at A23 (objecting
to the "new black patriarchy" advocated by Farrakhan's Million Man March and observing
that "mindful of the conflicts in black relationships, many young black women choose not
to marry"). See infra Part III.B for discussion.
223. BLANKENHORN, supra note 7, at 223.
224. See Martha F. Davis & Susan J. Kraham, Protecting Women's Welfare in the Face
of Violence, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1141 (1995) (arguing that violence in the lives of poor
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Third, the gender ideology of man as provider, robbed of his role
by welfare, may divert attention from structural factors impairing the
ability of many men to be "providers." It may treat such men as "irre-
sponsible" failures, while ignoring ways to foster women's economic
well being. William Julius Wilson's influential macroeconomic analy-
sis of the rise in single-parent households among African Americans
in the inner city assigned a central causal role to African-American
male joblessness and inadequate employment opportunities.225 Other
studies also indicate a relationship between the declining economic
fortunes of young men and the increase in households headed by wo-
men. These studies suggest'that the erosion of the economic basis for
marriage among certain segments of young people (particularly,
young men's ability to support a family)-rather than the absence of
"family values"-causes increasing numbers of young people to re-
gard marriage as an unrealistic possibility.22 6 An important implica-
tion of such analyses addressing broader structural causes of family
patterns is that society as a whole has a collective responsibility to
address the structural or systemic problems contributing to poverty
and limiting people's family options.
However, in another sense, Wilson's analysis echoes the gender
ideology of man as provider and embraces the solution of helping men
meet the provider role through economic policy, without attending to
solutions that would directly help poor mothers in providing for their
families and escaping poverty without men. Wilson also overlooks the
significance of factors other than male unemployment in shaping Afri-
can-American women's choices (for example, women's increased eco-
nomic independence and perceived lower costs of exiting bad
marriages).227
women is particularly devastating and that welfare is often a "lifeline" for abused women
and children); Katha Pollitt, Welfare Reform, TI NATION, July 11, 1994, at 45. Welfare
historian Mimi Abramovitz has spoken of welfare's "subversive" potential. Mimi
Abramowitz, Remarks at the Feminism and Legal Theory Workshop on Women, Children,
and Poverty at Columbia University School of Law (June 6-10, 1995) (unpublished).
225. See WILSON, supra note 179, at 66-92. Cf. Michael Massing, Hanging Out, N.Y.
REv. BooKs, May 25, 1995, at 34, 36 (reviewing ELLIOT LmBow, TALLY'S CORNER: A
STUmY OF NEGRO STREETCOR1NER MEN (1968)) (arguing for the continuing relevance of
Liebow's observation that "the 'inability of the Negro man to earn a living and support his
family' is 'the central fact of lower-class Negro life"').
226. See Margaret L. Usdansky, Single Motherhood. Stereotypes vs. Statistics, N.Y.
TIMES, Feb. 11, 1996, § 4, at 4; Steven A. Holmes, Low-Wage Fathers and the Welfare De-
bate, N.Y. Tuns, Apr. 25, 1995, at A12.
227. Wilson does identify such other factors as explaining white women's declining
rates of marriage and marital births. See WILSON, supra note 179, at 90-92. For feminist
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Fourth, the "responsible fatherhood" movement pays inadequate
attention to the problem of violence committed by men against wo-
men and children within the family. As I will discuss in Part III, some
feminist scholars and advocates have pointed out links between male
dominance of and violence against women and marital breakup, pov-
erty, and welfare dependency. In this regard, it is encouraging that
some public figures have recently acknowledged the problem of male
violence against women in families and called upon men to be more
responsible and to pledge an end to such violence.228 Nonetheless,
some proponents of male responsibility argue that monogamous mar-
riage is the "antidote" for male violence, and that when men are de-
tached from their roles of father and husband they are more likely to
engage in violence toward women.229 Such arguments underestimate
the extent to which male violence may have led to a detachment from
the home. Although there may be some truth to the idea that men
turn to other destructive and violent lifestyles when they fail to live up
to cultural expectations of manhood and masculinity,230 the incidence
of male violence against women within marriage is simply too high to
make this defense of marriage persuasive.
Finally, identifying "fatherlessness" as a pressing social problem
may foster the illusion that there are model fathers waiting in the
wings who want to provide for and be with their children, and may
mask the fact that men's attitudes and behaviors are a core part of the
problem, that is, men's flight from the family and from responsibil-
criticism of Wilson along the lines in text, see Maxine Baca Zinn, Family, Race, and Poverty
in the Eighties, 14 SIGNs 857, 871-74 (1989); Roberts, supra note 166, at 26-27.
228. See Douglas & Young, supra note 210, at A5 (reporting that Farrakhan led men
attending the Million Man March in a pledge never to raise a hand to "any member of my
family or any human being, except in self defense"); Clinton Asks Men to Pledge Never to
Strike Any Woman, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 15, 1995, at 25 (reporting President Clinton's remarks
that "the real solution to this problem [domestic violence] starts with ... our personal
responsibility and a simple pledge that we will never, never lift a hand against a woman for
as long as we live").
229. See BLANKENHORN, supra note 7, at 32-42. Blankenhorn first cites studies to sug-
gest that women are at greater risk from nonmarital male partners than from husbands.
Then he uses newspaper stories to claim that it is estranged and jealous husbands who
become violent. Id. See also Testimony of Ballard, supra note 218 (arguing that fathers
detached from families have higher rates of violence and criminality).
230. Cf. Massing, supra note 225, at 35 (reporting Liebow's observation in TALLY'S
CORNER, supra note 225, that African-American men who failed in their family life exper-
ienced depression, rage, and sometimes were violent toward their wives and children, and
that in the culture of the street corner, their failures are transformed into "manly flaws").
See also Elijah Anderson, The Code of the Streets, THE ATLANTIC, May 1994, at 81 (analyz-
ing interpersonal violence and aggression in the poor inner-city black community in terms
of the quest for "respect" and concepts of "manhood").
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ity.231 In fact, those who say that fathers are the solution rarely mean
that if you literally placed a particular biological father in the house-
hold, without reconstructing him as a responsible father, the family's
material and emotional life would improve.232 On the contrary, some
of these unreconstructed fathers might cause considerable damage
and set dangerous examples for their children. Instead, there is an
ideal of a "responsible" father from which many flesh-and-blood fa-
thers deviate and toward which they must be nudged through exhorta-
tion, training, and effort.233 In assessing the .rhetoric of the crisis of
"fatherlessness," it is important to keep in mind this gap between the
ideal and the actual.234
The project of bolstering men's sense of responsibility as fathers
and enhancing their family participation is valuable. But the true
challenge is to find models of "responsible fatherhood" that do not
perpetuate patriarchy and defend fathers' "unique" contributions to
the rearing of children by impugning mothers' capacities to rear them.
Further, in seeking to promote paternal responsibility, public policy
should not perpetuate women's economic dependency or repudiate
collective responsibility for helping families.
231. See GRIswOLD, supra note 104, at 219-39; BLANKENHORN, supra note 7, at 1-2;
Bob Herbert, It's Never Father's Day, N.Y. TMs, June 17, 1995, at 19.
232. For example, Charles Ballard is a social worker by background and his Institute
has an extensive training program. Media coverage of Ballard and the Institute frequently
recounts his journey to responsible fatherhood, after abandoning his family and serving
time in prison. Ballard works with young men, especially teens, to turn their lives around
through pursuing education, employment, "legitimating" their children, learning to play a
part in their children's lives, and avoiding self-destructive behavior. Ballard, supra note
211, at 67-69. Promise Keepers stresses repentance and personal transformation.
Minkowitz, supra note 216, at 68-69. Blankenhorn offers a model of the "good family
man," which "represents an increasingly smaller proportion of actual men in our society."
BLrANicntNoRN, supra note 7, at 201. The Million Man March called upon African-Ameri-
can men to "atone" and take responsibility, triggering commentary about the relationship
between the prevalence of female-headed African-American families and the absence of
paternal responsibility. See Joan Beck, Dads: Missing in Action, Cm. TRn., Oct. 19, 1995,
at 31; Joseph H. Brown, Black Men Pledge to do the Right Thing, TAMPA TRm., Oct. 22,
1995, at 6.
233. See supra text accompanying notes 209-210 and note 232 for discussion.
234. See Lewin, supra note 209, at 1 (quoting Ballard reporting that the teen-age males
he helps frequently draw a distinction between having kids and being a "dad"). The com-
ment in text also applies to the gap between rhetoric about care and nurturing by fathers
and the low rates of fathers' participation in such activities. See generally ARLmI HocH-
scimD, THE SEcoND Smi=r (1989).
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B. Conflicting Governmental Objectives: Encouraging Childbirth or
Deterring "Ilegitimacy"?
(1) The Intersection of Abortion and "Irresponsible" Reproduction
"Illegitimacy," we have seen, is perhaps the most potent signifier
of procreative irresponsibility in the rhetoric of irresponsible repro-
duction. In condemning "Murphy Brown" as a poor role model for
her nonmarital childbearing, Vice President Quayle stated that
"[b]earing babies irresponsibly is, simply, wrong. 2 35 Yet, another
look at the "Murphy Brown" incident illustrates some conflicting
messages about irresponsibility: women behave irresponsibly or im-
morally if they bear children outside of marriage, but they also behave
irresponsibly if they terminate their pregnancies by abortion.
Quayle adamantly opposed abortion rights and indicted the "cul-
tural elite" that "avoids responsibility and flees from the conse-
quences of its self-indulgence" by getting rid of "God's greatest gift-
new life-as an inconvenience to be discarded. '236 Some critics
pointed out the apparent contradiction between Quayle's "Murphy
Brown" speech and his stance on abortion, suggesting that: "If the
Vice President thinks it's disgraceful for an unmarried woman to bear
a child, and if he believes that a woman cannot adequately raise a
child without a father, then he'd better make sure abortion remains
safe and legal. '2 37 People also questioned Quayle's condemnation of
Murphy Brown because it was her sexual partner (her former hus-
band) who fled responsibility and she who continued the pregnancy
instead of having an abortion.2 38 Subsequently, Quayle's office
praised Murphy Brown as showing "pro-life" and "strong" family val-
ues and praised single mothers as "true heroes and inspirations."2 9
235. See supra text accompanying note 34.
236. Robin Toner, 1992 Campaign: White House: Quayle, at Anti-Abortion Meeting,
Presses "Cultural Elite" Attack, N.Y. TIMES, June 12, 1992, at A15. Dan and Marilyn
Quayle assured the public that if their thirteen year old daughter became pregnant, she
would take the pregnancy to term. Kevin Sack, Quayle Insists Abortion Remarks Don't
Signal Change in His View, N.Y. TIMES, July 24, 1992, at Al.
237. See Rosenthal, supra note 33, at A20 (quoting Diane English, producer of "Mur-
phy Brown").
238. Whitehead, supra note 36, at 57; John E. Yang & Ann Devroy, Quayle:
"Hollywood Doesn't Get It": Administration Struggles to Explain Attack on TV's Murphy
Brown, WASH. PosT, May 21, 1992, at Al.
239. Yang & Devroy, supra note 238, at A17; cf Michael Wines, Views on Single Moth-
erhood Are Multiple at White House, N.Y. TIMES, May 21, 1992, at B16.
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More recently, Quayle contended that the point of his speech was
fatherlessness and the importance of paternal responsibilities.24 0
Quayle's mixed messages provide a useful point of departure for
consideration of how abortion complicates the issue of irresponsible
reproduction. The dilemma faced by Quayle also confronted many
conservative legislators and organizations as they pondered the appro-
priate stance toward the child exclusion provisions of the Personal Re-
sponsibility Act. The dilemma illuminates the difficulties involved in
both identifying what constitutes irresponsible reproduction and in
reaching a consensus about the appropriate means to discourage it. It
also illustrates how public policy reflecting these conflicts can create
double binds for women facing reproductive choices: If a woman is a
target of condemnation, whether she chooses to abort or to continue
her pregnancy in a nonmarital situation, how is she to assess her moral
duty and make a morally responsible choice?
The right to choose an abortion is sometimes presented by its op-
ponents as a right that licenses irresponsibility, indeed, as the ultimate
triumph of rights over responsibilities.241 As Quayle's condemnation
of the "cultural elite" suggests, opponents of legal abortion charge
that abortion permits and reflects sex without responsibility, that is,
sex without the willingness to accept the consequences. 242 The irre-
sponsibility targeted is not just that of women, for opponents of legal
abortion often view women as victims of both male and societal irre-
sponsibility.243 Under this view, abortion rights permit irresponsibility
as unaccountability and immorality because they permit the immoral
taking of a human life.
How does the abortion issue complicate the question of irrespon-
sible reproduction? On the one hand, the government's interest in
protecting potential life and in promoting childbirth is invoked to jus-
tify state and federal restrictions on funding of poor women's abor-
tions and on access to hospitals and counseling, as well as
requirements of waiting periods and informed consent schemes for all
240. See supra note 43.
241. See A New American Compact: Caring About Women, Caring for the Unborn,
N.Y. TIMES, July 14, 1992, at A23 [hereinafter A New American Compact].
242. Some opponents of legal abortion also object to contraception for the same rea-
son. See KRISTrN LUKER, ABORTION AND THE POLrICS OF MormHmooD 163-68 (1984).
243. See id. at 161-62 (reporting "pro-life" activist views that abortion diminishes male
responsibility and oppresses women); Linda C. McClain, Equality, Oppression, and Abor-
tion: Women Who Oppose Abortion Rights in the Name of Feminism, in FEMINIST NIGrr-
MARES: WOMEN AT ODDS 159 (Susan Ostrov Weisser & Jennifer Fleischner eds., 1994)
(analyzing these themes in rhetoric of Feminists for Life of America); A New American
Compact, supra note 241 (expressing similar views).
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women seeking abortions. On the other hand, in welfare reform, the
government's interest in discouraging irresponsible reproduction and
promoting parental responsibility is advanced to justify restrictions
such as New Jersey's family cap provision. The Personal Responsibil-
ity and Work Opportunity Act would require state governments to
make similar exclusions. 244 Whatever federal legislation emerges, it is
probable that it will permit, if not require, states to impose caps, as a
number of states have already done. 245 In short, poor pregnant wo-
men are steered in the direction of childbirth, activity deemed in the
public interest and in furtherance of a governmental interest in pro-
tecting potential life or "unborn children." But these same women
are denied help in supporting their children, pursuant to New Jersey's
"legitimate" state interest in discouraging irresponsible reproduction,
or the federal government's "very important" interest in reducing
"out-of-wedlock" births.246 If government uses the denial of public
resources to steer poor women simultaneously toward and away from
childbirth, does it send any coherent message about morally and so-
cially responsible reproductive choice or government's interest in pro-
tecting human life?
From the perspective of personal responsibility proponents, is the
government's preference for childbirth also the morally and socially
responsible choice in the case of unwed mothers? In light of all the
costs alleged to accompany single-parent families, even when they are
not receiving public assistance, and the preference for the two-parent
family as a seedbed of civic virtue, is the state's scheme of persuasion
in effect encouraging "irresponsible" reproduction? Do abortion re-
strictions premised on a state's preference for childbirth over abortion
lead such women to make choices likely to be deemed irresponsible?
Does the state's preference for childbirth over abortion hold regard-
less of the alleged social and fiscal costs of single-parent homes?
What messages do such laws send about responsible and irre-
sponsible reproduction? If a state imposing a family cap also funded
244. See discussion supra text accompanying note 172.
245. The National Governors' Association welfare proposal gives states the option of
imposing caps. Tom Diemer, Governors Agree on Medicaid and Welfare; But Clinton, Dole
Give Conference No Firm Commitments, CLaav. PLArN DEALER, Feb. 7, 1996, at 1A. Eight-
een states and the District of Columbia are pursuing or have received federal waivers from
AFDC requirements for laws imposing family caps similar to those in the Personal Re-
sponsibility Act. Cheryl Wetzstein, Hearings Set on Welfare Reform, WASH. TimE-:s, Feb.
19, 1996, at A4. For some examples, see FLA. STAT. ANN. § 409.185 (7) (1993 & Supp.
1996); GA. CODE ANN. § 49-4-115 (1994); 1993 Wis. Laws Assembly Bill 21.
246. C.K. v. Shalala, 883 F. Supp. 991, 1015 (D. N.J. 1995); Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportunity Act of 1995, H.R. 4, 104th Cong., 1st Sess. § 101 (1995).
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abortions for poor women (as New Jersey does), the message intended
to be sent by the cap-that people should not have children unless
they can afford them-would not be contradicted, but might even be
reinforced, by the abortion funding scheme. In combination, these
schemes would steer women-perhaps coerce them-toward abor-
tion. It would seem that a "rational" family planning policy of states
imposing a family cap would logically include abortion as one method
to avoid having children3 4 7 However, some states both impose family
caps and decline to fund most abortions for poor women, putting poor
women in a problematic double bind.248
To be sure, one might argue that these conflicting objectives are
reconcilable if one assumes that protecting potential life always takes
precedence over other considerations, such as discouraging
nonmarital pregnancy and childbirth, due to the value of life and the
moral consequences or costs of abortion.249 Indeed, the state may
prefer that unmarried women, poor women, and teen women not en-
gage in "irresponsible" sex in the first place, i.e., not get pregnant.
That preference is evident in various governmental measures designed
to discourage teen sex and to encourage contraceptive use by poor
women and welfare recipients (as well as some less voluntary meas-
247. Although New Jersey's statutory law restricts funding to abortions medically nec-
essary to save the life of the pregnant woman, the New Jersey Supreme Court has held,
under the Equal Protection provision of the New Jersey Constitution, that the statute must
be construed "to require Medicaid funding of all abortions that are medically necessary to
preserve the mother's life or health." Right to Choose v. Byrne, 450 A.2d 925, 941 (1982)
(construing N.J. STAT. ANN. § 30:4D-6.1 (West 1981 & Supp. 1995)). When asked about
whether the family cap would lead to more abortions by recipients of welfare, Bryant, the
sponsor, responded: "What decisions they make-whether they decide to have a child,
have abortions, use condoms-that is their personal decision," just as "each of us has had
to decide whether we wait to have a family." Testimony of Bryant, supra note 50, at 10.
See Laracy, supra note 181, at 9-10 (discussing increase in number of medicaid-financed
abortions since cap adopted).
248. Se4 e.g., ARK. CONST. amend. 68, § 1 (Michie 1987 & Supp. 1995) ("No public
funds will be used to pay for any abortion, except to save the mother's life.") (statute
declared unconstitutional and enforcement enjoined in Little Rock Family Planning Serv-
ices v. Dalton, 860 F. Supp. 609 (E.D. Ark. 1994)); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 20.927 (West 1986 &
Supp. 1995) (prohibiting subsidy of abortions except for those "directly and medically nec-
essary to save the life of the woman or in a case of sexual assault or incest," if reported and
verified by a physician, or medically necessary to prevent "grave, long-lasting physical
health damage to the woman").
249. Appearing to undergird the Supreme Court's joint opinion in Casey that upheld
the state's interest in unborn life are the Court's references to abortion as a "unique act...
fraught with consequences for others," including not only a pregnant woman's family and
the fetus, but "society which must confront the knowledge that these [violent] procedures
exist." Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 112 S. Ct. 2791, 2806-07 (1992).
ures).250 But once a pregnancy has begun, even if unintentionally due
to contraceptive failure, childbirth is the morally responsible choice
whether women are married or unmarried, financially self-sufficient
or in poverty, in good or poor health, and no matter what their own
assessment of their responsibilities and readiness for motherhood. In-
deed, although some legislative schemes exempt women whose
pregnancies result from rape or incest from funding prohibitions (pre-
sumably on the ground that victimized women cannot fairly be held
responsible for their pregnancies), others do not, suggesting that, even
under those extreme circumstances, government prefers childbirth to
abortion.2 51 If women cannot meet the responsibilities of motherhood
because of lack of financial resources (a prospect made more likely by
the family cap) or any other reason, they should carry the pregnancy
to term and relinquish the child for adoption-a prominent solution in
both anti-abortion and conservative welfare agendas.252 Some propo-
nents of responsibility would argue that not relinquishing the child in
such circumstances would make a woman irresponsible and a bad
mother.2 53 Taken together, the combination of the abortion funding
denial and the family cap warrant the conclusion that the state's con-
cern for protecting potential life extends only to "unborn" children
and ends at birth.254 In any case, the message indicates a lack of re-
250. The current AFDC law requires states to provide recipients, on a voluntary basis,
with family planning services. 42 U.S.C. § 602(a)(15) (1988 & Supp. 1994). States have
used a mixture of coercive and persuasive measures to steer exercise of procreative rights
(e.g., the sterilization abuse of African-American women). See Roberts, supra note 123.
One contemporary debate involves giving women on public assistance financial incentives
to use Norplant, a long-term contraceptive. Id
251. For example, Arkansas. ARK. CONsT. amend. 68, § 1 (Michie 1987 & Supp. 1995).
The current Congress removed the rape and incest exemptions in the most recent version
of the Hyde amendment. Jerry Gray, Senate Limits Federal Funds for Abortions, N.Y.
TiMEs, Aug. 6, 1995, at 1. The rationale usually given by abortion opponents is that the
"unborn child" is innocent of the rape and should not be sacrificed. See Katharine Q.
Seelye, Republican Debate Reveals Rift on Abortion, N.Y. TrMES, Mar. 1, 1996, at Al (re-
porting Presidential candidate Pat Buchanan's proposal to execute a "serial" rapist, instead
of the "innocent," "unborn child").
252. See Testimony of Bennett, supra note 22, at 3 (testifying that "adoption is the best
alternative we have in a postwelfare world"). From World War II until the 1960s, the
solution society advocated for single white adolescent females and women who did not
marry was to give up their babies for adoption. See SOLINGER, supra note 168, at 148-86,
224-26. Today, the overwhelming majority of unmarried adolescent females and women
who continue their pregnancies keep their babies. Id at 224-26; Dowd, supra note 17, at
44.
253. See Murray, supra note 5, at A14 (advocating that unmarried mothers without
resources surrender their children to two-parent families).
254. To be fair, some opponents of legal abortion also oppose family caps because of
the message sent about the value of human life. See infra text accompanying notes 278-280
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spect for women's own choices about the resolutions of their
pregnancies.
To date, the Supreme Court has upheld limitations on women's
reproductive autonomy that target abortion in the name of a state's
interest in protecting potential life and favoring childbirth. 255 The
Court has clearly stated that Roe v. Wade's principles would prohibit
state attempts to restrict a woman's right to carry a pregnancy to
term.256 But defenders of the New Jersey family cap successfully ar-
gued that a message common to both types of state schemes (i.e.,
those encouraging or discouraging childbirth) is the idea that govern-
ment has no affirmative constitutional obligation to provide women
with the financial wherewithal to exercise their reproductive rights
through, for example, additional AFDC benefits or funding of abor-
tion along with childbirth, and may selectively fund some choices and
not others.257 The common denominator in both applications is the
idea that it is a poor woman's poverty, an obstacle that is not created
by the government and one that government has no constitutional ob-
ligation to remove, that stands in the way of her "ability to enjoy the
full range of constitutionally protected freedom of choice. ' '258 One
might argue further that the "message" in both instances is that the
refusal to fund women's abortion or their childbearing avoids subsi-
dizing irresponsibility, either in the sense of immorality or
unaccountability.259
for discussion. But the Christian Coalition, for example, supports both types of restric-
tions. See infra note 275.
255. In Roe v. Wade, the Court held that a state's compelling interest in protecting
potential life after viability would allow a state to prohibit abortion during that period,
except in cases of threats to the life or health of the pregnant woman. 410 U.S. 113, 163-64
(1973). The funding cases upheld restrictions on funding pursuant to the government's
interest in potential life throughout pregnancy on the rationale that they did not place
obstacles in a woman's path or impose an undue burden. Maher v. Roe, 432 U.S. 464,473-
74 (1977); Harris v. McRae, 448 U.S. 297, 314-15 (1980). Although adhering to Roe's via-
bility line with respect to a state's ability to prohibit abortion, Planned Parenthood v. Casey
abandoned the trimester approach in concluding that the state had a "substantial" or
"profound" interest in potential life throughout a woman's pregnancy and could enact per-
suasive measures furthering that interest. 112 S. Ct. at 2818-21 (O'Connor, Kennedy, and
Souter, JJ., joint opinion).
256. Casey, 112 S. Ct. at 2811.
257. See C.K v. Shalala, 883 F. Supp. at 1014-15.
258. Harris, 448 U.S. at 316; see C.K v. Shalala, 883 F. Supp. at 1015 (citing Harris, 448
U.S. at 316; Rust v. Sullivan, 500 U.S. 173, 201 (1991)).
259. Although fiscal concerns (avoiding cost-shifting) appear to drive the welfare caps,
they cannot adequately explain the selective funding cases, since funding childbirth is more
costly than funding abortion. Rather, the concern is subsidizing immorality. See Gray,
supra note 251, § 1, at 1 (reporting Senator Nickles' justification of funding restrictions:
January 1996] "IRRESPONSIBLE" REPRODUCTION
It remains to be seen what further challenges will arise from fed-
eral welfare reform and state measures that place exclusions on who
may receive aid, and how constitutional precedents will feature in
such challenges. Constitutional precedents involving due process and
equal protection (including procreative autonomy, unconstitutional
conditions, and limits on a state's ability to use status of birth to distin-
guish between categories of children) would seem to provide support
for such challenges.260 At the same time, the opinion in the New
Jersey family cap litigation may well illustrate the limits of current
constitutional doctrine and signal the need to construct new argu-
ments about collective responsibility and affirmative obligations.
261
For present purposes, what is most striking about the New Jersey
district court's analysis of the family cap is how well it illustrates the
fact that the model of irresponsible reproduction underlying the fam-
ily cap depends on both the absence of affirmative obligations (or col-
lective responsibility) and the acceptance of the economic status quo
as the baseline from which to assess responsibility as accountability:
New Jersey's reform proposal does not attempt to fetter or con-
strain the welfare mother's right to bear as many children as she
chooses, but simply requires her to find a way to pay for her prog-
eny's care. This is not discrimination; rather, this is the reality
known to so many working families who provide for their children
without any expectation of outside assistance. The legislative
choices made by the New Jersey legislature and approved by the
Secretary reflect their judgment that the exercise of fundamental
rights by welfare recipients ofttimes brings with it the onset of funda-
mental responsibilities which the recipients themselves must bear.262
Here, the court accepted the state's professed goals behind the family
cap as legitimate: to "give AFDC recipients the same structure of in-
centives as working people, to promote individual responsibility, and
to strengthen and stabilize the family unit. '263 As the court further
stated:
"forcing... millions of prolife Americans to pay for abortion on demand with their tax
dollars is a gross violation of their freedom of conscience").
260. The district court of New Jersey rejected such arguments. C.K.v. Shalala, 883 F.
Supp. at 1012-15. The court also accepted the state's proffering of Dandridge v. Williams,
397 U.S. 471 (1970), as a precedent for the constitutionality of a maximum family grant and
rejected plaintiffs' argument that such a limit effectively and arbitrarily punished a child for
the circumstances of its birth. 883 F. Supp. at 1012-13.
261. See Roberts, supra note 123 (rejecting unconstitutional conditions doctrine as ade-
quate defense against unjust welfare policies that regulate poor women's reproduction).
262. C.K. v. Shalala, 883 F. Supp. at 1015 (emphasis added).
263. Id. at 1013. The state's argument resembled that described supra in text accompa-
nying notes 50-53. Part of the incentive structure is that families subject to the cap are
entitled to retain a larger amount of earned income without a loss of benefits. Id. at 999.
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[I]t cannot be gainsaid that the Family Cap sends a message that
recipients should consider the static level of their welfare benefits
before having another child, a message that may reasonably have an
ameliorative effect on the rate of out-of-wedlock births that only
foster the familial instability and crushing cycle of poverty currently
plaguing the welfare class.264
This model of rational family planning sends the "message" that
irresponsible reproduction contributes to poverty and seems to carry
the further message that an important and legitimate way to end pov-
erty is to end procreation by poor people.265 But this very incentive
structure proves problematic for other proponents of reproductive re-
sponsibility because of its implied "message" about the acceptability
of abortion.
(2) Child Exclusion and Welfare Reform Controversies
The intersection of public policy goals concerning abortion and
"illegitimacy" has given rise to some of the most heated and intense
conflicts in recent Congressional welfare reform efforts. 266 Provisions
in the House's Personal Responsibility Act that excluded certain cate-
gories of women and children from benefits drew sharp criticism from
some Republican legislators precisely because of the assumed "unin-
tended consequences" such provisions would have in promoting abor-
tion. 6 7 A broad coalition of organizations protested these child
exclusion provisions, with "pro-life" groups stressing their likely im-
pact of increasing abortion rates, because of economic pressure, and
"pro-choice" groups stressing the coercive impact on women's repro-
ductive choices.268 Republican Representative Christopher Smith ar-
264. Id. at 1014.
265. Roberts reaches a similar conclusion. See Roberts, supra note 123.
266. The National Governors' Association opposes these exclusions and other compo-
nents of the Personal Responsibility Act because it believes that the decision to provide, or
not provide, benefits should be left to the states. See Pear, supra note 59, at A22.
267. See 141 CONG. REc. H3517-18 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 1995) (statement of Rep.
Smith); Tamar Lewin, Abortion Foes Worry About Welfare Cutoffs, N.Y. TiMES, Mar. 19,
1995, § 4, at 4. Among those criticizing the bill on this ground was Henry Hyde, author of
the Hyde Amendments limiting Medicaid funds for abortion. See 141 CONG. Rc. H3519
(daily ed. Mar. 22, 1995) (statement of Rep. Hyde).
268.. See Henneberger, supra note 181, at Al; Arthur Jones, Foes Join to Fight Welfare
Cuts, NAT'L CATH. REP., Feb. 10, 1995, at 5. The Child Exclusion Coalition first formed in
1994 to oppose President Clinton's proposal to give states the option of imposing family
caps. William Claiborne, Reluctant Allies Oppose Clinton "Family Cap" Welfare Proposal,
WASH. PosT, May 27, 1994, at Al ("[Ain unusually broad coalition of eighty-five civil
rights and religious organizations, including abortion rights and antiabortion groups, said it
will challenge the 'child exclusion' policy."). To the extent that New Jersey's family cap
legislation offers empirical learning, the results are somewhat ambiguous. Initially, there
were reports that births to women on AFDC were down after the new law went into effect
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gued that the Personal Responsibility Act would have two equally
unacceptable consequences: (1) to encourage abortions by women
who "will feel financially trapped and abandoned," and (2) to contrib-
ute to "the further impoverishment of children born to women on wel-
fare. ' 269 The morally responsible choice for women, from this
perspective, is to have a child, and the responsible policy choice for
society is to support and give the child a chance in life.
In contrast, opponents of the cap argued, states that cap benefits
and fund Medicaid abortions send an even stronger "message not to
carry the baby to term. '270 In opposing the elimination of an entitle-
ment for the basic economic well being of families, Catholic leaders
stressed themes of collective responsibility for children and of the ne-
cessity of a welfare state.2 71 Such opposition failed to carry the day,
but it did lead to the inclusion in the Personal Responsibility Act of
provisions allowing states to provide mothers with non-cash benefits
for some child care needs. In addition, the Act established an "illegiti-
macy" ratio, whereby states that reduce out-of-wedlock births and do
not increase abortion rates (among all women, not only women on
public assistance) receive additional federal money.272
But not all individuals or groups opposed to legal abortion have
protested child exclusion provisions. Some appear to place a higher
priority on addressing the problems of the "underclass" and ending
"dependency," "illegitimacy," and sexual permissiveness, even if the
short-term consequences might include an increase in abortions. In
fact, prominent conservative Republican Senators, echoed by some
conservative religious organizations, condemned the compromise of
permitting, rather than requiring, states to impose family caps for in-
(although it was not clear to what extent that resulted from termination of pregnancies by
abortion). Medicaid figures show a slight increase in the number of abortions among wo-
men on welfare (from 9A3 to 9.78 per 1000). Iver Peterson, Abortions Up Slightly for
Welfare Mothers, N.Y. TIMES, May 17, 1995, at B7. The most recent findings indicate no
significant impact of the family cap on birth rates to women on AFDC. See supra note 181
and accompanying text.
269. See supra note 267.
270. Wetzstein, supra note 23, at A6 (quoting Doug Johnson, Right to Life Committee
legislative director).
271. See Robert Pear, Catholic Bishops Challenge Pieces of Welfare Bill, N.Y. TiMEs,
Mar. 19, 1995, at Al.
272. H.R. 4, § 101 (proposed § 403(b)(2) (defining "illegitimacy ratio")); proposed
§ 405(4)(c), (5)(c) (state option to provide vouchers). For the introduction of this amend-
ment by Representative Smith and the debate and voting on it, see 141 CONG. REC. H3515-
25 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 1995).
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adequately attacking the central problem of "ilegitimacy."273 Simi-
larly, conservative strategist William Kristol urged that "we can't not
reform welfare because it might lead to a few more abortions," and
that an increase in abortion is "not a big issue because in the long run,
an attack on illegitimacy is an attack on promiscuity is an attack on
abortion." 274 Ralph Reed of the Christian Coalition also supported
such welfare provisions because his goal was to end the "culture of
illegitimacy."275 Finally, former Education Secretary Bennett report-
edly "urged GOP lawmakers not to 'give in to this argument by extor-
tion,' warning that the 'threat of abortion could be used' to quell
efforts to change work requirements, child-support provisions, or even
a decrease in welfare payments." 27
6
One reading of this willingness to prioritize eliminating "illegiti-
macy" over preserving "children" (prenatal life) is that, in their view,
not all childbearing is in fact in the public interest. Feminist legal
scholars such as Dorothy Roberts have argued that a recurring
message in poverty discourse is that African-American children, who
are disproportionately among the poor and among welfare recipients,
are less socially valuable than white children. 277 Indeed, in opposing
the family caps in the Personal Responsibility Act, Representative
Smith argued that a woman on welfare "will get a powerfully negative
message that her child has little or no value."278 And abortion oppo-
nents who also opposed the exclusion similarly remarked upon this
273. Senator Phil Gramm and some others opposed Senator Dole's initial bill as giving
inadequate attention to "illegitimacy" and proposed a different bill more closely mirroring
the Personal Responsibility Act's child exclusions. See Robert Pear, Clinton and Dole Bid-
ding to Break Welfare Impasse, N.Y. Tiras, July 30, 1995, at 1; Robert Pear, Dole Offers
Welfare Bill But Conservatives Reject It, N.Y. TiMES, Aug. 5, 1995, at 8. For conservative
religious opposition to compromise, see MacNeil/Lehrer News Hour, supra note 136 (inter-
viewing Kristi Hamrick of the Family Research Council).
274. Lewin, supra note 267, § 4, at 4.
275. Id. The Christian Coalition has recently successfully placed more restrictions on
public funding of abortion and family planning on the legislative agenda. See CHRISTIAN
COALMON, CONTRACr WinH THE AMEmcAN FAMILY: A BOLD PLAN TO STRENGTHEN
Tm FAMILY AND RESTORE COMMON-SENSE VALuEs 20-24 (May 1995) (proposing exclu-
sion from Medicaid funding of abortions sought because of rape or incest and ending fund-
ing under Title X of family planning because some organizations "promote and perform
abortions"). So far, they have prevailed on the abortion funding restrictions. See Gray,
supra note 251, at 1.
276. Wetzstein, supra note 23, at A6.
277. See Dorothy E. Roberts, The Value of Black Mothers' Work, 26 CONN. L. REv.
871, 876-78 (1994).
278. 141 CONG. REC. H3449, 3517-18 (daily ed. Mar. 22, 1995) (statement of Rep.
Smith).
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"message" about the devaluation of life.279 Indeed, the message
seems to be that saving fewer "unborn children" to prevent more "un-
socialized" children is an acceptable trade-off.
280
A second reading of this division is that some opponents of legal
abortion, such as the Catholic Bishops, have a vision of collective re-
sponsibility and social justice that other opponents do not share.
From their standpoint, the nearly exclusive focus upon personal re-
sponsibility ignores the problem of growing economic inequality and
of the responsibility of government and society to help poor fami-
lies.281 Another reading is that some opponents of legal abortion are
less willing to abide consequentialist arguments, such as the idea that
the possibility of a few abortions should not stand in the way of the
greater goal of ending "illegitimacy," and insist upon consistency in
principle. Thus, Helen Alvare, spokesperson for the National Confer-
ence of Catholic Bishops, stated her opposition to the exclusions:
"We grant the goodwill of those seeking to end the culture of teen
parenting. But we cannot seek a good end by evil means."
282
Finally, the ongoing debate over the use of such measures as fam-
ily caps illustrates the problem of agreeing upon "responsible" and
effective means to further the goals of promoting responsibility. The
debate brings us to the problem of the relationship between the pur-
poses of governmental programs and their effects and when the means
used to further one principle conflict with other principles. There may
well be widespread agreement across the political spectrum that par-
ents should bear primary responsibility for their children and that
people should have children only in circumstances in which they are
prepared to provide for them. For example, moderates, liberals, and
even some radical advocates for the poor may concur with conserva-
tives that it is problematic-even wrong and irresponsible-for teens
to have children. Yet, these parties vehemently disagree that cutting
benefits is the solution and some deem such an approach "immoral"
279. See Wetzstein, supra note 23, at A6 (quoting Wanda Franz, President of National
Right to Life Organization). Thus, even if the idea of rational economic calculation does
describe an ideal of family planning for middle-class (or other) American families, it con-
flicts with "pro-life" or anti-abortion ideology that every conception should result in child-
birth and Catholic ideas about welcoming every child regardless of the financial cost. See
Jerry Z. Muller, The Conservative Case for Abortion, NEw REPUBLIC, Aug. 21, 1995, at 27.
280. See Muller, supra note 279, at 29.
281. See Pear, supra note 9, at A16; Peter Steinfels, Catholic Bishops Urge Congress to
Reject Social Cutbacks, N.Y. Tirgms, Nov. 15, 1995, at A19.
282. Lewin, supra note 267, § 4, at 4.
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and "irresponsible. ' '283 Significantly, although Senator Moynihan is
often credited for sounding the alarm about "illegitimacy," he has op-
posed not only the child exclusion provisions, but also the "repeal" of
AFDC, that is, the elimination of the entitlement status of public
assistance.284
One reason for this divergence is the lack of a sound empirical
basis proving that such disincentives will have any effect other than
increasing the number of mothers and small children in poverty. Be-
cause people engage in reproductive behavior for a complex range of
reasons, which may include the effects of poverty itself, a simplistic
model is inadequate, and there is reason to doubt that government
can, or should, successfully legislate morality in the area of reproduc-
tive behavior.2 5 Further, denying public assistance to children pun-
ishes children for their parent's "mistakes. ' W6 Thus, the principle of
fairness to taxpayers, who should not have to subsidize the procrea-
tion of welfare recipients, is met with the principle of fairness to chil-
dren, who did not ask to be born and should not be punished by
measures aimed at their parents. 7 As forcefully stated by Marian
Wright Edelman, such welfare measures would "destroy... the fun-
283. See Firing Line Debate, supra note 36, at 29-30 (remarks of Frances Fox Piven and
Eleanor Holmes Norton); Melinda Hermeberger, Rangel's Voice: Stronger than Ever, N.Y.
TimEs, May 16, 1995, at B1, B3; Joe Klein, The Out-of-Wedlock Question, NEwswEEK,
Dec. 13, 1993, at 37 (reporting comments by President Clinton and Health and Human
Services Secretary Donna Shalala).
284. See Daniel Patrick Moynihan, The Devolution Revolution, N.Y. TiMES, Aug. 6,
1995, § 4, at 15.
285. Republican Governor Christine Todd Whitman of New Jersey has expressed this
doubt. See John Carlin, A Gentlewoman's Challenge to Newt's Republican Revolution, TiH
INDEPENDENT, Apr. 9, 1995, at 14. Whitman's remarks stirred controversy because she
illustrated the point by reference to a game (which she was told about by some black
parents) that young black males play concerning fathering "out-of-wedlock" children. See
Joseph F. Sullivan, Whitman Apologizes for Remark on Blacks, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 1995,
at B6.
286. President Clinton has opposed such approaches, especially with respect to teen
mothers, on the ground that they punish children for parents' mistakes and punish adults
for prior behavior. See Transcript of the News Conference With President Clinton, N.Y.
TIMEs, Apr. 19, 1995, at B8. However, Clinton's administration has supported benefit cut-
offs for additional children born to women on AFDC as a state option. See Summary of
AFDC Waiver Activity Since February 1993, at 10 (Center on Social Welfare Policy and
Law, Apr. 1995) (listing states that have applied for or have received waivers).
287. See Moynihan, supra note 19, at 34 (quoting George Will: "No child in America
asked to be here. No child is going to be spiritually improved by being collateral damage
in a bombardment of severities targeted at adults who may or may not deserve more severe
treatment from the welfare system."); 141 CONG. REc. S11777 (daily ed. Aug. 7, 1995)
(statement of Sen. Breaux) (capping benefits for children born to teen mothers "punishes a
child who did not ask to be born").
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damental moral principle that an American child, regardless of the
state or parents the child chanced to draw, is entitled to protection of
last resort by his or her national government. '288 Thus, it is one thing
to espouse the principle that the primary responsibility for providing
for children lies with parents, and quite another to promote it through
a legislative scheme in which government bears no responsibility for
those children. Finally, some critics of family caps resist solutions em-
phasizing personal responsibility because they ignore salient causes of
poverty and behavioral trends whose solutions require consideration
of collective responsibility.289 I turn now to the missing dimension of
collective responsibility.
C. Personal or Collective Responsibility?
How one answers the question of what constitutes responsible
and irresponsible reproduction depends in large part upon how one
answers background questions about personal and collective responsi-
bility for poverty, for securing minimum conditions of economic well
being, and for support of dependents, of which caring for children is a
significant component. In particular, diagnosing the causes of poverty
involves a range of assumptions not only about personal and collective
responsibility and irresponsibility, but also about the respective roles
that "character," "choices," and "environment" should play in the at-
tribution of responsibility. One's view of the proper role of the wel-
fare state depends in part upon assumptions about the extent to which
the poor are responsible for their poverty. If their poverty stems from
their "irresponsibility," they are "unworthy" or "undeserving;" but, if
they are blameless and not "irresponsible," they are among the "wor-
thy" or "deserving" poor.290 To be sure, as I have suggested in my
analysis of recent welfare reform debate, a society might accept some
responsibility to aid even the "irresponsible" poor, but attempt to do
so through a moral tutelage that minimizes incentives to irresponsibil-
ity. Moreover, as noted above, more complications ensue if one adds
the problem of harming "innocent" children through sanctioning their
parents.
288. Marian Wright Edelman, Say No to This Welfare "Reform," WASH. POsT, Nov. 3,
1995, at A23.
289. See Firing Line Debate, supra note 36, at 28-30 (remarks of Frances Fox Piven); id.
at 15-18 (remarks of Rep. Charles Rangel).
290. See HANDLER & HASENFELD, supra note 164, at 9-11; KATz, supra note 164;
Thomas Ross, The Rhetoric of Poverty: Their Immorality, Our Helplessness, 79 GEo. L.J.
1499, 1509-10 (1991).
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'Through the lens of personal responsibility, the welfare crisis
seems to stem largely from people procreating irresponsibly and
parenting without the financial resources or the willingness to work
and save to provide for their children. The core failing of the welfare
state lies in its perverse incentive structure that encourages such pro-
creation. As Republican Senator Phil Gramm lays the charge: "What
a great paradox it is that while families across America are pulling the
wagon, both husband and wife working every day to save enough
money to have a baby, they are paying taxes to support programs like
this one which is subsidizing people to have babies they cannot sup-
port."' 291 Through another lens, current welfare reform rhetoric,
which focuses on personal responsibility, obscures questions of causal
and collective responsibility. It engages in scapegoating and ignores
the macroeconomic and systemic reasons for poverty, as well as the
demands of social justice and society's collective responsibility for
supporting the poor.292
Different issues and solutions arise when one shifts the lens from
asking questions about why people who are in poverty have children
to asking why people in our society lack the economic resources nec-
essary to provide for their children. As Senator Carol Moseley-Braun
aptly framed this perspective: "I cannot imagine anybody who would
argue with [the] proposition [that] a person who brings a child into
this world should take care of that child. But to do so, since we are
talking about poor people here.., they have to work. The reality
there, of course, is people can only work when there are jobs to be
had."293 Indeed, one might argue that a person ought to be able to
earn a "living wage" (or a "family-sufficient wage"), 2 94 and to exercise
the fundamental constitutional right to decide to bear or beget chil-
291. 141 CONG. REc. S13487-88 (daily ed. Sept. 13, 1995) (statement of Sen. Gramm).
292. See Note, Dethroning the Welfare Queen: The Rhetoric of Reform, 107 HARV. L.
REv. 2013, 2016 n.10 (1994) ("A basic, formidable tension exists between dealing with
poverty as a structural problem inherent in the economic system, which alleviates recipi-
ents' moral culpability, and dealing with poverty as the result of individual irresponsibility,
which engenders in recipients guilt for their own low socioeconomic position.").
293. 141 CONG. REc. S11781 (daily ed. Aug. 7, 1995) (statement of Sen. Moseley-
Braun).
294. I take the term "family-sufficient" from WORK TO BE DONE: REPORT OF Tm
MANHATrAN BOROUGH PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON EDUCATION, EMPLOYMENT AND
WELFARE 13, 16 n.2 (Aug. 1995) (reporting term used by welfare recipient to describe the
type of job needed). The term "family wage" has a gendered history, referring to the
ability of.a man to earn an income sufficient to support his wife and children. See
GORDON, supra note 220, at 53-59. Here I use "family-sufficient" to connote the idea of a
parent of either sex being able to earn enough income to support her or his dependent
children.
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dren in a meaningful way, but that structural economic factors impair
such exercise. Thus, Senator Moseley-Braun charged that one of the
"dirty little secrets" of Republican welfare proposals was "the absence
of any job creation" and urged her colleagues to adopt reform that
would "help people to work, to do for themselves ... and to provide
for their children. '29
5
The rhetoric of reproductive irresponsibility accepts the status
quo of economic arrangements and distribution of resources as an un-
problematic baseline from which to assess both personal responsibility
and "fairness." From this perspective, proponents of personal respon-
sibility diagnose poor people who have children and depend upon
governmental assistance as irresponsible and violating norms of fair-
ness with respect to working families who play by the rules. This ac-
ceptance of the status quo fails to make critical inquiry into why
mothers and fathers lack resources or are unable to provide for their
children. It fails to inquire whether, for example, poverty and welfare
"dependency" derive not from "bad behavior," but from economic in-
equality rooted in structures of sex, race, and class.296 By so limiting
the inquiry, issues of collective responsibility for poverty remain
unaddressed.
A related point is that the model of responsible reproduction
from which poor people deviate fails to consider the extent to which
the rhetoric of family values does not translate into valuing families.
As Herbert Gans contends in his new book, The War Against the
Poor, "most of the time most of the poor do not violate the fundamen-
tal moral values," and indeed "want to work in secure, well-paid, and
respectable jobs like everyone else"; perceptions to the contrary aid in
labeling them and condemning them as "undeserving. '297 Similarly,
other critics of the current rhetoric argue that there is a lot of "com-
mon ground" on such values as responsibility: people believe not only
that they should provide for their children, but also that they ought to
be able to provide for their children, who should not have to grow up
in poverty. There is too little attention paid to the problem that peo-
ple are unable to "live consistent with their values" and to designing
public policies that value families and children.298 Instead, the prob-
295. 141 CONG. REc. S11782 (daily ed. Aug. 7, 1995) (statement of Sen. Moseley-
Braun).
296. Gwendolyn Mink, Welfare Reform in Historical Perspective, 26 CONN. L. REv. 879,
898-99 (1994).
297. HERBERT GANS, THE WAR AGAINST THE POOR 96-97 (1995).
298. MacNeil/Lehrer News Hour (PBS television broadcast, Sept. 8, 1994) (LEXIS,
News library, Script file) (remarks of Angela Blackwell, Urban Strategies Council). See
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lem of family poverty is reduced to a "poverty of values" charge and
to failings of personal responsibility and of not playing by the rules,
rather than the economic problems facing many families. 299
(1) Structural Factors and Collective Responsibility
There are at least three claims regarding collective responsibility
relevant here. First is the claim that there are impersonal causes of
poverty, related to the familiar idea that in a market economy there
will be inevitable imperfections and fluctuations. One result is that
some members of society will suffer economic insecurity impairing
self-sufficiency.300 Second is the contention that decisions and actions
of government also create poverty and the "underclass," and in this
sense government contributes to the economic privations of certain
members or groups of society.30' Third is the argument that govern-
ment creates and exacerbates the poverty of single mothers and their
children through, for example, welfare policy, employment law, and
family law.302
All three of these claims suggest that some of the most salient
and intractable causes of poverty implicate collective responsibility for
its solution. This is not to say that personal choices play no role. Pov-
erty scholars caution against simplistic dichotomies between individ-
ual behavior and, circumstance, or agency and social structure, which
render the poor either wholly agents or wholly victims.3 0 3 Instead,
studies suggest that low-income people recognize that mistaken
choices, such as early parenting, contribute to their plight. Poor peo-
also Usdansky, supra note 226, § 4, at 4 (reporting that most young people want and expect
to marry but that an eroding economic base makes it an unrealistic possibility).
299. See MacNeil/Lehrer News Hour, supra note 298 (remarks of William Bennett sug-
gesting that "the economic argument... just doesn't go very, very far," and that "govern-
mentalism" is not the answer because "we are suffering from a moral and spiritual
deficit"). The term "poverty of values" refers to former Vice President Quayle's "Murphy
Brown" speech discussed supra text accompanying note 33.
300. J. Donald Moon, The Moral Basis of the Democratic Welfare State, in DEMOC-
RACY AND THE WELFARE STATE 27, 28-30 (Amy Gutman ed., 1988).
301. See, e.g., Michael B. Katz, Refraining the "Underclass" Debate, in THE UNDER-
cLAss DEBATE 457-66 (Michael B. Katz ed., 1993) (explaining how governmental regula-
tion of the market as well as racially discriminatory laws and practices have contributed to
African American's "marginalization, exclusion and isolation" in the inner cities).
302. See e.g., Dowd, supra note 17, at 51-81 (arguing that the "ideologies" of these
areas of law "incorporate and create stigna by impoverishing single parents").
303. See Katz, supra note 301, at 441-42; Paula Roberts, Why Don't We Do It Right
This Tune? Redefining The Welfare Reform Debate, 21 CLEARINGHOUSE REv., Apr. 1988,
at 1305, 1305 (citing studies).
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ple, however, differ from other people in that they have fewer options
to rectify those mistakes.
3 4
Attention to structural factors is critical in a climate so drenched
in the rhetoric of personal responsibility. Notwithstanding the slogan
that the way to end welfare is to move people from welfare to work,
even if at minimum wage, the alleviation of poverty through work is
not that simple. For example, declining real wages at the low end of
the labor market practically ensure that a minimum-wage job will in-
creasingly do no more than shift welfare recipients to the ranks of the
"working poor. '30 5 Given that such jobs often offer no family medical
benefits and do not provide adequate income for safe child care, wo-
men who go on and remain on AFDC to help support their children
appear to be making rational choices when they conclude that they
simply cannot afford to take or keep such jobs (or, at least, cannot risk
losing AFDC by reporting such employment).30 6 Moreover, there is
considerable competition for even these low-wage jobs, which allows
employers to weigh job qualifications in ways that may disadvantage
significant numbers of welfare recipients.307 Some states have experi-
mented successfully with moving women on welfare into higher-pay-
ing jobs that increase their prospects for long-term self-sufficiency.
But such programs are unlikely under the welfare scheme set out in
the Personal Responsibility Act, which emphasizes mandatory work
requirements, no matter what the job, and makes inadequate provi-
sion for child care at the expense of more innovative approaches.
30 8
304. See Roberts, supra note 303, at 1305.
305. See Peter T. Kilborn, Take This Job. Up From Welfare: It's Harder and Harder,
N.Y. TiNms, Apr. 16, 1995, § 4, at 1.
306. Such factors as the historical and ongoing segregation of women, and dispropor-
tionately women of color, into low-income, dead-end jobs also contribute to the problem
of moving them from welfare to work. See TERESA L. AMOrr & JULIE A. MATTHAEI,
RAcE, GENDER, AND WORK (1991). Nor can it be a surprise that so many women "cycle"
between AFDC and such jobs. Jason DeParle, Welfare Mothers Find Jobs Are Easier to
Get Than Hold, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 24, 1994, at Al (discussing Donna A. Pavetti's findings
on "welfare cycling"); 1994 GREEN BOOK, supra note 58, at 440-42. Research indicates
that mothers on AFDC often work without reporting it because few mothers can actually
subsist on AFDC benefits alone. Jencks & Edin, supra note 66, at 45-46.
307. See Katherine Newman & Chauncy Lennon, The Job Ghetto, AM. PROSPECr,
Summer 1995, at 66, 66-67 (reporting findings that in Harlem, the ratio of applicants to
hires for minimum-wage jobs in fast-food restaurants was 14 to 1 and that both hired and
rejected job applicants typically had more work experience than many welfare recipients);
WORK TO BE DONE, supra note 294, at 21 (reporting that "[iun New York City today, the
jobless outnumber the jobs available by more than ten to one.").
308. In the House, Democratic legislators unsuccessfully attempted to substitute legis-
lation with such components as guaranteed child care, funding for education and job train-
ing, and transitional health insurance. See Family Stability and Work Act of 1995, 141
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Further, there are a number of structural factors creating eco-
nomic insecurity not only for welfare recipients, but even for the most
educated and skilled American workers and their families.30 9 These
factors include the effects of corporate "downsizing," as well as record
levels of wealth and income inequality in society.310 Democratic op-
position to the Personal Responsibility Act and its progeny empha-
sized the need to address such factors.311 Similarly, President Clinton
stresses that problems posed by economic woes often impede individ-
ual efforts to be responsible and that the rhetoric of personal responsi-
bility and family values should not obscure the important role that
CONG. REc. H3742-61 (daily ed. Mar. 24, 1995) (offered by Rep. Mink); Individual Re-
sponsibility Act of 1995, 141 CONG. R-c. H3634-77 (daily ed. Mar. 23, 1995) (offered by
Rep. Deal). Although the compromise version, the Personal Responsibility and Work Op-
portunity Act, departs from current law in not guaranteeing child care for mothers re-
quired to work, it differs from the Personal Responsibility Act in prohibiting states from
terminating a recipient for failure to comply with work requirements if her reason is the
"demonstrated inability (as determined by the state) to obtain needed child care." H.R. 4,
§ 103 (proposed § 407(e)(2)). For more innovative approaches, see Isabel Wilkerson, Taste
of Middle-Class Pay for Welfare Mothers, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 10, 1994, at Al, D21 (describing
construction work programs in Chicago); MacNeil/Lehrer News Hour (PBS television
broadcast, Jan. 13, 1995) (LEXIS, News file, Script library) (featuring Colorado's employ-
ment training program).
309. For example, commentators attribute Republican Presidential candidate Pat
Buchanan's successes in early primaries in part to his promise to "look[ ] out for working
men and women and middle-class families who have seen their standard of living fall."
John B. Judis, White Squall, NEW REPUBLIC, Mar. 11, 1996, at 28 (quoting Buchanan). The
elimination of many higher-paying jobs in construction and industry that used to provide a
decent wage to persons with less than a college, or even high school, education has espe-
cially affected African-American men. See WILSON, supra note 179, at 39-45, 100-04. For
accounts of the more general economic insecurity, see Peter Kilborn, In New Work World,
Employers CallAll the Shots, N.Y. Tamms, July 3,1995, at 1 (reporting on job insecurity and
bleak job market for middle-class Americans); Charisse Jones, Free From Want, But Just
Getting By, N.Y. TiMEs, Feb. 18, 1995, at 1 (describing struggles of middle-class wage earn-
ers); Louis Uchitelle, Moonlighting Plus: 3-Job Families on the Rise, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 16,
1994, at Al (reporting that difficult economy necessitates multiple jobs).
310. See Louis Uchitelle & N.R. Kleinfeld, On the Battlefields of Business, Millions of
Casualties, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 3, 1996, at 1, 26 (reporting that corporate downsizing is lead-
ing to "the most acute job insecurity since the Depression"); Keith Bradsher, Gap in
Wealth In U.S. Called Widest in West, N.Y. TIMus, Apr. 17, 1995, at Al (reporting on
America's record wealth inequality); Edward N. Wolff, How the Pie is Sliced:- America's
Growing Concentration of Wealth, AM. PROSPECr, Summer 1995, at 58 (same).
311. See 141 CONG. REaC. H3360 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1995) (statement of Rep. McDer-
mott) (arguing that welfare seems to be the poor's best option); id. at H3368 (statement of
Rep. Brown); 141 CONG. REC. H3764-65 (daily ed. Mar. 24, 1995) (statement of Rep. Col-
lins); id. at H3769-70 (statement of Rep. Woolsey) (advocating Mink substitute bill as rem-
edy for welfare cycle); see supra text accompanying note 293 (remarks of Sen. Moseley-
Braun).
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government should play in addressing such economic problems.312
Addressing these kinds of problems, however, would require serious
economic and family policies and a degree of governmental invest-
ment that is anathema in an era where reducing governmental spend-
ing and saving taxpayers money is a primary objective of welfare
reform. 31
3
(2) Affirmative Obligations of Government, Fairness, and Reproduction
The rhetoric of reproductive irresponsibility suggests that the
problem stems from individuals shirking duties to procreate in a mor-
ally and socially responsible manner. But a focus on collective re-
sponsibility requires that we make a broader inquiry into the
existence, and the breach, of other duties.
Does our government have a responsibility to address such struc-
tural factors as stark economic inequality when some members of so-
ciety lack the material resources that are preconditions for meaningful
human agency and effective exercise of their basic liberties and rights?
One might answer this question in the affirmative, drawing upon a
number of political theorists who have justified the welfare state on
the basis of commitments to principles of justice, fairness, or agency
rights, such as self-control and self-direction.314 While liberal theory
often posits an ideal of an economically self-sufficient and independ-
ent citizen, it recognizes that there will be inevitable casualties and
inequality, which the welfare state is obligated to address. Similarly,
notwithstanding the hold of the idea of the "negative" constitution on
the current Court,315 some constitutional theorists have posited af-
firmative governmental obligations to secure certain minimum eco-
nomic conditions or minimum livelihood for all. By such accounts,
persons may have constitutional rights "to adequate food, shelter,
health care, and education in exchange for reasonable efforts on their
312. A prominent Clinton theme has been a pairing of government offering more op-
portunity with people taking more responsibility. Alison Mitchell, On Issue of Family Val-
ues, Clinton Unveils an Agenda of His Own, N.Y. TIms, July 29, 1995, at 6; Alison
Mitchell, Clinton Urges "Less Combat" by Politicians, N.Y. TIMES, July 7, 1995, at Al, A14.
313. See CONTACT WITH AMERICA, supra note 8, at 65, 66, 72, 74. See also WrLSON,
supra note 179, at 140-64 (describing macroeconomic proposals).
314. See, e.g., JOHN RAWLS, A THEORY OF JUSTICE (1971); STEPHEN HOLMES, PAS-
SIONS AND CONSTRAINT 257-66 (1995); J. DONALD MOON, CONSTRUCTING COMMUNITY:
MORAL PLURALISM AND TRAGIC CONFLICrS 121-45 (1993); Ronald Dworkin, Foundations
of Liberal Equality, in XI THE TANNER LECTURES ON HUMAN VALUES 1 (Grethe B. Peter-
son ed., 1990).
315. See Susan Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A Critique, 88 MICH. L. REv. 2271,
2272-78 (1990).
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own behalf," rights that impose or derive from responsibilities on the
legislature and citizens, even if they are not judicially enforceable ab-
sent legislative enactment.3 16 From this point of view, a society faces
serious charges of injustice when a significant number of its members
lack the minimal material preconditions for a good life.
These arguments typically stem from conceptions of fairness and
social justice. If people are poor because of structural or
macroeconomic reasons, or because there are inevitable losers in a
capitalist economy, does not the view that certain people ought not
procreate raise questions of fairness and social justice? First, the no-
tion that government should not subsidize "irresponsible" procreation
by providing welfare benefits ignores the extent to which government
already subsidizes reproduction, chiefly to the benefit of middle in-
come and wealthy families, through a taxation scheme allowing de-
ductions for dependent children, child care, and mortgages, as well as
through programs supporting public and higher education.317 The
supposed contrast between responsible and irresponsible families un-
derlying the "fairness" rationale for capping benefits depends upon a
narrow definition of "dependency" and of "welfare," under which
AFDC, a very small percentage of governmental expenditures, repre-
sents an illegitimate and unfair shifting of costs to government while
other governmental subsidies and benefits, given to individuals, fami-
lies, and corporate entities, escape condemnation.3 18
Second, the critique of unaccountability contains the implicit as-
sumption that everyone could have adequate resources to provide for
children without reliance upon governmental assistance if only they
"played by the rules." In other words, people who are willing to work
and save will be able to support children; the failure to do so stems
316. Lawrence G. Sager, Justice in Plain Clothes: Reflections on the Thinness of Consti-
tutional Law, 88 Nw. U. L. Rv. 410, 420 (1993).
317. See supra note 69 and accompanying text; FiNEMAN, supra note 12, at 191,226-27;
MCLANAHAN & SANDEFuR, supra note 6, at 145-47. Of course, the proponent of repro-
ductive responsibility would likely say that middle-class children grow up to be responsible
citizens who contribute something back to society; not so, the self-destructive, drug-using
criminals who are the products of irresponsible reproduction.
318. For charges that the current Congress fails to scrutinize and trim "welfare" to
segments of society other than the poor, see Richard W. Stevenson, Move in Senate Aims
at Cutting Corporate Aid, N.Y. TrAs, Mar. 6, 1996, at 1 (reporting that Congress' inability
to confront "corporate welfare" issue has led to bipartisan call for independent commission
to do so); 141 CONG. REac. H3379 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1995) (statement of Rep. Owens)
(urging review of all big government programs, such as home loan mortgages and price
subsidies for farmers and welfare for electric power users); Peter J. Sepp, Are Republicans
Serious About Cutting Fat?, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 30, 1995, at A17 (noting that the House
"flinched at cutting many forms of corporate welfare").
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from failings of personal responsibility. Christopher Jencks and Kath-
erine Edin argue persuasively that if poor women heed the call to
"play by the rules" and defer childbearing until they are financially
prepared-which is equated with such measures as getting an educa-
tion, a job, and getting married-they may never bear a child because
many of those women will never be able to afford to have children
without some public assistance.319 If that is so, then perhaps a further
assumption of the model is that if some people, even if they "play by
the rules," are not able to afford children, then they should not have
them. Under such a scheme, lack of economic resources would in ef-
fect preclude entire segments of the population from exercising their
procreative liberty, regardless of their individual responsibility for
their economic circumstances. 320 Moreover, the burden falls dispro-
portionately on groups such as African Americans and women who
have suffered historical subordination and discrimination and whose
poverty results in part from governmental policies and laws.321
Of course, proponents of personal responsibility may reject the
persuasiveness of structural or macroeconomic accounts, in which case
these fairness concerns may not pose a serious challenge to the model.
Or they may grant that we as a society should work toward addressing
the structural or macroeconomic causes of poverty, but argue that in
the meantime, people should not worsen their own condition. They
may further grant that society's failures of collective responsibility
contribute to that condition, but counter that such failures do not jus-
tify or excuse failures of personal responsibility. People have a duty,
the argument goes, to be responsible in their situations in the world as
it is. This may mean not procreating under circumstances of poverty.
These arguments are cogent and, to a degree, persuasive. But if the
structural arguments are persuasive and there are persons in a market
economy whose condition is unlikely to improve without governmen-
tal assistance or other changes, is it fair to expect that they should
indefinitely abstain from childbearing and rearing? Why should the
relevant inquiry not be what resources an individual could expect to
command in a society whose economic distribution met the require-
ments of fairness and justice? If the problems associated with single-
parent families are significantly or even, as some feminist scholars
319. Jencks & Edin, supra note 66, at 43.
320. See id. (challenging myths about why poor women should wait until a later time to
have children); Austin, supra note 36, at 569 (rejecting "means test" for black
motherhood).
321. See Katz, supra note 301, at 457-66; Dowd, supra note 17, at 34-35, 51-81.
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conclude, primarily due to poverty,322 why not propose a program-
matic commitment to addressing the causes of that poverty so that
single-mother households are economically viable?
Here, the proponents of personal responsibility may fall back on
claims that we have a "negative" constitution and that, as proponents
of the New Jersey family cap argued, there are no affirmative obliga-
tions of government to provide the resources to facilitate the exercise
of rights. Government, such proponents claim, did not create the ob-
stacles presented by a person's poverty. Yet, the alleged absence of a
constitutional obligation does not answer the question of what respon-
sibilities members of society have to one another and how govern-
mental policies should reflect those responsibilities.
(3) Burdens of "Inevitable Dependency" and Collective Responsibility
There are also powerful feminist analyses that strengthen argu-
ments for collective responsibility by focusing upon the issue of de-
pendency and its relationship to the poverty of single-mother families.
Liberal models of the welfare state assuming an ideal of the economi-
cally independent and self-sufficient citizen who may need an occa-
sional boost from the government often fail adequately to address the
status of women as dependents or as caretakers of dependent chil-
dren. Thus, in some liberal models, dependency distances a person
from the ideal of citizenship and the need for and receipt of welfare
inevitably insults human dignity and self-respect.323 As noted above,
feminist analysis of dependency has illuminated how only certain
forms of dependency are deemed a problem. For example, a woman's
financial dependency on AFDC is problematic, but not (at least, tradi-
tionally) her dependency on her husband, or an employee's on an em-
ployer.324 Such an analysis challenges the premise of self-sufficiency
by highlighting the extent to which all members of society are "depen-
dent" not only upon each other but also upon government through
various forms of "welfare" provisions.
Feminist analysis of "dependency" illustrates that "dependency"
is an integral part of human existence and that one of society's most
vital tasks is meeting the needs of its "dependent" members.
Fineman's arguments about how society should allocate the burdens
322. See FiNEMAN, supra note 12, at 101-05 (recognizing a multiplicity of factors that
affect children's well-being in single-family homes); Dowd, supra note 17, at 26-35 (arguing
that poverty, not family form, is the source of many detrimental effects).
323. MOON, supra note 314, at 129-32.
324. See Fraser & Gordon, supra note 145, at 314-26.
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of "inevitable dependency" are quite helpful in addressing issues of
collective responsibility.325 She argues that in a society such as our
own, there will inevitably be people who are dependent upon others
for care, a primary example being children, another being elderly per-
sons. In our society women overwhelmingly provide that care. They
assume the burdens of inevitable dependency, which generally disable
them from being full market participants and in turn lead to their "de-
rivative dependency" upon others for resources. Traditionally, the
burdens of inevitable dependency have been allocated to the "pri-
vate" marital family (or "natural" family), and, within the family, to
the mother, who was, at least in theory, provided material resources
by the husband/father. The state has relied upon the "private" family
to perform these functions and subsidized it in various ways.
326
The irresponsibility critique charges that families who are not
self-sufficient-those who must look to public sources for the re-
sources to meet these burdens of dependency-are irresponsible, and
that the state should not assume the role of the "private" family.
Fineman instead challenges this model of self-sufficiency and argues
that the failure of the "natural" family to adequately meet these bur-
dens accounts, in part, for the rise of single-mother families. The "de-
pendency" of such mothers stems from the difficulty of engaging in
the caretaking that women do within the two-parent family and in ac-
quiring the economic resources to do So.327 Fineman's proposal is that
we eliminate any special status afforded marriage, redefine the basic
family unit as the mother-child caretaking unit, and redistribute to it
the social and economic subsidies now provided to the married fam-
ily.328 Whether or not one endorses Fineman's proposal with respect
to marriage,329 her proposed redefinition of the family valuably high-
lights the vital task of meeting the burdens of "inevitable dependency"
as a component of social reproduction and the way in which propo-
nents of reproductive responsibility fail to address the role of collec-
tive responsibility in meeting those burdens. The debate over
325. See FINEMAN, supra note 12, at 161-76.
326. Id. at 161-69, 226-27.
327. Id. at 164-66.
328. See id at 226-36.
329. My concerns are two-fold. First, rather than eliminating the special legal status of
marriage, I would move in the direction of expanding the category to include other inti-
mate relationships, such as gay and lesbian marriage. Second, although I recognize that
Fineman uses the term "mother" as a metaphor and states that men can and should fill that
role, iad at 234, I am hesitant about using such a sex-linked term. A related concern is the
risk of inadvertently reinforcing gender norms about who should do caretaking work.
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reproductive responsibility and irresponsibility might take a different
shape in a society with greater commitments to supporting the work of
social reproduction and the burdens of inevitable dependency.3 30
I. Enriching Public Discourse About Reproduction
and Responsibility
In this Part, by concentrating upon feminist analysis, I suggest
some dimensions of responsibility and irresponsibility that are not ad-
equately addressed in the current discourse of "irresponsible" repro-
duction. Attempting to inject feminist analysis into the discourse
seems particularly valuable now, when reductive stories about motiva-
tion and rationality, evidencing a problematic gender ideology, are ad-
vanced to support efforts to eliminate irresponsibility. A serious
public conversation about reproduction and responsibility should take
into account dimensions of the issue of responsibility illuminated by
feminist work, which serves both a critical role of pointing out flaws
with current models and a constructive role of contributing to better
models. Although I do not offer a complete alternative paradigm
here, I suggest that a continuum model of agency and responsibility is
a helpful framework for understanding how issues of responsibility
and irresponsibility feature in women's lives and for constructing bet-
ter models than those in current discourse. I also suggest that feminist
work on mothering as well as on women's moral reasoning about
abortion may contribute to these tasks. Feminist analysis may also
illuminate difficult questions about the role of normative judgment
and the importance of including in the conversation the voices of wo-
men who are targeted as irresponsible.
A. Feminist Responses to the Rhetoric of "Irresponsible" Reproduction
Questions of responsibility occupy a prominent place in feminist
legal scholarship. Feminist scholars have addressed such questions de-
fensively, in responding to attacks on abortion rights as licensing irre-
sponsibility, and affirmatively, in offering models of ethics as well as
legal rules and standards placing responsibility at the center.331 In-
330. Some find instructive the family policies and more generous provision for families
in some European social welfare states, which often reflect affirmative governmental obli-
gations and positive rights of citizens. See id. at 216-17; GLENDON, supra note 102, at 98-
108.
331. For examples of the defensive use of responsibility in the context of abortion, see
Williams, supra note 105, at 1589-94 (advocating that feminists develop narratives about
abortion as a morally responsible choice) and Part II.C.3 infra for discussion. For a few
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deed, some feminist scholars argue that a feminist perspective would
place more emphasis on responsibility, interdependence, and care,
and less on autonomy and rights, reflecting women's moral and moth-
ering experiences. 332 From such a viewpoint, a strategic feminist re-
sponse to charges of reproductive irresponsibility would involve
focusing upon the prominence of themes of responsibility in women's
lives, including their role as mothers. Such a response would also
likely critique the negative valuation of "dependency" in current rhet-
oric and stress themes of collective responsibility for caretaking and
meeting the dependency needs of members of society.
333
A related line of response, exemplified in the work of Martha
Fineman,334 is to argue for collective responsibility for the work of
caretaking by pointing to the practical reality that it is primarily wo-
men who do caretaking (or, to use Fineman's term, shoulder the bur-
dens of the "inevitable dependency") but that society devalues such
caretaking and thus disadvantages women. Similarly, in response to
the rhetoric of personal responsibility and the call to move women
from welfare to work, a feminist perspective grounded in the premise
that caretaking is a socially valuable-but undervalued-form of work
would stress that the difficulties mothers on welfare face, in attempt-
ing to meet the dual responsibilities of caretaker and financial pro-
vider, are a more extreme version of the challenges many other
mothers face.335 Fineman's work also focuses on gender ideology,
contending that it is due to the norm of the patriarchal family that the
examples from the considerable literature on the affirmative use of responsibility, see
Katharine T. Bartlett, Re-Expressing Parenthood, 98 YALE L.J. 293 (1988) (proposing a
transformation of our legal vision of parenting to incorporate notions of responsibility,
care, and other-directedness instead of rights and selfishness); Leslie Bender, A Lawyer's
Primer on Feminist Theory and Tort, 38 J. LEGAL EDUC. 3 (1988) (proposing redefinitions
of negligence standards in tort law and repudiation of "no duty to rescue" rule based on
feminist notions of care and responsibility).
332. See, e.g., Bender, supra note 331; Robin West, Feminism, Critical Social Theory
and Law, 1989 U. Cm. LEGAL F. 59. For an evaluation of such scholarship, see Linda C.
McClain, "Atomistic Man" Revisited: Liberalism, Connection, and Feminist Jurisprudence,
65 S. CAL. L. REv. 1171 (1992).
333. See, e.g., Martha Minow, The Welfare of Single Mothers and Their Children, 26
CONN. L. REv. 817 (1994).
334. See discussion supra Part II.C.3.
335. For a discussion of these points, see Minow, supra note 333, and the series of
articles commenting on Minow's article in 26 CONN L. REv. 843-911 (1994), especially
Roberts, supra note 277; Lucie E. White, On the "Consensus" to End Welfare: Where are
the Women's Voices?, 26 CONN. L. REv. 843 (1994); Heidi Hartmann & Roberta Spalter-
Roth, Reducing Welfare's Stigma: Policies that Build Upon Commonalities Among Women,
26 CONN. L. REV. 901 (1994).
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paradigmatic mothers I have discussed are labelled as deviant.336 As
discussed below, she challenges feminists to look at single mothers as
making a "deliberate choice" questioning such patriarchal ideology.337
Another emphasis within feminist work is on the importance of
"voice" and the need to include many perspectives, as well as to ques-
tion the assumptions underlying objective standards and normative
judgments. In particular, one premise is that attending to the voices
of those who often lack power or privilege yields not only a more
inclusive and richer analysis of women's lives, but also better law and
policy.3 38 A strategic response from this perspective would likely
stress the importance of including the voices and perspectives of wo-
men targeted as "irresponsible"-single mothers, poor mothers on
welfare, and teen mothers-in a conversation about reproductive re-
sponsibility and welfare reform, and of learning how questions of re-
sponsibility and irresponsibility feature in their lives and
perspectives. 339
Other feminist work stressing the reality of domination and sub-
ordination in women's lives illuminates important unresolved tensions
over questions of agency and responsibility. Such work analyzes the
impact of male power upon female agency, rendering the assumption
that women's reproductive behavior reflects their "choice" problem-
atic.34° As I discuss below, a strategic response from this perspective
would shift the focus from female irresponsibility in the sense of cul-
pable, immoral choice to an incapacity, or diminished capacity, due to
the effects of male domination. The solution would lie in empowering
women so they could make meaningful choices, not in punishing them
for behavior for which they lack full moral responsibility.
Finally, a response I advance that is not confined to any particular
strand of feminist thought is to shift the focus from female irresponsi-
bility to a consideration of male irresponsibility and how it contributes
to the problems targeted by the irresponsibility critique. Similarly,
one could shift the lens from supposed failings of personal responsibil-
ity to failings of collective responsibility.
All of these different lines of feminist thought usefully contribute
to a response to the critique of irresponsible reproduction. In reflect-
336. FrnqmAN, supra note 12, at 101-25.
337. See id. at 125; infra text accompanying notes 382-390.
338. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Feminist Legal Methods, 103 HAiv. L. REv. 829, 867-87
(1990) (analyzing feminist theories of knowledge).
339. See, e.g., White, supra note 335.
340. See CATHARINE A. MAcKiNNON, Privacy v. Equality: Beyond Roe v. Wade, in
FEmINISM UNMODWMD 93-102 (1987).
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ing upon a useful framework for thinking about the different mean-
ings of responsibility and irresponsibility in women's reproductive
choices and behaviors, I propose a continuum model of agency and
responsibility. Such a model attempts to avoid reductive dichotomies
and to recognize the interplay of choice and constraint in women's
and adolescent females' reproductive lives. I also take up the difficult
question of whether and how feminists should make normative judg-
ments about women's lives and choices.
B. Toward Better Procreation Stories: Missing Dimensions of
Responsibility and Irresponsibility
(1) Men's Irresponsibility and Women's Lives
It may be helpful to begin with a feminist analysis of the relation-
ship between men's irresponsibility and women's agency and responsi-
bility. As noted above, contemporary paradigms of irresponsible
reproduction focus heavily upon women, but they could instead center
upon the irresponsibility of men. Male irresponsibility is a familiar
theme in feminist work on sexuality, procreation, and the family. For
example, dominance feminism stresses the extent to which legal con-
cepts such as privacy, rape laws, and the exemption of marital rape
and assault from legal proscription have rendered men unaccountable
by affording them immunity from the consequences of their actions.341
Similarly, if cultural norms do not hold men accountable for their sex-
ual and reproductive behavior, they in effect license male irresponsi-
bility as a form of "natural" aggressiveness and lack of self-control or
restraint.342 Here one thinks of the accounts of "natural" masculinity
prominent in some conservative critiques of welfare noted above, that
men are inclined toward predatory, irresponsible, and promiscuous
sex. At least some feminists would resist attributing this type of irre-
sponsibility to nature and would instead target constructions of mas-
culinity aided by such cultural messages as "boys will be boys," which
seem to assume a certain inevitability about male sexual aggression.'
43
Feminists sometimes make recourse to male irresponsibility as an
explanatory strategy for women's predicaments and needs. For exam-
341. See, e.g., CATHARINE A. MAcKINNON, TOWARD A FEMINIST TmoRY OF THE
STATE 171-83, 193-94 (1989). For an evaluation of this feminist critique of privacy, arguing
for privacy's potential for securing women's inviolability, see Linda C. McClain, Inviolabil-
ity and Privacy: The Castle, the Sanctuary, and the Body, 7 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 195
(1995).
342. See Lynne Henderson, Rape and Responsibility, 11 LAw & PHiL. 127 (1992).
343. See, e.g., id. at 130-31, 160-62; McClain, supra note 341, at 220-40.
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pie, feminist historian Linda Gordon observes that in the nineteenth
and early twentieth centuries, feminist work on behalf of single
mothers treated women as blameless victims of male irresponsibility
as a way to find women harmless and make them worthy of help, not
responsible or culpable for their plight.3" Similarly, arguments for
women's rights as individuals, within the family and the broader pol-
ity, stressed women's vulnerability due to legally-sanctioned patriar-
chal authority, sustained by male legislators, and men's exploitation of
that power.345 Posing the question, "How is men's irresponsibility to
family related to women's assertion of individual rights?," Jane Larson
observes that, as women have gained rights within the family, eroding
patriarchal prerogatives, men have increasingly abandoned their fami-
lies emotionally and financially. 346 If, as suggested in the conservative
gender ideology discussed in Part II, the trappings of such patriarchal
authority are a necessary inducement to male responsibility within the
family, the price is too high, such feminists argue.
Contemporary feminists identify male irresponsibility as a cause
of unwanted pregnancy, abortion, single motherhood, family poverty,
and family violence, often critiquing the ways that law permits or per-
petuates such irresponsibility.347 Male irresponsibility here includes
both moral irresponsibility and unaccountability, acting heedless of
consequences for self and others, fleeing responsibility for those con-
sequences, and failing to honor obligations. Some examples relating
to reproduction include not taking responsibility for contraception,
not accepting responsibility for pregnancy, and not meeting family re-
sponsibilities by parenting or paying child support. This location of
344. GORDON, supra note 220, at 31-32. But that did not mean that those women were
to be free of moral supervision. See supra text accompanying notes 131-32.
345. See JoHNs STUART MILL, The Subjection of Women (1869), in THREE EssAYs 427
(Richard Wollheim ed., 1975).
346. Jane E. Larson, The Sexual Injustice of the Traditional Family, 77 CORNELL L.
REv. 997, 997 (1992).
347. See, e.g., Sylvia A. Law, Rethinking Sex and the Constitution, 132 U. PA. L. REv.
955, 996-97 (1984) (stating that "the stereotype of male irresponsibility in relation to the
children they father is... distressingly accurate" and "a core social problem of our time"
as well as critiquing the Supreme Court's "unwed father" jurisprudence for reflecting that
stereotype); Dowd, supra note 17, at 60-62 (critiquing divorce law for allowing men to
escape from responsibility without consequences). See also PATRICIA HILL COLLINS,
BLACK FEMiNsT THOUGHT 116 (1991) (linking the growing number of African-American
children living in poverty to male unaccountability, for example, young men who "en-
courage their unmarried teenaged girlfriends to give birth to children whose futures are at
risk"). Cf. Ellis Close, Black Men and Black Women, NEwSWEEK, June 5, 1995, at 66, 68
("Too many black women have been hurt, abused, abandoned, left pregnant, helpless, and
homeless by black men who refuse to accept responsibility." (quoting A.L. REYNOLDS, Do
BLACK WOMEN HATE BLACK MEN? (1994))).
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causal responsibility is an important counter to the disproportionate
focus upon women's supposed irresponsibility in current rhetoric. To
some extent, this is recognized in the rhetoric of irresponsible repro-
duction in calls to target "deadbeat dads" and calls for "responsible
fatherhood. ' 348 Many observers, including some feminists, view
men's financial irresponsibility as a key contributor to the poverty of
women's families, one warranting social and legal sanction. 349 At the
same time, some feminists raise concerns that attention to "deadbeat
dads" is contrary to women's interests when it takes the form of
mandatory paternity establishment and child support enforcement.
350
It also exaggerates the extent to which some men actually could con-
tribute enough resources to alleviate poverty and reinforces the as-
sumption that provision for children is exclusively a private, rather
than also a collective, responsibility.351
In considering the extent to which single motherhood is a "delib-
erate choice,"352 we should seriously consider accounts of women's
lives that point to various forms of male irresponsibility as causal fac-
tors in creating single-parent families and their poverty. Recent stud-
ies chronicling causes of poverty in the lives of poor single mothers
who have relied upon welfare offer ample illustrations of the causal
relationships between men's irresponsibility and women's single
parenthood, poverty, and recourse to welfare.353 In a more personal
account, Barbara Omolade contends that most black single mothers
did not set out to be a single mother, but began in an intimate rela-
tionship with a man, whether in marriage or cohabitation. 354 In many
cases, those relationships ended because a woman elected to remove
herself and her children from the man's violence or other forms of
348. See discussion supra Parts I.A.2 and II.A.3. The Personal Responsibility and
Work Opportunity Act of 1995 has extensive provisions addressing establishment and en-
forcement of child support obligations. H.R. 4, §§ 300-391 (child support).
349. For feminist work, see supra note 347. For other work, see MARY ANN GLENDON,
ABORTION AND DIVORCE IN WESTERN LAW (1987).
350. See FINEMAN, supra note 12, at 208-17.
351. See id.
352. Id. at 125.
353. See BERRICK, supra note 85 (offering portraits of lives of women formerly or pres-
ently on AFDC based upon initial study of four hundred women and their children in
GAIN program in California and in-depth interviews with five women); VALERIE PO-
LAKOW, LIVES ON TiE EDGE (1993) (presenting stories of single mothers' lives drawn from
oral interviews in Michigan from 1989-91).
354. BARBARA OMOLADE, THE RISING SONG OF AFRICAN AMERICAN WOMEN 88
(1994) (drawing upon her own experience and that of her friends; Omolade also indicates
that many women mistakenly assumed the presence of a long-term commitment).
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domination.3 55 These stories of women's lives find confirmation in
other empirical work revealing that "for many women, poverty is
caused, exacerbated, or prolonged by an abusive relationship," with
such consequences as homelessness, recourse to AFDC, and impeding
by such men of efforts by women on welfare to obtain and hold
jobs.356 To the extent that women chose to leave problematic rela-
tionships with men, they did, of course, make certain choices about
their family form. Yet, in many cases male irresponsibility precipi-
tated those choices, just as it constrained women's power and in-
creased the caretaking and financial burdens of mothering.
(2) Female Irresponsibility and Male Dominance
What about female irresponsibility? Dominance feminism places
women's subordination due to male domination and patriarchy at the
core of an understanding of women's lives.357 As some feminist critics
observe, this emphasis raises the question whether female identity is
conflated with victimization.3 58 Dominance analysis also raises ques-
tions about whether it is possible to speak of women as possessing
agency and autonomy, that is, are they morally responsible beings
with the capacity for self-direction or self-governance who are ac-
countable for their choices and behaviors? 359
A strong, and perhaps caricatured, reading of some feminist
claims about the effects of male domination, the social construction of
355. Id. at 89.
356. Davis & Kraham, supra note 224, at 1143-50 (citing studies).
357. See CATlHARtE A. MACKINNON, Difference and Dominance: On Sex Discrimina-
tion, in FEMInIsM UNMoImED, supra note 340, at 32-45 (urging men to "[t]ake your foot
off our necks").
358. See Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L.
REv. 581, 612-13 (1990); Martha R. Mahoney, Whiteness and Women, In Practice and The-
ory: A Reply To Catharine MacKinnon, 5 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 217 (1993) (criticizing
MacKinnon's defining feminism "by what is done to women").
359. I realize that my use of the term "agency" may bring to mind philosophical de-
bates about the question of free will versus determinism. "Agency" is a term commonly
used in feminist scholarship to get at issues of acting notwithstanding the effects of subordi-
nation. The term "autonomy," which I prefer, more broadly captures ideas of the exercise
of moral responsibility in the sense of self-government and decisions concerning one's life
plan. See eg., GERALD DWORKIN, THE THEORY AND PRAcrIcE OF AUTONOMY 10-11
(1988). Some philosophers have used "agency" to describe a similar idea of the capacity to
evaluate one's desires and motivation and to change oneself, a capacity making one re-
sponsible for one's evaluations. See CHARLEs TAYLOR, PHILOSOPmCAL PAPERS I:
HUMAN AGENCY AND LANGUAGE 38-39 (1985). As I use the term "agency" in text, what I
mean to connote is whatever level of self-direction is necessary for a society to be comfort-
able with assigning responsibility for a person's actions. Another term might be "fully
voluntary."
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gender, and other forces shaping identity suggests that women are, in
effect, irresponsible in ways that bear upon the notions of immorality,
unaccountability, and incapacity found in the rhetoric of procreative
irresponsibility. First, in contrast to liberal models of agency and self-
determination stressing the role of moral capacity and responsibil-
ity,360 women are not self-determining agents who exercise moral re-
sponsibility in making choices. This may stem from the consequences
of discrimination and subordination, placing severe limits on women's
choices, or from socialization about women's proper roles and range
of choices. 361 Second, women lack the capacity for moral agency, be-
cause they lack the preconditions for such agency and act, or rather,
react, under the constraining "fist in the face" of patriarchy and male
domination.362 Third, if women are victims and lack the capacity to
exercise moral responsibility, they should not be held morally (or le-
gally) accountable for their actions, even if they are causally responsi-
ble in the sense that they performed those actions.
In the context of irresponsible procreation, dominance analysis
would suggest that the most crucial questions about responsibility im-
plicate issues of power-namely, women's relative lack of power vis-a-
vis that of men-and the impact of power on women's moral agency.
Feminist writer Adrienne Rich, invoked by Catharine MacKinnon,
captures such a stance: "In a society where women entered sexual
intercourse willingly, where adequate contraception was a genuine so-
cial priority, there would be no 'abortion issue.'363 In the face of
assumptions that women could have chosen to avoid pregnancy and
that abortion is almost always a form of "ex post facto" birth control,
such analyses call into question women's causal and moral responsibil-
ity both for the underlying sexual activity itself and for the use or non-
use of contraception. In so doing, these diagnoses suggest that
charges that abortions result from "irresponsible" sex and that wo-
360. See, e.g., DWORKIN, supra note 359, at 31-32 (arguing that autonomy is a capacity
we have a responsibility to exercise); 3 JOEL FEINBERG, THE MORAL LiMrrs OF THE CRIMI-
NAL LAW: HARM TO SELF 43 (1986) (discussing personal responsibility as derivative from
autonomy).
361. An important aspect of MacKinnon's dominance analysis is the extent to which
sex inequality and male domination shape women's beliefs and desires, raising the problem
of whether women make authentic choices. See, e.g., MACKINNON, supra note 340, at 95;
CATHARINE A. MACKINNON, Desire and Power, in FEMINISM UNMODIFIED, supra note
340, at 46-62.
362. Catharine A. MacKinnon, Reflections on Sex Equality Under Law, 100 YALE L.J.
1281, 1285 (1991).




men's demand for abortion is a "form of irresponsibility" miss the ex-
tent to which men's dominance renders women incapable of
responsible reproductive choice.364
For example, MacKinnon's analysis of abortion opponents' "best
case for opposing abortion as female irresponsibility"-women who
repeatedly fail to use contraception and repeatedly get abortions-
questions the assumption of female agency under conditions of sex
inequality to the extent of suggesting that the real problem of female
"irresponsibility" is the absence of female autonomy (or the capacity
for choice).3 65 More generally, she contends that women "often do
not control the conditions under which they become pregnant" and
that it is "exceptional when they do," given current conditions of sex
inequality (including the effects of socialization about male sexual en-
titlement to women's bodies).366 MacKinnon argues that, through no-
tions of privacy, men are rendered legally unaccountable for exercises
of power compromising women's autonomy.367 At the same time, if
abortion is restricted, women are held legally accountable for the con-
sequences of sexual activity even if they lacked the agency or auton-
omy to prevent sex and pregnancy. Thus, in her view, abortion must
be available under conditions of sex inequality as one means, however
limited, by which women can exercise power and control over their
reproductive lives.36
In the broader context of irresponsible reproduction, this analysis
would shift the meaning of women's irresponsibility from that of im-
morality or unaccountability to that of incapacity, or compromised ca-
pacity, due to male power and sex inequality. It would also lead to a
questioning of the model of women as rational actors who can simply
"tell men to get lost," "tame" them, and respond to financial disincen-
tives to procreation (such as family caps). Dominance feminism may
364. RicH, supra note 363, at 271. A similar analysis may be seen in Michelle Ober-
man's account of her reaction to the story of Pamela Rae Stewart's behavior late in preg-
nancy. Michelle Oberman, Sex, Drugs, Pregnancy, and the Law: Rethinking the Problems
of Pregnant Women Who Use Drugs, 43 HAsrNGs L.J. 505 (1992). Her initial reaction on
learning that Ms. Stewart, contrary to medical advice, had intercourse with her husband
late in pregnancy, resulting in hemorrhaging and the baby's eventual death after delivery,
was "disgust" at Ms. Stewart's "irresponsibility." After learning about Stewart's relation-
ship with her violent, abusive husband, she shifted her focus to questions of his responsibil-
ity and the broader context in which Ms. Stewart acted. Id. at 505-06.
365. See MAcKnNON, supra note 340, at 95 (describing the "repeat" abortion popula-
tion as manifesting so deep a passivity that they do not attempt to use contraception, "or
worse, cannot even want to").
366. MacKinnon, supra note 362, at 1312.
367. Id. at 1311.
368. Id. at 1317.
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well run the risk of minimizing or denying the extent to which women
do experience meaningful agency in their sexual and reproductive
lives.369 It is nonetheless valuable in focusing upon the continuing
problems that surround women's sexual experiences with men and af-
fect their ability to exercise responsibility in the sense of agency and
autonomy.3 70 It would enrich the current rhetoric of irresponsible re-
production to elaborate on the extent to which men's sexual aggres-
sion, abuse, and violence (often within families) features in the lives of
women labelled as irresponsible reproducers. 37'
All of these issues of power and irresponsibility are especially im-
portant when looking at teenage girls and their sexual interactions
with teenage boys or, in the more typical case, adult men.372 Research
on adolescent females' sexual and reproductive experience reveals
that much sexual activity, particularly in the case of younger female
teens, results from male sexual abuse (often by relatives) exploitation,
coercion, and aggression (including battering). 373 Moreover, teenage
females often have a sense of responsibility for arousing and satisfying
male desire, which impairs an independent sense of their sexuality or
sexual desire. 374 Male irresponsibility is seen in young, as well as
369. See Kathryn Abrams, Ideology and Women's Choices, 24 GA. L. REv. 761, 776
(1990); Henderson, supra note 342, at 158-68.
370. Some studies of women's sexual and reproductive experiences with men indicate
the lack of power or the sort of passivity MacKinnon describes, including unsuccessful
attempts by women to get their partners to use contraception. See RUTH COLKER, ABOR-
TION AND DIALOGUE: PRO-CHOICE, PRO-LIFE, AND AMERICAN LAW 43-57 (1992). This
was a reason given for the need to develop a female condom. See Elizabeth Kaye, The
Sexes: Reality Dawns, N.Y. TIMES, May 9, 1993, § 9, at 8; Mireya Navarro, A Condom For
Women Is Winning Favor, N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 15, 1993, at B1.
371. For example, in her examination of the life of one woman on welfare, Darlene,
Berrick details how the sexual abuse Darlene suffered as a child at the hands of her father
made her vulnerable to sexual involvement with irresponsible men. BERRICK, supra note
85, at 87-97. Another woman, Sandy, recounted the sexual molestation of her daughter by
the father of the child. Id. at 56-57. Polakow offers similar stories. POLAKOW, supra note
353, at 86-91.
372. See Steinhauer, supra note 14, at A10 (reporting that most babies born to teenage
mothers are fathered by adult men).
373. See FRANCES HUDSON & BERNARD INEICHEN, TAKING IT LYING DOWN: SEXU-
ALITY AND TEENAGE MOTHERHOOD (1991); Tracy E. Higgins & Deborah L. Tolman, Fem-
inism, Rape Law, and the Missing Discourse of Desire, in FEMINISM, MEDIA, AND THE LAW
(Martha Fineman & Martha McCluskey eds., forthcoming 1996); Bob Herbert, Battered
Girls in School, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 24, 1993, at A25. See also Whitehead, supra note 83, at
73-74 (stating that recent research indicates that early teenage sex is often exploitative sex
and that "girls who are sexually active at early ages are likely to experience coercive sex").
374. HUDSON & INEICHEN, supra note 373, at 19-77; Higgins & Tolman, supra note 373.




older, men's views that contraception is the young woman's responsi-
bility, as well as their attitudes of sexual entitlement, with which girls
go along because that's "just the way boys are. '375 In the face of such
circumstances, it seems inapt and unrealistic to suppose that teen fe-
males are making fully voluntary, "rational" choices.376 Feminists ex-amining such phenomena conclude that, to realize the vision of
women of all ages controlling their reproductive lives, "we must break
the cultural linking of masculinity with sexual dominance and feminin-
ity with sexual passivity and subordination. '377
Although male irresponsibility and power are factors negatively
affecting female agency, they are not the only reasons that women do
not have complete control over their reproductive lives. Adrienne
Rich's utopia entails not only freedom from rape but also the availa-
bility of entirely safe and effective birth control.378 As the plaintiff
welfare recipients claimed in the New Jersey litigation over the family
cap, many pregnancies to women on public assistance (like those of
other women) are unintended. Among the reasons for women's unin-
tended pregnancies are contraceptive failure and nonuse of contracep-
tion. Women's contraceptive experiences may reflect lack of access,
The notion they have the right to their own bodies is something that is completely
foreign to them.... Many of these girls have been in coercive sexual relation-
ships since they were 9 or 10 years old. By the time they get to their middle
adolescent years, they are so vulnerable to pleasing males, or at least to staying on
their good side.
Susan Chira, Educators Ask if All-Girl Schools Would Make A Difference in Inner Cities,
N.Y. TiMEs, Oct. 23, 1991, at B5. Other effects of female socialization include the desire to
be popular and to maintain relationships with males, and not to hurt their feelings. See
Marion Howard & Judith Blamey McCabe, Helping Teenagers Postpone Sexual Involve-
ment, 22 FAm. PLAN. PEPsp. 21, 22 (Jan./Feb. 1990) (reporting that in study of 1,000 sexu-
ally active girls aged 16 and younger, "teenage girls were most likely to indicate that they
wanted more information on how to say 'no' without hurting the other person's feelings").
375. See HUDSON & INEICHmN, supra note 373, at 31-36; ROSAuND POLLACK PET-
CHESKY, ABORTION AND WOMAN'S CHoICE: TmE STATE, SExUALITY, AND REPRODUC-
TrVEFREEDOM 226-27 (rev. ed. 1990).
376. Steinhauer, supra note 14, at A10; Whitehead, supra note 83, at 74; see also MARY
PIPHER, REVIVING OPHELIA: SAVING THE SELVES OF ADOLESCENT GIRLS 203-10 (1994)
(describing pressures on adolescent girls and the barriers to such girls making conscious
choices about sex). Indeed, one feminist study of British and American teens indicates
that younger pregnant teenage females often experience a disassociation from the sexual
activity leading to pregnancy to such a degree that they deny personal responsibility for the
pregnancy. See HuDSON & INEICHEN, supra note 373, at 47-48, 106-13. See also Tamar
Lewin, Boys Are More Comfortable With Sex Than Girls Are, Survey Finds, N.Y. TImEs,
May 18, 1994, at A20 (reporting that "81% of the sexually active [teenaged] boys said 'sex
is a pleasurable experience,' [while] only 59% of the girls said they felt that way").
377. Rhode & Lawson, supra note 79, at 8.
378. R.cH, supra note 363, at 132.
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ignorance, inattention, misplaced reliance on (mis)representations by
male partners, or deliberate choice (as well as the current imperfect
state of contraceptive technology).3 79 An analysis of why so many
pregnancies are unintended should also address the role played in
such decisions by the various constraints upon adolescent females' and
women's choices related to men's attitudes and behaviors that domi-
nance and other feminist theorists have identified.380 Obviously, in
any discussion of reproductive responsibility, assertions, often made
by teen females, that an unintended pregnancy "just happened" invite
closer attention to the capacity and opportunity for the exercise of
responsibility. 381 But such an examination should also ask these ques-
tions of men.
(3) Single Motherhood as a "Deliberate Choice"
In her recent book, The Neutered Mother, The Sexual Family and
Other Twentieth Century Tragedies, Martha Fineman argues:
Single motherhood as a social phenomenon should be viewed by
feminists as a practice resistive to patriarchal ideology, particularly
because it represents a "deliberate choice" in a world with birth
control and abortion. As such, the existence of single motherhood
as an ever-expanding practice threatens the logic and hold of the
dominant ideology.
3 8 2
Thus, Fineman would argue that there is often a subversive message
about a choice of female identity by a mother outside the structure of
the patriarchal family. As her reference to birth control and abortion
indicates, she posits some degree of control by women over their re-
productive lives. Similarly, Linda Gordon concludes that "a higher
proportion of single mothers today enter that situation with some de-
gree of volition-through ending a marriage or bearing a child with-
379. On the issue of men's representations as to their fertility, see BERRICC, supra note
85, at 68 (reporting that most of the women in her study "readily acknowledged that the
father of their child had assured them they were sterile").
380. See PETCHESKY, supra note 375, at 168-204 (discussing problems of contracep-
tion); see also KRISTIN LUKER, TAKING CHANCES: ABORTION AND THE DECISION NOT TO
CONTRACEPT 78-111 (1975) (arguing that women's decisions not to use contraception re-
flect a rational calculus, itself influenced by such factors as men's attitudes).
381. See POLiAKOw, supra note 353, at 79 (reporting that, of the teenage single mothers
she studied, "awareness and use of birth control methods were absent prior to their first
pregnancy, which seemed to 'just happen' to them"); THOMPSON, supra note 85, at 113-14
(reporting that "many teenage mothers tersely explained that sex 'just happened"');
Mireya Navarro, The Threat of No Benefits: Will It Deter Pregnancies?, N.Y. TiMEs, Apr.
17, 1995, at Al (reporting that "it just happened" was a typical explanation of pregnancy in
a study of first-time teenage mothers on welfare).
382. FINEMAN, supra note 12, at 125.
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out marriage. ' 383 However, differences based on income and in the
availability of contraception and abortion contribute to the higher
rates of unmarried motherhood among poor women.3 84 Dorothy
Roberts suggests that feminists should consider whether "deviant"
(single) mothers might offer a glimpse of "liberated motherhood" be-
cause they exist outside of patriarchal expectations of marriage and
challenge assumptions about family forms and proper female depen-
dency upon men.3 85
"Deliberate choice" may seem a strong word to apply to women's
reproductive and mothering decisions, especially if such choices flow
from or are affected by male irresponsibility or dominance. Feminist
analysis of motherhood suggests an interplay of "deliberate choice"
and constraint. Fineman's stance is certainly not incompatible with
recognizing constraints on choice. Indeed, she describes motherhood
as a "colonized" concept to stress the ways that patriarchal ideology of
motherhood shapes women's experiences. 386 The women Omolade
described apparently became pregnant in a consensual relationship
rather than setting out to be "single" mothers. But they then made a
choice to leave a problematic relationship, most often because of male
violence, in this sense rejecting norms of patriarchal authority.387
There are, however, other stories of single motherhood clearly signal-
ling a choice not driven by male power or irresponsibility. Consider
women who decide to adopt children or to bear a child outside of
marriage because they do not want to miss the experience of mother-
hood (one prominent example is the group Single Mothers By
Choice) and lesbians who form families.388
383. GoRDoN, supra note 220, at 34.
384. Id.
385. See Roberts, supra note 166, at 28-29.
386. FINEmAN, supra note 12, at 124-25.
387. See OMOLADE, supra note 354, at 88-89. See also Roberts, supra note 166, at 26-27
(criticizing William Julius Wilson's analysis in WILSON, supra note 179, of female-headed
families for failing to consider the "extent to which Black women have deliberately created
single-mother families by dissolving unwanted relationships in response to sexism in their
homes or other disadvantages of marriage").
388. In the aftermath of Quayle's "Murphy Brown" speech, the media featured many
stories of women, often in their thirties and forties, often white, in professional jobs, who
have not married and/or have not found the "right" man but do not want to give up the
experience of having a child and being a mother. See Marsha King, Single Motherhood-
There's A Boom In Those Starting Families on Their Own, Sa-rL TMns, July 30,1993, at
Fl; Smith, supra note 186, at El. Although they face continued discrimination, lesbians
have had some success in using adoption to secure joint parental rights for one partner's
biological child. See Adoption of Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315 (Mass. 1993) (interpreting Mas-
sachusetts' adoption law to permit two unmarried women in a "committed" relationship to
adopt one woman's biological daughter); In re Jacob, 86 N.Y.2d 651 (1995) (interpreting
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One strength of Fineman's stance is that it squarely meets the
rhetoric of procreative irresponsibility-on which account single
motherhood and "illegitimacy" are signs of immorality-by contend-
ing that single motherhood issues a challenge to patriarchal ideology
about the natural and proper family form. In Part II, I suggested the
role of gender ideology and the fear of female independence in this
rhetoric; a feminist rebuttal would further affirm women's choices
about different family forms, pointing to the strengths of such families.
Jane Mattes, founder of Single Mothers by Choice, suggests that men
who condemn female-headed families fear the beginnings of matriar-
chy and she challenges the empirical case against the single-parent
family with claims that children in single-parent families do well, and
perhaps even better than in two-parent families.38 9 Similarly, Omo-
lade challenges the equation of single-mother households with pathol-
ogy and social crisis and points out that most single mothers, although
they may weather many crises, ultimately hold their families together
and live free of male domination and violence.390 As discussed above,
Fineman also offers a powerful response to the charge of irresponsibil-
ity in the sense of unaccountability by calling for collective responsi-
bility for helping women meet the burdens of "inevitable
dependency."
C. Toward A Continuum Model of Agency and Responsibility
(1) Feminist Dilemmas: Agency, Victimhood, and Responsibility
A central dilemma in feminist work is articulating meaningful
conceptions of agency and responsibility without ignoring constraints
on choice or reducing selfhood to victimhood. If some feminists re-
gard liberal models of agency or autonomy as unrealistic to the extent
that they seem to assume unconstrained choice, they are also cautious
about offering a counter-analysis that ignores the ways in which wo-
men act as agents in their own lives. 39' These issues are vital to a
discussion of reproduction and responsibility.
New York's adoption law to permit adoption in case of unmarried homosexual or hetero-
sexual couple).
389. Mattes, supra note 95, at 29 (arguing, based on experience as a psychotherapist,
that "it is the parenting skills, rather than the number of parents in the home, that deter-
mines whether a child turns out well or not" and pointing to violence in two-parent fami-
lies to illustrate that such families are not always ideal). Single Mothers By Choice
newsletters indicate that Mattes has begun a fund for research along these lines.
390. OMOLADE, supra note 354, at 69-73.
391. See Kathryn Abrams, Sex Wars Redux: Agency and Coercion in Feminist Legal
Theory, 95 COLUM. L. Rnv. 304, 327-30 (1995).
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Kathryn Abrams has recently observed that, within feminist legal
theory, there are emerging critiques of dominance feminism attempt-
ing to elaborate accounts of agency. 392 One model that she explores is
"partial agency," which juxtaposes agency, or women's capacity for
self-direction and resistance, with often-internalized patriarchal con-
straint.3 93 Moreover, Angela Harris has done helpful work on the role
of will and assertion in the creation of self and has rejected an either/
or, racism/sexism, agent/victim analysis of women's experiences.
3 94
Feminist work in such areas as sexuality, mothering, and domestic vio-
lence also explores the interplay of choice and constraint.
3 95
Feminists in other disciplines have also argued for models of self
that acknowledge the impact of constraints upon choice, yet hold to
the possibility of meaningful agency. Such work often takes as a point
of departure the problems of patriarchy and subordination (or oppres-
sion) and the possibilities of survival and resistance.396 Seyla
Benhabib offers the idea of the "situated self" to acknowledge the
effects of social construction but to insist upon the importance to fem-
inism of a conception of women's agency, autonomy, and sense of self-
hood.3 97 Claudia Card argues that a central task of feminist ethics is
to identify the "possibilities for agency in oppressive contexts" and
consider such questions as "[w]hat does it mean to resist, to make
morally responsible choices, to become moral agents, to develop char-
acter?" 398 Similarly, Sarah Hoagland argues that "choice is at the very
core of the concept of 'moral agency' and that "it is because we...
choose from among alternatives" and "act in the face of limits" that
we are "moral beings. '399
392. See id. at 346-50.
393. Id. at 362-67.
394. Harris, supra note 358, at 608-15.
395. See Carlin Meyer, Sex, Sin, and Women's Liberation: Against Porn Suppression,
72 TEx. L. REv. 1097, 1126-29 (1994); Mahoney, supra note 358, at 237; Elizabeth M.
Schneider, Particularity and Generality: Challenges of Feminist Theory and Practice in
Work on Woman-Abuse, 67 N.Y.U. L. REv. 520,548-50 (1992). On motherhood, see infra
text accompanying notes 427-34.
396. This emphasis upon survival and resistance and the possibilities of articulating
alternative models of self and community is especially strong in lesbian ethics, in which one
salient source of oppression is heterosexism. See SARAH LUCIA HOAGLAND, LESBIAN
ETHIcs: TOWARD NEW VALuE 24-68 (1988). Similar themes of survival and resistance
amidst oppression are prominent in the work of feminists of color, who often experience
themselves as "outsiders" and as burdened because of sex and race. See, e.g., MoTimHRNG:
IDEOLOGY, EXPERIENCE, AND AGENCY (Evelyn Nakano Glenn et al. eds., 1994).
397. SEYLA BENHAB B, SITUATING THE SELF 202-30 (1992).
398. Claudia Card, The Feistiness of Feminism, in Feminist Ethics 3, 25-26 (Claudia
Card ed., 1991).
399. HOAGLAND, supra note 396, at 231 (emphasis omitted).
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An important question raised by this feminist work is how these
conceptions of agency and responsibility should translate to an analy-
sis of women's reproductive choices and to the realm of law and pub-
lic policy. Abrams observes that overly dichotomous constructions of
women as legal subjects lead to viewing them as either fully autono-
mous, and thus culpable and irresponsible, or powerless and in need
of protection and intervention.400 I have shown that welfare reform
rhetoric depicts poor women both as victims and agents, trapped by
perverse incentives, yet also as proper targets of punitive "tough love"
reforms to combat their irresponsibility (i.e., immorality, unac-
countability, and diminished capacity). Thus, one need not necessarily
be viewed as an unimpaired agent to be treated as one and held ac-
countable for "irresponsibility." Charged with treating women as vic-
tims, feminists face a formidable challenge in attempting to illuminate
the constraints on poor women's choices and their victimization and
how that should shape public policy debate.401 A related challenge is
exploring the extent to which women targeted as irresponsible are
making choices that they find empowering and in accord with their
conceptions of responsibility.
(2) A Continuum Model of Agency and Responsibility
The helpful guidelines provided by such feminist work suggest
that one can talk about agency and responsibility without a model of
unconstrained self-determination, but that one must be attentive to
the relationship between agency and constraint. Such an approach ac-
cepts the premise that the self is shaped by society, and that a wo-
man's identity is in part shaped by oppression, subordination,
discrimination, or socialization based on sex and gender, as well as
other defining features, such as race, sexual orientation, and class.
400. Abrams, supra note 391, at 374-75.
401. For some attempts, see Davis & Kraham, supra note 224; Lucie E. White, No Exit:
Rethinking "Welfare Dependency" from a Different Ground, 81 GEO. L.J. 1961 (1993); Wil-
liams, supra note 78. At a symposium on welfare reform held at Fordham University
School of Law on March 1, 1995, conservative scholar Lawrence Mead, following remarks
by Lucy Williams on the media's distorted treatment of welfare recipients and by Martha
Davis about the violence poor women encountered, said that Republicans get elected be-
cause of such victim stories. He maintained that the public rejects liberal and feminist
rhetoric that treats women as victims (even if such accounts are empirically correct) and
that it refuses to hold them to a standard of accountability (e.g., work requirements). Law-
rence Mead, Comments at the Fordham Urban Law Journal's Symposium on Urban Wel-
fare Reform: The 4th Annual Stein Center Symposium on Contemporary Urban Challenges
(Mar. 1, 1995).
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Examination of women's lives suggests that, rather than an undi-
luted image of woman as agent or victim, an adequate portrait of the
reproductive lives of women requires a continuum model. Such a
model would not treat the category "single mother" or "female-
headed household" as a monolith, but would begin with an assump-
tion that there is a spectrum across which women and female teenag-
ers experience the interplay of agency, responsibility, and
victimization in their sexual and reproductive lives. Factors such as
age, race, ethnicity, class, sexual orientation, and cultural and religious
beliefs will also likely be relevant to their location on such a spectrum.
Notions of deliberate choice as well as of limited or constrained choice
are important to such a continuum model.
For analytic purposes, it may be useful to distinguish several dis-
tinct occasions or opportunities for the exercise of agency and respon-
sibility within a woman's reproductive and mothering experience: the
underlying sexual activity leading to pregnancy (including use or non-
use of contraceptives); the resolution of the pregnancy; the relation-
ship between the woman and her partner; and the woman's mothering
role. Women may face constraints or subordination to varying de-
grees at each of these points. Thus, while a woman or a teenage fe-
male may experience a lack of agency or control concerning the sexual
activity leading to pregnancy, she may experience a greater sense of
agency and responsibility in her handling of the pregnancy and its out-
come.402 Or, while she may not initially intend to get pregnant, she
may then deliberately choose to become a mother. Moreover, a wo-
man may make deliberate choices concerning the relationship with the
father of her child, or her partner, that affect her status, that is,
whether she becomes a single mother, gets married, or gets divorced.
A look at two of the stories of the women in the New Jersey liti-
gation challenging the family caps suggests the range of experiences
that women have, and the ways in which issues of female and male
agency and responsibility shape women's reproductive lives and moth-
ering. One plaintiff, Q.A., describes her first pregnancy as resulting
from contraceptive failure despite using condoms regularly. Her boy-
friend promised that he would provide financial support for the child
but then did not, precipitating her reliance upon AFDC.403 Later, af-
ter the relationship ended, he raped her, leading to a second preg-
402. See Annette Lawson, Multiple Fractures: The Cultural Construction of Teenage
Sexuality and Pregnancy, in THE PoLTIcs oF PREGNANCY, supra note 16, at 101-25.




nancy. Ambivalent about abortion, she had a second child, now
subject to the family cap.404 Within this story are consensual and non-
consensual sex, male abandonment, and convictions about abortion as
causes of female poverty and reliance on welfare. Another plaintiff,
E.P., tells a story of consensual sex without contraception, free of
male violence. During a time of emotional distress over her son's sur-
gery, she had sex with the son's father, not thinking about the conse-
quences or that she might become pregnant.40 5 She was not regularly
using contraception because she was not in a continuing relationship.
She had religious concerns over abortion, still tried to have one, but
then could not go through with it.406 And so, she had a second child,
for which she receives no help from the father, and who is now subject
to the family cap.
40 7
Studies of the lives of women in poverty suggest the usefulness of
a continuum model, given the range of experiences of such women.
Although there are some common themes, such as the role played by
the sexually and financially irresponsible male partner, abuse by such
a male partner, or the reluctance to terminate a pregnancy by abor-
tion, there is also great diversity among the women who rely upon
AFDC.40 8 Those differences relate not only to reproductive choices
and behaviors, but also to the degree of agency and responsibility such
women manifest in other parts of their lives. In fashioning sensible
public policy, it would be useful to consider such a continuum in de-
termining the kind and amount of help women would need to leave
poverty. For example, in her book Faces of Poverty, Jill Duerr Berrick
suggests that at one end of the spectrum are large numbers of women
with "strong job skills" who "simply need welfare to tide them over
until their economic fortunes change. '409 At the other end are women
who, "owing to a combination of personal characteristics and environ-
mental conditions," have "many and great needs" requiring individu-
alized services.4
10
A continuum model may also be helpful in thinking about the
issues of adolescent pregnancy and motherhood. The rhetoric of re-
productive irresponsibility often collapses all single motherhood into
404. Id. at 6-9.
405. Affidavit of E.P. at 3-4, C.K. v. Shalala, 883 F. Supp. 991 (D.N.J. 1995) (No. 93-
5344).
406. Id.
407. Id. at 3.
408. See BERRICK, supra note 85.




one category so that adult women's reproductive choices are not dif-
ferentiated from those of teenage females, obscuring difficult ques-
tions about agency and responsibility among the latter. Such
reductive phrases as "children having children," which fail to differen-
tiate between younger teen mothers and the much more typical eight-
een or nineteen year old teen mother, not only lend themselves to
blanket assumptions about teen females' incapacity but also, some
feminists argue, may predispose public policy discourse to the charac-
terization of teenage females as victims rather than agents.411
Nonetheless, as discussed above, there is reason for concern
about the lack of agency and autonomy that many adolescent females,
particularly younger teens, appear to have with respect to their sexual
behavior and pregnancies, raising questions about the capacities of
such adolescents to make morally responsible and fully voluntary
choices. Pointing to the evidence of the extent to which such teens are
victims of sexual abuse, coercion, and pressure, and to the impact of
gender socialization upon them, is one important response to reduc-
tive models of why teens get pregnant and the punitive proposals now
at the forefront of welfare reform efforts. Studies suggest that other
significant factors affecting both teen females' and males' ability to
make responsible reproductive decisions are the lack of "future orien-
tation" and of a realistic view of the consequences of their sexual be-
havior, as well as "the barrage of contradictory messages about
contraception and responsible behavior emanating from the media,
schools, and sometimes parents. '412
Yet feminist and other scholarship suggests that some adolescent
females who get pregnant, continue their pregnancies, and keep their
children may be making rational choices from the point of view of
their own assessment of their circumstances.413 Their motivations
may include achieving the status of womanhood, securing a male part-
ner's commitment, pleasing a male partner, parent, or other relative,
opposition to abortion, wanting a baby to love, and, as we so often
411. See Pearce, supra note 16, at 46-47. Michelle Fine argues that approaches to teen
sexuality focusing only on a discourse of female victimhood, for example, sex education
programs treating sex as a source of danger and fear, and keeping out any discourse of
female desire, may serve to perpetuate, rather than to challenge, such problems. See
Michelle Fine, Sexuality, Schooling, and Adolescent Females: The Missing Discourse of
Desire, 58 HARv. EDuc. REv. 29, 31 (1988).
412. ALAN GurMACHER INsTrruE, SEX AND AMERimA's TEENAGERS 74 (1994);
Howard & McCabe, supra note 374, at 21.
413. See Pearce, supra note 16, at 46-58; Deborah L. Rhode, Adolescent Pregnancy and
Public Policy, in THE POLTCS OF PREGNANCY, supra note 16, at 301, 314-16.
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hear, wanting someone who will love them.414 Indeed, it is ironic, in
light of the themes in the rhetoric of irresponsible reproduction of
falling away from "family values" and marriage, that such adolescent
females often appear to be acting out a romantic dream of combining
sex, pregnancy, and marriage, only to be disappointed by the aban-
donment by their male partners.4 15
Poverty itself appears to play a causal role in such decisions, be-
cause poor teens may have an insufficient motivation to avoid early
parenthood and may view the opportunity cost of having a child while
young as lower than might young women in more favorable economic
circumstances. 416 Regina Austin suggests that "[t]eenage pregnancy is
a product of the teens' contradictory pursuit of romance, security, sta-
tus, freedom, and responsibility within the confines of their immediate
surroundings. '4 17 In thinking about a "black feminist jurisprudential
analysis" of single motherhood, Austin argues that young women's
sexual and reproductive decisions may be rational, defiant, and even
liberating under the circumstances, but all too often these decisions do
not have good outcomes for these young women or their children, and
that such young women need help critically assessing their goals and
the means they choose.418 Dorothy Roberts similarly urges feminists
to do the "hard work of distinguishing between self-destructive and
self-affirming behavior," which she acknowledges is "risky territory"
in the context of adolescent pregnancy, since it may be a response to
such circumstances as poverty and racial subordination.4 19 A contin-
uum model might approach this challenge by saying that such teens
are acting pursuant to an understanding of the good life for them, and
in this sense are morally responsible agents, but that we should seri-
ously consider whether the severe constraints that they face impair
their exercise of agency and lead to what may often be unwise choices.
414. See LEON DASH, WHEN CHILDREN WANT CHILDREN (1989); Linda M. Burton &
Carol B. Stack, Conscripting Kin: Reflections on Family, Generation, and Culture, in THE
POLITICS OF PREGNANCY, supra note 16, at 174-85.
415. For an illuminating study of teenage mothers along these lines, see THOMPSON,
supra note 85, at 109-42. See also ANDERSON, supra note 85, at 113-15 (describing poor
adolescent girls' dreams of "being carried off by a Prince Charming who will love them,
provide for them, and give them a family").
416. See DASH, supra note 414. Studies suggest that poor teens (disproportionately
teens of color) are far more likely than other teens to have uncontracepted sex, to become
pregnant, and to continue rather than to terminate those pregnancies. ALAN
GU-rMACHER INSTrI1UTE, supra note 412, at 64-72.
417. Austin, supra note 36, at 560. Austin draws upon ANDERSON, supra note 85.
418. Austin, supra note 36, at 561-64.
419. Roberts, supra note 166, at 29.
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A feminist analysis of teen pregnancy can acknowledge the nega-
tive effects that early motherhood can have on adolescent females and
their children, due in significant part to economic factors. 420 The
"personal responsibility" solution that Republicans advocate for teen
mothers in poverty is to remove the supposed incentives encouraging
teens to have a baby (e.g., AFDC, government-funded housing).421
Feminist scholarship about adolescent pregnancy and motherhood in-
stead concludes that the solution is to address the underlying con-
straints and circumstances that young women face in order to afford
them the opportunity for making better choices.422 Accordingly, com-
mon goals of efforts aimed at addressing teenage pregnancy are em-
powering young women with respect to making decisions about sexual
activity (virginity is reportedly making a comeback as a sort of defiant
counterculture), 423 motivating them to think about their futures (wit-
ness the prescription: "the best contraceptive is a real future"424), and
attempting to expand their opportunities. 425 Feminists would also aim
420. For such consequences, see RISKING THE FuTuRE: ADOLESCENT SExuALrrY,
PREGNANCY, AND CHILDBEARING 123-39 (Sandra L. Hofferth & Cheryl D. Hayes eds.,
1987); ALAN GutrmACHER INSTrrUTE, supra note 412, at 58-63. Teen mothers are more
likely than older mothers to need public assistance. Teens who drop out of high school are
among the long-term welfare recipients who face the most hurdles. See ALAN
GuTrMACH-nR INSTrruTE, supra note 412, at 58-59.
421. See supra Part II.A for discussion. Although empirical studies do not support
these claims about why teenaged females have children, see supra text accompanying notes
178-81, it must be acknowledged that some studies suggest that the availability of welfare
benefits plays some role in adolescent females' reproductive behavior. See ANDERSON,
supra note 85, at 134-37.
422. See Rhode, supra note 413, at 301-35; Austin, supra note 36, at 563-64. Clinton's
program to address adolescent pregnancy aims to afford "incentives for responsible behav-
ior," yet also observes: "Telling young people to be responsible will not be effective unless
we also provide them the means to exercise responsibility and the hope that playing by the
rules will lead to a better life." Work and Responsibility Act, Detailed Summary, supra
note 47, at 34.
423. See DeNeen L. Brown, Virginity Is New Counterculture Among Area Teens,
WASH. POST, Nov. 21, 1993, at Al (reporting on a growing group of self-described "vocal
virgins" who are proud of their sexual status and have banded together to maintain it).
Religious groups also promote virginity as a counterculture. Thousands of teenagers have
reportedly signed pledge cards in connection with True Love Waits, a virginity movement
arising out of the Baptist Church. Teen-agers Choose Chastity in a New Sexual Rebellion,
BALT. SUN, Sept. 24, 1993, at IA.
424. Malaika Home, Reading, Writing and Reproduction: The Teen Pregnancy Crisis,
CRISIS, July 1995, at 6, 36 (quoting Marian Wright Edelman of the Children's Defense
Fund); see also Special Report: The Baby Trap, supra note 16, at 56 (reporting view of
Michael Carrera of the Children's Aid Society Adolescent Pregnancy Prevention Program
that, "[Y]oungsters who feel that they have a future rarely become teen parents ....
Education, employment and self-esteem are the most powerful contraceptives of all.").
425. One of the model programs that President Clinton has praised is Postponing Sex-
ual Involvement Program, which stresses helping teens see their options and, through peer
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to help young women who do have children become responsible par-
ents and lead successful lives, supporting the provision of public assist-
ance to help them do so. For such young women, motherhood can
provide a transformative occasion for developing and exercising "re-
sponsible agency. '426
(3) Mothering, Abortion, and Responsibility
One source for formulating feminist paradigms of reproductive
responsibility and irresponsibility along a continuum model is feminist
work on mothering. In her influential book, Maternal Thinking, Sara
Ruddick describes mothering as a practice, "a kind of work" that
someone does when she responds to the demands of children.427
Fineman similarly speaks of what mothers do as a "specific practice of
social and emotional responsibility. ' 428 Patricia Hill Collins stresses
that the experience of mothering by women of color reveals themes of
responsibility for physical and psychic survival, not only of children,
but of racial and ethnic communities, and the interplay of agency and
constraint, resistance and oppression.429
Such feminist work on motherhood cautions against idealizing or
romanticizing motherhood. It recognizes that not all mothers accept
the challenges of responsible mothering.43 0 Moreover, it notes that
mothers often perform the tasks of mothering under less than optimal
conditions, including poverty, racial discrimination, and societal deval-
uation and lack of accommodation of mothers' work.431 Such con-
counseling, resist pressures for early sexual involvement. Jason DeParle, President to Cam-
paign Against Teen-Age Pregnancy, N.Y. TIMES, June 10, 1994, at A12. Recently, announc-
ing the National Campaign to Reduce Teenage Pregnancy, President Clinton stated: "We
have to work to instill within every young man and woman a sense of personal responsibil-
ity, a sense of self-respect, and a sense of possibility." John F. Harris, President Taps Foster
as Adviser: Obstetrician to Counsel on Teenage Pregnancy, WASH. POST, Jan. 30, 1996, at
A13.
426. See Sara Ruddick, Procreative Choice for Adolescent Women, in THE POLITIcS OF
PREGNANCY, supra note 16, at 126, 129. Berrick describes the successful journey of one
teen-aged mother from an irresponsible and reckless adolescence to responsible mother-
hood, assisted by AFDC. BERRICK, supra note 85, at 65-86. See also Pearce, supra note 16,
at 55-56.
427. SARA RUDDICK, MATERNAL THINKING: TOWARD A POLITICS OF PEACE 51-52
(1989).
428. FINEMAN, supra note 12, at 234.
429. See Patricia Hill Collins, Shifting the Center: Race, Class, and Feminist Theorizing
About Motherhood, in MOTHERING: IDEOLOGY, EXPERIENCE, AND AGENCY, supra note
396, at 45, 49-52. See also COLLINS, supra note 347, at 118-19, 123-29 (describing black
mothers' efforts to ensure the physical and psychic survival of their children).
430. See RUDDICK, supra note 427, at 28-40; FINEMAN, supra note 12, at 234.
431. COLLINS, supra note 347, at 133-37.
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straints add to the burdens of mothering and may impair women's
ability to exercise responsibility in the ways that they would wish.
Mothers struggle to balance their responsibilities to meet children's
emotional, physical, and material needs. When they are in poverty,
they face such added challenges as mothering on limited material re-
sources and protecting their children in physically dangerous housing
and neighborhoods.432 Valerie Polakow's portraits of single mothers
vividly suggests the material obstacles with which such mothers strug-
gle, often as a result of welfare rules and regulations.433 Given the
many tasks single-mothers must perform, it might be more accurate to
conclude that the problem with single-parent families is not that
mothers are irresponsible, but that they bear a disproportionate
amount of responsibility and receive insufficient help from fathers and
society.434 In thinking about responding to and refraining the current
discourse of irresponsible reproduction, examination of feminist ideals
of mothering as well as the actual experiences of mothering is very
important.
Another useful source in elaborating ideas of responsibility and
irresponsibility in the area of reproduction is feminist analyses of wo-
men's abortion decisions. One irony in the debate over irresponsible
reproduction is that the very reasons that single motherhood is viewed
as problematic (lack of second parent, lack of economic resources,
youth of mother, not ready for responsibility) are reasons that women
frequently give for choosing to terminate pregnancies through abor-
tion.435 Yet those same reasons are viewed by many as morally unac-
ceptable, according to public opinion polls about abortion.436 This
debate highlights the double binds that women face about their repro-
ductive choices. Pregnant women who decide to have abortions, and
therefore not to become mothers, because they are single, young, lack
economic resources, or lack an acceptable relationship with the father
are condemned as immoral and irresponsible, while women with simi-
lar life circumstances who decide not to have abortions, and therefore
to become mothers, are also condemned as immoral and irresponsible.
432. See Minow, supra note 333, at 829-30; White, supra note 335, at 851-53.
433. PoLAKow, supra note 353; see also THERESA FUNICIELLO, TYRANNY OF KIND-
NESS: DISMANTLING THE WELFARE SYSTEM TO END POVERTY IN AMERICA 24-53 (1993)
(discussing "the brutality of the bureaucracy").
434. See McLANAHAN & SANDEFUR, supra note 6, at 155.
435. See Aida Torres & Jacqueline D. Forrest, Why Do Women Have Abortions?, 20
FAM. PLAN. PERsP., July/Aug. 1988, at 169.
436. See PErrcHEsz',, supra note 375, at 352-53, 369-70 (citing polls on opinions about
the morality of abortion generally).
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To meet charges of irresponsibility and "convenience abortion," a
number of feminists have used "responsibility" talk in defending legal
abortion and in arguing that abortion can be a moral, responsible
choice.437 Feminist and other work on the abortion decision suggests
that a morally "responsible" decision to choose abortion may involve
a determination by a woman of her capacity to be "responsible" for,
or assume parental responsibility for, a new human life.438 And, by
implication, some women feel that it would be "irresponsible" for
them to continue a pregnancy in circumstances where a child would
not be nurtured and loved or a new birth would place burdens on an
existing family.4 3 9 Some feminist analyses have drawn upon the abor-
tion study by moral psychologist Carol Gilligan, who reported that her
female subjects asked "[i]n effect, whether it is responsible or irre-
sponsible, moral or immoral, to sustain and deepen an attachment
under circumstances in which [they] cannot be, for whatever reason,
responsible, and in which [they] cannot exercise care." 4 0 In abortion
litigation, "voices of women" amicus briefs have presented women's
narratives to illustrate that women exercise their moral responsibility
in making often difficult choices not to continue pregnancies. 441 As
437. See, e.g., Robin West, Foreword: Taking Freedom Seriously, 104 HARV. L. REv.
43, 79-85 (1990) (arguing that reproductive freedom should be based on responsibility and
rights). I have been critical of some of these attempts, in part because of their devaluation
of autonomy and in part because of the practical problems of persuading a larger audience
that women's decisions are morally responsible. See McClain, supra note 332, at 1244-56
(discussing the work of Robin West); McClain, supra note 119, at 150-72 (discussing the
work of West and Ruth Colker). Some abortion opponents have resisted the terminology
"convenience abortion" because it minimizes the real constraints that women face. See
McClain, supra note 243, at 169 (discussing Feminists for Life of America).
438. West, supra note 437, at 83-85 (asserting that most women's abortion decisions are
"made within a web of interlocking, competing, and often irreconcilable responsibilities
and commitments" and rest on a "responsible and moral desire to ensure that a new life
will be borne only if it will be nurtured and loved"). Cf. Torres & Forrest, supra note 435,
at 170 (noting that women who got abortions commonly gave as a reason that they were
not ready for the responsibility).
439. See GINSBURG, supra note 193, at 146-71.
440. Isabel Marcus & Paul J. Spiegelman, Feminist Discourse, Moral Values, and the
Law-A Conversation, 34 BUFFALO L. REv. 11, 38 (1985) (Gilligan, conversing). See
CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOIcE 70-105 (1982) (describing "abortion study" in-
terviews assessing how twenty-nine women constructed and resolved abortion decisions).
Over twenty years ago, in its amicus curiae brief in Roe v. Wade, the New Women Lawyers
organization argued that it would be "irresponsible" to have, and parent, a child for which
one was not prepared. See Motion for Permission to File Brief and Brief Amicus Curiae on
Behalf of New Women Lawyers, Women's Health and Abortion Project, Inc., National
Abortion Action Coalition at 14-24, Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (No. 70-40).
441. See Amicus Brief for National Abortion Rights Action League (NARAL), Thorn-
burgh v. American College of Obstetricians & Gynecologists, 476 U.S. 747 (1986) (Nos. 84-
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Peggy Davis argues, a decision whether to terminate or continue a
pregnancy is "a decision at the gates of responsibility for nurturing a
child to free citizenship and moral and personal responsibility."442
Indeed, some feminists explicitly use the language of motherhood
to suggest that women's abortion decisions might be seen as within a
continuum of mothering decisions, that is, that a woman's assessment
of her responsibilities and circumstances may lead her to conclude
that she cannot be a responsible mother.443 Accounts of women who
would be mothers if they could be often point to the lack of societal
accommodation of mothers and children (e.g., work/family conflict),
the negative impact of motherhood on women's equal citizenship, and
failures of collective responsibility4" As a defense of abortion rights,
this approach may have strategic risks because it implies, if not con-
cedes, that abortion rights are contingent upon current social condi-
tions.445 However, it may be a useful source in constructing a model
of the social preconditions for responsible reproduction.
Thus, the responsibility talk that emerges from such feminist
work on motherhood and on abortion suggests a broader notion of
responsibility and irresponsibility than simply whether one has or
lacks financial resources. There will undeniably be significant differ-
ences among women about the meaning and content of "responsible"
choices, reflecting their different moral convictions as well as different
circumstances. For example, some women who face unintended
pregnancies may lack the material preconditions for optimal, responsi-
ble motherhood, yet may believe that the only responsible choice for
them, perhaps because of their convictions (or those of others) about
abortion, is to have the child. The role that the rejection of abortion
as an acceptable option plays in single motherhood in circumstances
of poverty should be acknowledged as a further reason why family
495 & 84-1379); Amicus Brief of NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund and NARAL,
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, 492 U.S. 490 (1989) (No. 88-605).
442. Peggy Cooper Davis, Neglected Stories and the Lawfulness of Roe v. Wade, 28
HARv. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 299, 393 (1993).
443. See Julia E. Hanigsberg, Homologizing Pregnancy and Motherhood: A Considera-
tion of Abortion, 94 MicH. L. REv. 371, 373 (1995) (positing the view that "abortion, and
indeed all procreative decisionmaking, is about mothering in its broadest terms ... ."). See
also MacKinnon, supra note 362, at 1318 (characterizing women's abortion decisions as
those of "absolute realism and deep responsibility as a mother").
444. See West, supra note 437, at 85. Cf. Williams, supra note 105, at 1589-94 (describ-
ing moral reasons women choose abortion in the context of making pro-choice rhetoric
more persuasive).
445. See PETcHEsKy, supra note 375, at 388-401; McClain, supra note 243, at 173-75.
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caps are unlikely to steer reproductive behavior.446 Such women may
instead conclude that they are ready to nurture and love a child, and
then do the best they can to secure economic resources. Conversely,
women who have adequate economic resources may conclude for
other reasons that they are not ready for the responsibilities of moth-
erhood. Finally, in addressing broader social and economic factors
making pregnancy and motherhood unwanted, feminist responsibility
talk also points to collective responsibility for facilitating reproduction
and motherhood.
D. Responsibility and the Role of Judgment and Voice
(1) Judgment in Feminist Inquiry
An attempt to provide a more adequate framework for a public
conversation about reproduction and responsibility must address the
issue of normative judgment. Should we make critical evaluations of
reproductive choices and behaviors? Within feminist discourse, there
is an understandable impulse to protect women from vilification and
reductive critiques. One possibility, which I reject, is that the most
appropriate feminist stance is accepting and validating women's
choices and behaviors and protecting them from governmental inter-
vention and societal condemnation. Such a stance might entail the
view that no female reproductive choice was "irresponsible" and that
any and all reproductive and parenting choices by women should be
respected and be free from legal regulation or sanction. Indeed, crit-
ics of feminism often suggest that feminists refuse to hold women ac-
countable or morally responsible and do not draw moral
distinctions.447 Although some feminist legal scholarship may come
close to such a stance or lend itself to such a reading, I believe that
this stance exists mainly in caricature.
A second possibility, which I will endorse here as part of a contin-
uum model of agency and responsibility, is that there is an important
role for normative judgment and critical evaluation in feminist in-
quiry. Such judgment requires careful evaluation of women's lives,
choices, and circumstances, to gain understanding of issues of agency
and victimization and to formulate feminist models of responsibility
446. See discussion supra text accompanying notes 403-408; BERRICK, supra note 85, at
27 (describing "Anne's" unwillingness to have abortion because of religious beliefs).
447. See, e.g., KATIE RoIPHE, THE MORNING AFTER: SEX, FEAR, AND FEMINISM ON
CAMPUS (1993) (criticizing the hyperbole surrounding sexual harassment and rape discus-
sions on college campuses); see also supra note 401 (discussing Lawrence Mead's
comments).
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and the preconditions for agency. It also aids in responding to the
discourse of irresponsible reproduction and suggesting more responsi-
ble legislative reform and public policy. But there are important
threshold questions concerning the different contexts in which ques-
tions of judgment and critical evaluation arise and what consequences
flow from such judgment. For example, is it judgment by a friend, a
sister, or a member of a community, who is giving wanted advice
about the responsible choice, or is expressing disapproval of a choice?
Or is it made by a policy maker, or a public official, for the purpose of
facilitating, deterring, or punishing women's choices?
Feminists adopting a stance of critical evaluation may ask about
women's underlying decisionmaking and the mix of choice and con-
straint. Feminist ethicists who speak of the problem of "agency under
oppression" point to the key tasks of identifying the possibilities for
agency and of distinguishing "modes of resistance" that contribute to
women's survival from those that do not.448 Roberts similarly argues,
in the context of evaluating women's reproductive and mothering be-
havior, that feminist legal scholars should ask whether the behavior of
"deviant" or "marginalized" women may be read as "resistance," but
cautions that it is "extremely difficult" to discern "transformative po-
tential in what is basically a response to subjugation." 449 It is useful to
distinguish the question of how feminists might evaluate women's
choices and behaviors from the question of how laws might regulate
them. A feminist might conclude that while a reproductive choice is
not ideal, or even morally responsible, a coercive/restrictive legal re-
sponse is inappropriate. The reason for this conclusion may be con-
victions about human dignity and autonomy akin to liberal reasons for
rejecting paternalism, or it might stem from concerns about the linger-
ing sexism and racism of political and legal institutions.450 Most femi-
nists would likely prefer facilitative to punitive approaches and
instead would begin with a premise of respecting women's capacities
for moral responsibility, helping women to make the best choices they
can, and ultimately seeking to change their circumstances so that their
choices are not so constrained. Indeed, it would be useful to develop
a feminist argument for governmental responsibility to facilitate and
448. Card, supra note 398, at 25-26.
449. Dorothy E. Roberts, Motherhood and Crime, 79 IowA L. RFv. 95, 138 (1993).
450. See Ronald Dworkin, Liberal Community, 77 CAL. L. REV. 479, 484-87 (1989)
(offering a liberal argument against paternalism); Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Mar-
gins: Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L.
REv. 1241, 1257 (1991) (describing reluctance of women of color to report domestic vio-
lence because of racism in law enforcement).
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protect women's autonomy rooted in a conception of the material and
social preconditions for autonomy.
45 '
There has been a deep impulse in feminism, throughout its his-
tory, to engage in judgment or critical evaluation with a view to help-
ing women. Arguably, the role of consciousness-raising as a feminist
method yielding knowledge about women's lives reflects this impulse.
But, as applied to other women, a stance of judgment may suggest an
us/them or self/other relationship in which feminists attempt to inter-
pret the experience and voices of other women. Particularly when dif-
ferences such as race, ethnicity, and class exist, there are risks of
incomprehension and misinterpretation, as well as solipsistic use of
one's own experience as a measure or norm.452 The consequences are
exacerbated when the interpreter is in a position of power (e.g., to
prescribe policy agendas or to regulate the lives of the women under
interpretation). 453
For example, feminist historian Linda Gordon poses the paradox:
"Why was ADC [the precursor to AFDC], designed by feminists, so
bad for women and children?" 454 Two points she makes are pertinent
to the issues of judgment and critical evaluation and the importance of
voice. First, she argues that feminist activists diagnosed poor mothers
as requiring not only financial assistance, but also moral supervision to
451. Although I must leave this project for another day, a feminist argument along
these lines might build upon'Joseph Raz's contention that government has a duty to pro-
tect and promote conditions for autonomy. See JOSEPH RAZ, THE MORALITY OF FREE-
DOM 400-29 (1986).
452. A related problem is assuming commonality among women without adequately
investigating other women's experiences. On the problem of "essentialism" within femi-
nism, see ELIZABETH SPELMAN, INESSENTIAL WOMAN: PROBLEMS OF ExcLusION IN FEMI-
NIST THOUGHT (1988); Harris, supra note 358.
453. For example, Rickie Solinger's analysis of the sharply divergent treatment of
white and black single pregnancy from the 1920s into the 1960s reveals that women in the
helping professions played a prominent role in diagnosing and treating the problem of
single pregnancy. Preconceived diagnoses precluded assessing agency, rationality, respon-
sibility, and the meaning of motherhood from the perspectives of the women themselves.
Thus, while pregnant black single females were expected to keep their children and suffer
the social consequences, pregnant white single females were not regarded as mothers, but
were urged to relinquish their children for adoption. SOLINGER, supra note 168. As a
second example, Judith Walkowitz argues that in the nineteenth century, middle-class, "so-
cial purity" feminists who campaigned against prostitution could not understand the role of
sexuality in the lives of working-class women and fostered an image of female innocence
inadvertently lending support to such things as the Comstock Laws (which banned dissemi-
nation of birth control information as "obscene"). Judith Walkowitz, Male Vice and Female
Virtue: Feminism and the Politics of Prostitution in Nineteenth-Century Britain, in POWERS
OF DESIRE: THE PoLrrIcs OF SEXUALITY 419 (Ann Snitow et al. eds., 1983).
454. GORDON, supra note 220, at 289. The author also notes that ADC (as well as
AFDC) "has been constructive as well as destructive." Id.
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help them be good mothers, thus contributing to the design of ADC as
a program with strings attached in the form of scrutiny of recipients'
personal lives for signs of moral unsuitability.455 On the one hand, the
activists' vision reflected an egalitarian impulse that all mothers had
the potential to perform the vital societal role of rearing children to be
good citizens. On the other, Gordon suggests that, although some of
these mothers indeed may have lacked the skills or material resources
to be good mothers, differences in class, ethnicity (and later, race),
and ways of mothering contributed to the reformers' incomprehension
and critical judgment of poor women.456 Second, Gordon argues that
these feminist activists failed to inquire as to what poor women
wanted and to listen to their voices, which are lost to us today. In-
stead, they accepted the ideology of "maternalism," of women moth-
ering in the home, supported by men laboring in the market, or if that
failed, by the government, without promoting an ideal of female eco-
nomic independence (an independence that many activists themselves
enjoyed). 457 Gordon further suggests that black female activists had a
more realistic approach to women's economic independence, and that
white activists failed to learn from them. 458 She argues that the home-
maker-breadwinner model of welfare, which proved unrealistic even
then for many women and men, is inadequate today to help women
meet their domestic labor and wage-earning obligations.459 Gordon
concludes that "[tioday's welfare problems ... derive above all from
the political exclusion of those with the greatest need to be included:
the poor."460
An argument for the important role of judgment and critical eval-
uation should take such criticisms seriously. The problems of judg-
ment and of inclusion and exclusion have led to much attention in
contemporary feminist legal discourse to listening to women's voices
and attending to difference as well as commonality.46' In the context
of poverty discourse, some feminists have called for putting the voices
and experiences of poor women at the center, rather than the margin,
455. Id. at 28, 295-99.
456. Id. at 27-32. For a helpful analysis of this vision, see Mink, supra note 137.
457. See GORDON, supra note 220, at 135-36.
458. Id. at 141-43.
459. Id. at 306.
460. Id.
461. See MARTHA MINow, MAKINo ALL THE DIFFERENCE: INCLUSION, EXCLUSION,
AND A ERIcAN LAw 239-60 (1990) (considering lessons of reform efforts in Progressive
era for contemporary feminism).
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of welfare discourse.462 As applied to the discourse of irresponsible
reproduction, this method might lead to a re-evaluation of what is
branded "wrong," "irresponsible," or deviant, as well as to a defense
of women's moral reasoning as both different and important. For ex-
ample, as against the labelling of single mothers as immoral, unac-
countable, and incapable, I have suggested that feminist analysis
would attend to how the themes of responsibility feature in women's
reproductive and mothering experiences in order to fashion feminist
norms of responsibility. Moreover, as noted above, some feminist re-
sponses to charges of deviancy and irresponsibility contend that such
"deviant" mothers offer important challenges to patriarchal ideology
and problematic models of family.
Listening to the voices of single mothers, especially poor mothers,
brings out their own reactions to being labelled deviant and irrespon-
sible. For example, some poor single mothers who receive public
assistance strongly resent being used as scapegoats for such national
problems as the budget deficit. 463 Moreover, they express the view
that it is nobody's business why they made the sexual and reproduc-
tive choices that they did, arguing that they have a right to have chil-
dren and that they and their children have a right to survive. 464 An
inquiry into poor women's perspectives leads to asking such questions
as why are single mothers poor, and why are women generally at
greater risk for poverty? Is the problem these women's sexual and
reproductive choices? Or is it the practical and structural problems
that women encounter in attempting to be caretakers and providers
(sometimes exacerbated by the welfare system itself) in the absence of
the assumption of collective responsibility? Historically, the voices of
welfare recipients, who were a powerful force in welfare rights advo-
cacy, stressed that welfare was a women's issue because of all women's
potential need to rely on welfare and because stories told about wel-
fare mothers reflect society's stories about all women.465 Similarly,
taking on the current welfare reform discourse, feminist advocates
stress that "a war against poor women is a war against all women," for
whom welfare is "the ultimate security policy," and emphasize the
structural factors contributing to poverty and obscured by the rhetoric
462. See, e.g., White, supra note 335, at 851-56 (arguing that racism, stemming from the
increasing percentage of minority women on welfare, is largely responsible for this
marginalization).
463. See Woman to Woman: On Welfare Reform (CUNY television broadcast, 1994).
464. See, e.g., id.; Valerie Polakow, On A Tightrope Without A Net, THE NATION, May
1, 1995, at 590, 592 (quoting Karen Schaumann, a welfare rights activist in Michigan).
465. See Tillmon, supra note 199, at 50-52.
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of personal responsibility.466 Critical evaluation of women's lives thus
contributes to an insistence on a richer vocabulary of responsibility.
Listening to women's voices in an attempt to engage in critical
evaluation of issues of responsibility is not a panacea, but brings with
it the challenge of evaluating the complexity of voice and of women's
choices. Thus, even in feminist circles, some voices echo the current
rhetoric in criticizing women who have children when they cannot af-
ford them and urge that women take responsibility for their reproduc-
tive lives.467 Similarly, some present or former "welfare mothers"
support family caps, based in part on beliefs about why other women
have children.468 One plausible interpretation of this phenomenon is
the role of internalization of society's negative images of welfare
mothers.469 But it is also important to acknowledge the strong im-
pulse to use the vocabulary of responsibility to inquire about women's
reproductive choices and behavior and to attempt to establish feminist
norms of responsible choice. My argument here is that feminist work
on women's exercise of responsibility, deploying a continuum model
of agency and responsibility to frame such questions, would lead to
more complete answers and to better public policies than those cur-
rently promoted by the proponents of personal responsibility.
(2) Responsibility, Irresponsibility, and "Bad Mothers"
Inevitably, an appeal to normative judgment leads to the question
whether feminists should use such labels as "irresponsible" in evaluat-
ing women's choices and behavior. It may be instructive to consider
466. See Why Every Woman in America Should Beware of Welfare Cuts, N.Y. TIMES,
Aug. 8, 1995, at B7 (advertisement placed by Women's Committee of One Hundred).
467. For example, a recent article in Ms. magazine by a former welfare mother, jour-
nalist Rita Henley Jensen, Welfare, Ms., July-Aug. 1995, triggered a letter to the editor
inquiring why Jensen "failed to take precautions and got pregnant at 18 when she had no
support," why she was drawn to an "abusive" mate, and why she had a second child. Wel-
fare Debate, Ms., Nov.Dec. 1995, at 5. Another writer observed that we "avoid discussion
of the most difficult questions: Why do people have children whom they are not prepared
to support? ... How do we assist people in their time of need while holding them to high
standards of effort and responsibility?" ld.
468. Allan Luks, Advice From Welfare Mothers, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 24, 1995, at A23;
Isabel Wilkerson, An Intimate Look at Welfare: Women Who've Been There, N.Y. TIMES,
Feb. 17, 1995, at Al. As is sometimes observed, women on public assistance offer negative
judgments of, and manifest hostility toward, other women on welfare, favorably distin-
guishing themselves from other women, to whom they attribute many stereotypical behav-
iors. See, e.g., BERRICK, supra note 85, at 30-32.
469. BERRICK, supra note 85, at 30-32. See also Melinda Henneberger, Washington's
Bad Vibes: Welfare Bashing Finds Its Mark, N.Y. TIMEs, March 5, 1995, § 4, at 5 (describ-
ing how "welfare recipients have internalized the message").
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feminist work on what some feminist legal scholars have called the
problem of "bad mothers" and conflicts between women's interests
and children's interests.470 One strategy has been to offer stories of
such women's lives. But one question is what, exactly, would a femi-
nist re-telling reveal? That a woman is not an agent, and therefore not
culpable (or accountable) because not responsible (akin to dominance
analysis)? 471 Or is the point to suggest that her act is not as bad or
irresponsible as it seems?472 In other words, does the re-telling chal-
lenge assumptions about responsibility in the sense of agency or the
normative evaluation of the conduct or choice?
One point of such storytelling is to question diagnoses made in
terms of personal responsibility, or the lack thereof, by shifting the
focus to structural and institutional problems. In recent work along
these lines, feminist and poverty law scholars Lucie White and Lucy
Williams both have argued for a more contextual rendering of the
lives of women deemed irresponsible in order to reveal the psycholog-
ical and institutional constraints upon them.473 For example, White
challenges three common assumptions about how women can escape
"welfare dependency"-an education, a job, and marriage-by focus-
ing upon the experience of a female welfare recipient, "Elaine Pres-
ton," who describes herself as "just lazy. '474 White attempts to
demonstrate that these three avenues provide "no exit" and instead
are sites where welfare recipients experience institutionalized vio-
lence.475 She speculates about the relationship between such institu-
tional constraints and Ms. Preston's self-defeating and self-destructive
behavior.47
6
470. See Marie Ashe, The "Bad Mother" In Law and Literature: A Problem of Repre-
sentation, 43 HASTINGS L.J. 1017 (1992); Marie Ashe & Naomi R. Cahn, Child Abuse: A
Problem for Feminist Theory, 2 TEx. J. WOMEN & L. 75 (1993).
471. A difficult question about women's responsibility along these lines involves the
appropriateness of charging women battered by their male partners with the failure to
protect their children from their partner's abuse. See Schneider, supra note 395, at 550-57.
472. One disturbing example evidently intended to raise such questions is found in
FUNICIELLO, supra note 433, at 3-5. Welfare activist (and former welfare recipient) The-
resa Funiciello prefaces her indictment of the welfare system with a reported incident of a
mother attempting to drop her five children out the window of their apartment, resulting in
the death of one and the injury of another. The mother, a middle-class Muslim housewife,
was reportedly attempting to send her children back to Allah and planned to join them.
Funiciello speculates that the mother's behavior stemmed from her separation from her
husband and subsequent financial difficulties and that she "surely feared a descent into
poverty, alienation, and probably homelessness." Id. at 5.
473. See White, supra note 401, at 1970-71; Williams, supra note 78, at 1188-96.
474. White, supra note 401, at 1991.
475. Id. at 1975-90.
476. Id. at 1991-97.
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Williams demonstrates how the media seize upon and sensation-
alize stories of unrepresentative welfare recipients (e.g., mothers
charged with child abuse and neglect) as typical, which in turn distorts
public debate. Nonetheless, she notes that such recipients are not fic-
titious and urges a more contextual rendering of their lives. She does
not herself offer a full re-telling of the story of one such woman,
Clarabel Ventura, and does not attempt to defend or justify Ms. Ven-
tura's actions. She suggests that such a re-telling would require "the
intricate untangling of the multiple causes of pain, abuse, and
deprivation. ' 477
One conclusion to draw from both of these examples is that more
contextual, structural analyses of poverty and related problems should
inform, and improve, public policy.478 Such efforts serve a valuable
purpose in insisting that the emphasis in public policy discourse upon
personal responsibility should not obscure how social structure, in-
cluding law and policy, shapes and constrains the exercise of personal
responsibility. Indeed, storytelling about persons in poverty that is
not attentive to such structural causes may invite attention exclusively
to questions of personal responsibility and irresponsibility, thus feed-
ing into conservative rhetoric.479 But these feminist correctives may
run the opposite risk of going too far in the direction of either ignor-
ing personal responsibility or appearing to eliminate it as a meaningful
category, feeding into reductive criticism that those who oppose the
current rhetoric of irresponsibility view people purely as victims of
circumstances. 480 A continuum model of agency and responsibility
477. Williams, supra note 78, at 1195-96.
478. Williams points out that the Ventura story served in the Massachusetts legislature
to support cuts in welfare programs, with no attention given to strengthening child-protec-
tive services. Williams, supra note 78, at 1185-88.
479. See Michael Massing, Ghetto Blasting, THE NEw YORKER, Jan. 16, 1995, at 32-37
(making observation noted in text about recent quasi-ethnographic writing presenting nar-
ratives of persons in poverty, especially those in the inner city, and noting how these narra-
tives might support conservative viewpoints).
480. In teaching Professor White's article for the first time in my Law and the Welfare
State class, my own experience was that some students readily accepted the narrative as
demonstrating why it is hard for women to leave welfare, while a few were dissatisfied that
the author never discussed Ms. Preston's "real" problem-her irresponsible pregnancies.
In her portrait of Cora, a woman illustrating the stereotypical, but not typical, long-term
welfare dependent, Berrick concludes:
Observers from the left would say that she is a victim of circumstance, that she
was never given an opportunity to participate in the American mainstream and so
was made a social casualty by her environment, racism, a poor education, and a
poor family. Observers from the right would be equally justified in asserting that
she is an active participant in her dependency, that she abides by a different set of
standards for daily living, and her life is typified by disorganization and laxity.
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cannot provide easy answers to the question of how to engage in nor-
mative judgment and critical evaluation, but would attempt to avoid
either extreme in generating models of responsibility on which to base
public policy.
Conclusion
In this Article, I have offered an explication and critique of the
rhetoric of "irresponsible" reproduction that is prominent in public
policy discourse about family forms and welfare reform. Responsibil-
ity talk is pervasive in public policy circles, in the academy, and among
the public generally, and it is likely to be for some time to come. My
conclusion is not that we should abandon the idea of personal respon-
sibility, but that we should investigate more critically the deployment
of the categories of responsibility and irresponsibility in relationship
to welfare reform and reproductive freedom. I have analyzed the con-
trasting paradigms of responsible and irresponsible reproduction and
their asserted relationship to different aspects of irresponsibility: im-
morality, unaccountability, and incapacity. These paradigms are over-
and underinclusive, unduly focused upon women instead of men, and
undergirded by a problematic gender ideology and troublesome ste-
reotypes about welfare recipients. The assumptions about personal
responsibility and its absence and the models of human behavior and
reproductive responsibility at the heart of recent welfare reform ef-
forts are flawed, which in turn leads to flawed public policy proposals.
The appeals to personal responsibility as the cure to poverty, and the
reductive accounts of human motivation and agency accompanying
such appeals, ignore crucial issues of collective responsibility for alle-
viating poverty and for supporting the tasks of biological and social
reproduction. Moreover, as the conflict between the public policy
goals of deterring "illegitimacy" and deterring abortion illustrates,
there are serious internal tensions or contradictions about precisely
what constitutes procreative irresponsibility and what means govern-
ment should use to deter it.
If we seriously engage the idea that we-as a nation and as mem-
bers of diverse communities-should talk about reproduction and re-
sponsibility in the context of proposals for legal reform and public
policy, then we need a better basis for such a conversation. The cur-
Both observers would be correct. There are no simple reasons to explain why
long-term welfare recipients are poor, just as there are no easy solutions to their
poverty.
BERRICK, supra note 85, at 115.
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rent discourse labels as "irresponsible," "illegitimate," and deviant-
and deserving of stigma and social sanction as well as, in some cases,
harsh legal measures-the reproductive and parenting choices of per-
haps millions of members of our society. An assumption in much of
the rhetoric of reproductive irresponsibility is that a particular family
form-the marital, heterosexual two-parent family-is morally supe-
rior to other forms and best suited for important tasks of social repro-
duction. Too little serious conversation takes place, however, about
precisely what the functions of families are and how the state should
support and facilitate families in performing those functions. The ap-
peal to inscribe personal responsibility into law and policy raises sig-
nificant questions about what kind of responsibility government will
promote and who will be included and excluded from such campaigns.
I have suggested that current rhetoric stresses the need for responsi-
bility as accountability; insufficient attention is given to providing or
respecting the preconditions for responsibility as autonomy. As the
keen attention to steering the reproductive behavior of welfare recipi-
ents suggests, people dependent on government for the means of sub-
sistence may be more subject to and vulnerable to such campaigns
than other citizens, even though the rhetoric of irresponsibility at its
broadest implicates the lives of many other persons. This selectivity
warrants close attention.
I have argued that one way to critique and enrich that discourse is
to bring feminist analysis of issues of responsibility and irresponsibility
in women's reproductive and mothering experiences into the conver-
sation. Viewing the question of reproduction and responsibility
through such a lens illuminates missing dimensions in the current rhet-
oric and its models of human agency and responsibility. I have offered
a continuum model of agency and responsibility as a helpful frame-
work for thinking about the meanings of responsibility and the inter-
play of choice and constraint in women's reproductive lives.
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